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THE CRUELT Y OF THE CLASSICAL CANON 
We all strive to be.
(Something)
We all trust to believe.
(Someone)
And we all mourn.
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With this debut volume of Zetesis, the artists, philosophers, designers, 
technicians and scientists involved with this project and committed to an  
‘old fashioned’ kind of research ~ that which is generated by a curiosity and 
deep commitment to know (the whatever) ~ declare a new Daybreak. It is  
one that intends to take as a given, complexity and the irrational / imaginary  
in art and the sciences, physics and metaphysics, culture and its economies, 
skin and the pleasures of the flesh. It steps to the atonal rhythms of the 
mimetic patterns of camouflage and the flâneur. It aligns itself with the  
history of those who were (and remain) willing to ask and act upon this basic 
question: Supposing it could be otherwise, what would this otherwise look  
like, become, be, now? We want to say that however it would look, be, become 
(now), the journey to find out must be fuelled by experiment, rigour, and  
a willingness to risk.
We owe a strong debt of thanks to our past and present-day interlocutors, 
from the genealogists, libidinal economists, feminists and queer theory /  
practitioners to those dancing in, on, and with this new field of ‘wild science’ 
and its very welcome co-collaborator, the sensual. We also owe a strong debt  
of thanks to those who were and remain willing to take a (financial) punt on 
this possibly awkward, possibly bruised, blue-sky thinking endeavour: The 
Birmingham School of Art in particular and its wider platform, The 
Birmingham Institute for Art and Design at BCU along with the staff and 
student artists, designers, philosophers, technicians, web aficionados,  
research fellows and scientists who gave generously of their time, despite  
wider pressures cascading onto their already overworked work schedules. 
This is not a perfunctory acknowledgment to the School of Art at BIAD- 
BCU. For the academic, dare we say, intellectual world ~ and the universities  
that nourish its diversity, strident intelligence, playfulness and rigour ~ seems  
to have lost its way. This world, our world, challenged as it has been for the  
last decade or so with profound cuts in the arts & humanities, alongside  
a gluttonous appetite for all things STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, 
Maths), and topped with a seemingly wilful misreading of what constitutes 
experimentation, thinking, practice, indeed research itself, especially when it 
comes to art, philosophy, social science, culture, needs a bit of TLC (Tender 
Loving Care). 
So the journal and its future offspring, comes with a warning: be  
prepared to think outside the proverbial box, and to do so, slowly and with care, 
as if approaching an untamed but curious beast. As an aid memoire, we dedicate 
this, the first volume, no. 1 to questioning The Cruelty of the Classical Canon. 
Each intervention / contribution / design decision has been peer-reviewed with 
Preface
We Libidinal Economists! Daybreak, Version √2
members from an internationally and discipline-diverse advisory board. Some 
of the selected pieces support the classical canon; others reject it outright; still 
others try to strike a delicate balance between outright rejection and the appeal 
of its tried and tested repertoire. All have something to do with Nietzsche’s 
seminal text, Daybreak, Lyotard’s shout (demand), We Libidinal Economists! and 
the first discovered imaginary number, √2.1 It is up to you to decide which is 
which, and why. 




1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality (Cambridge Texts in the  
History of Philosophy), edited by Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003). Of particular interest, see Nietzsche’s remark: “We have to learn to think  
differently ~ in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently.” (103). As for 
libidinal economists, see Jean François Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, (London: Continuum, 2004),  
especially this remark in the chapter, ‘The Great Ephemeral Skin’: “I see you, Unkind One, smiling at  
the hoax played on me by the words of knowledge and capital, before I had even begun to speak.  
Let us love this farce, let us not fear it, let us say yes each time it requires us to (and it will require us to, 
and require us again) say what we have to say as libidinal economists… (16). And finally, the lovely  
mad imaginary number , one of the first or perhaps even the first of its kind, discovered on a  
Babylonian tablet approximately 1800-1600 BC (Y BC 7289). Like the Siren’s song of Ulysses, it sweeps  
anyone who tries to uncover its rationality into a torrent of proofs that can only prove (if it proves 
anything at all) its irrationality. But see in particular, David Flannery, The Square Root of 2: A Dialogue 
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Abstract: Representation is a canon as classic as it is cruel. Within a wider question 
about the logic of emergence of meaning, it seems very interesting to look at sense not  
as an a priori but as an aesthetic space (or event), where a distribution of the sensible 
does not happen without a simultaneous articulation of epistemological categories,  
and vice-versa. The article concentrates on this reciprocity, or inter-causality, to attempt 
a critique of the paradigm of representation drawing on Walter Benjamin’s work on 
technology and on Thomas Kuhn’s discussion of ‘scientific revolutions’, in order to 
analyse how moments of change reveal a ‘crisis’ where the shortcoming of the economy of 
such paradigm in engaging with the world become evident. This interdisciplinary 
approach merges questions from aesthetic and epistemological enquiries through the 
notion of emergence and feedback loop elaborated by complexity theory. 
Representation is a canon as classic as it is cruel. A critique of this paradigm 
can be attempted by drawing on Walter Benjamin’s work on technology 
and on Thomas Kuhn’s discussion of ‘scientific revolutions’, in order to analyse 
how moments of change reveal a ‘crisis’ where the shortcomings of such a
paradigm in engaging with the world become evident. This interdisciplinary 
approach merges questions from aesthetic and epistemological enquiries 
through the notion of emergence and feedback loop elaborated by complexity 
theory, proposing that the possibility of ‘making sense’, or establishing an 
economy, rests on a generative logic rather than the representation of an  
apriori meaning, and requires a reversal of temporality. Indeed the notion  
of crisis is directly linked to the paradigm of representation. Crises are  
not exceptional states, rather moments when incommensurable series, or 
discourses, converge and diverge simultaneously; they are paradoxical  
economies that escape a ‘restricted’ model and at the same time do not quite  
reflect a ‘general’ economy. In fact crises escape deterministic necessity  
entirely, they are ‘open states’ where there is simultaneously less, more, and  
else than what was expected in terms of value as well as meaning. 
Within a wider question about the logic of emergence of meaning, it 
seems very interesting to look at sense as an aesthetic space (or event) where a 
distribution of the sensible does not happen without a simultaneous 
articulation of epistemological categories, and vice versa. The argument 
concentrates on this reciprocity, or inter-causality, moving from the extinction 
of determinism brought about by complexity theory, and introducing a  
poietic form of temporality based on the feedback loop. It aims to show that a 
representational paradigm is the product of a misunderstanding of time in the 
relation between epistemology and aesthetics, and that this misunderstanding 
stems from the projection of a cause-effect economy that reflects a specific  
The Paradoxical Economy of Crisis:
“Crisis of Experience” and the Ana-Economy of Else







form of ‘enframing’, or paradigm, which inevitably enters a crisis when 
measured against change. That is, representation reflects an economy between 
sign and meaning (language-reality), a world organized around a cause-effect 
equation. From such a paradigm all interruptions or divergences from the  
zero-sum of the equation appear as a crisis. 
 
First Question: The Crisis of Experience 
 
When discussing representation, what are the differences and the implications 
occurring between the logic of reproducibility specific to production and the  
complex regime of emergence within networks? The problem is at least  
twofold: first it requires understanding technology not as a transparent  
vehicle, as neutral means to an end, but as a medium whose process of 
emergence generates language-specific and time sensitive dimensions, which 
install an ‘aesthetic space’; that is, a specific set of possibilities and limitations.  
This, in turn, eludes both the linear subject-object equation of production  
and the closed necessity of the causality equation for an open economy where 
something else emerges, an economy of the else without necessity. The answer 
can be approached moving from Walter Benjamin’s reading of modernity as a 
moment of crisis, in particular from his analysis of the concept of technology.1
Benjamin individuated a divergence between the existing order of things  
(culture) and the new technologies of modernity, which he tried to address via 
the necessity of the dialectical move. Yet, his analysis can be taken beyond 
dialectics. In Benjamin’s reading, “technology is the mastery not of nature  
but of the relation between nature and man; (…) in technology, a physis is being 
organized through which mankind’s contact with the cosmos takes a new and 
different form from that which it had in nations and families.” 2 This  
understanding of technology as a form of enframing, which, differing from  
Heidegger’s notion is intrinsically time sensitive,3 shows technology as a medium: 
1. The relation between technology and representation returns in several essays; here the  
main references are: Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”,  
in Illuminations, edited by Hannah Arendt, (London: Pimlico, 1999); Walter Benjamin, “To the  
Planetarium” and “The Author as a Producer”, in Selected Writings, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 of edited by 
M.W. Jennings, Harvard University Press, 1999; and “To The Planetarium”, in One Way Street,  
Vol. 1, respectively edited by M.W. Jennings, (Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press, 1999.)
2. Walter Benjamin, “To The Planetarium”, 487.
3. See Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”, in The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, edited by Joan Stambaugh and J. Glenn Gray, (London: Harper, 1977).  
For Heidegger, enframing (Gestell), is a form of “revealing”, a mode of existence, a distribution of the 
world that comes to light already organized in economic terms, what he calls “standing reserve”; it 
almost acts as the scene on which modern technologies take place. However, enframing differs from 
Benjamin’s analysis of technology insofar as it encompasses all technological phenomena and as  
such it is nothing technological.  
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not a neutral support representing meaning, but expressing specific sensual, 
political, and aesthetic properties. That is, engendering a language specific 
meaning, as Benjamin describes in his analysis of mechanical reproducibility. 
Technology thus becomes a place and a discourse at once, a set of dimensions, 
which requires and simultaneously generates a specific epistemology that is not 
absolute but, rather, is specific to the aesthetic space to which it refers. 
This analysis lies within a wider question regarding the possibility  
of preserving the integrity of experience, which Benjamin sought to explain  
merging neo-Kantian concerns about the validity of the traditional table of  
categories with the materialist concept of the forces of production as the motor  
of history; which in turn led him to seek to “dialectically redeem the concept  
of experience, by finding an appropriate way of experiencing the crisis of  
experience itself;” 4 that is from inside experience escaping the a priori of the 
Kantian architecture. In this move the symmetry between transcendental 
forms of knowledge (epistemology) and experience (aesthetics), or subject and 
object, was already broken. Modernity as a moment of change is, for Benjamin, 
experienced as a crisis: a dichotomy between the old (existing social relations 
and traditional culture) and the ‘new’ (the potential implicit in technology). 
New forms of technology allow for, or have the ability to engender, values 
different to those expressed by traditional art / culture. 
First Question Again
Following Benjamin’s method, yet not his conclusions, one should ask how is it 
possible to address the crisis of experience from within experience; that is, 
retaining the phenomenological and materialist angles of the question while 
abandoning the necessity required by the dialectic move. Indeed, according to 
Benjamin the crisis stems from applying the wrong politico-epistemological 
structure to the present, in fact from the very application of an external theory 
onto history. Benjamin had defined the Kantian organization of the sensible in 
the transcendental aesthetic a ‘mythology’, based on the assumption or 
projection of a separation between subject and object.5 Where does this leave 
the relationship between experience and reason? Is the present forced into 
representing the architecture of epistemology? There appears to be an 
incommensurable gap between the ephemeral forms of becoming and the  
 
 
4. “Walter Benjamin”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition),  
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/benjamin/>.
5. Walter Benjamin, “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy”, in One Way Street, Vol. 1  
of Selected Writings, edited by M.W. Jennings, (Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press, 1999), 103.
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transcendental forms of knowledge, which requires abandoning the opposition 
thesis-antithesis in favour of a different approach.6
Benjamin identifies a paradigm shift in the emergence of a new technology, 
which throws all expectations and projections about the world into a  
state of crisis; the crisis of an epistemology / ideology that can no longer 
support the a priori distinction between subject and object of knowledge, or 
sign and meaning as its paradigm. Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of the behaviour  
of scientific paradigms helps to unravel the notion of crisis beyond the  
impasse reached by Benjamin’s dialectical / messianic approach.7 In Kuhn’s 
argument science does not proceed by accumulation of knowledge, but  
through shifts of representational models of the world, where anomalies  
diverge from the paradigm until they appear as counter instances to the 
paradigm’s very principle. While paradigms are projected as stable, anomalies 
revealed as counter instances are a moments of disorder and refloating where the 
established categories of a culture (its self-representation) appear no longer  
apt for the task of organizing the experience of the present. That is, the 
ontology of the wrong state of affairs leads to a crisis of expectations. But  
how did thought come to misrecognise the things it hoped to theorize? 8 
An ontology not of being but of becoming, throws a transcendental 
epistemology into a paradoxical state. In a paradigm shift ontology becomes 
unstable, yet it does not enter a process of sublation and synthesis with  
experience, rather it abandons the old paradigm (the past) for something  
else, without deterministic or economical equivalence. The absolute 
architecture of the forms of knowledge that Benjamin criticizes in Kant stems 
from the past becoming fossilized and assuming a position external to the 
present.9 That is, pretending to explain change from an external point of 
observation not affected by it; a static position of being preserved from becoming, 
which projects and claims a hierarchy for its exclusive privilege, that of a 
metalanguage describing reality and ruling over it, thus perpetuating a  
metaphysical structure. The problem is to develop a logic that is not ‘applied to’ 
realty as a transparent theory (representation), and that does not engender a 
reading of reality already structured by its projected representation; but also  
 
6. On this regard Laruelle proposes to distinguish a regime of ‘modernity’, one that always  
refers to a metaphysical code to which all reality must be related, from a ‘contemporary’ regime,  
which opens philosophy to reality requiring continuous redefinition. François Laruelle, “Towards a  
Philosophy We Can Deem Contemporary,” Paper presented at the Swedenborg Society, (London,  
May 9, 2012).
7. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago  
Press, 1962).
8. I am indebted to Dr. Mark Walker for this comment during several conversations.
9. Benjamin, “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy.”  
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a logic that avoids the abyss of circular deferral produced by the returning 
‘always-already’ introduced by postmodernity.
What is required is a move that does not foreclose the heterogeneity  
of the present and keeps practice and theory in a reciprocal relation of  
inter-causality. The question then is one of method: how can the integrity  
of experience be preserved, without rejecting the possibility of thought?  
Can the notion of feedback loop at play in complex systems be adopted as the  
logic of cohesiveness that generates meaning in the present, as synthetic but 
without necessity?
The ‘suspension of the epistemological presupposition’ of the neo-Kantian 
/ phenomenological move opens the way for a regime of simultaneous 
converging and diverging serializations (technologies diverging from the 
existing epistemology and converging onto new discourses), which does not 
follow a teleology but synthesises retroactively, thus reversing the notion of 
temporality. While in representation there is a circular argument at play, which 
prevents understanding how meaning is established, serializations are 
heterogeneous regimes of emergence that escape the organization of the 
homogeneous code installed by a universal economy. That is, a crisis is no  
longer an exception to the equilibrium of the paradigm, rather it is intrinsic to 
the state of the present; the irreconcilable relation between converging and 
diverging series. These must not be mistaken for the traditional partition that 
keeps thought, epistemology, and the transcendental on one side and sensible 
and history on the other; a partition that implies that it is technology, or 
history, which diverges from epistemology and ontology. On the contrary, in a  
moment of change / crisis the emerging of new questions or distributions is  
not exclusively coming from the side of the sensible / experience; the ‘new’  
can be a conceptual space as much as an sensual space. Indeed, it is not only  
technology, or experience, that ‘runs ahead’ and re-launches the questions of 
the paradigm in a new direction, as the materialist tradition proposes,  
rather it seems that it is the very logic of thought, when presenting itself as  
theory / epistemology (converging, defining, and closing), to be upset by  
escaping divergent series. Thus in a crisis the passage is from the anomaly  
of an epistemology in a paradoxical state, to an ana-economy, not in self-
contradiction and in need of solution, but simply open. 
But there is more. Beyond the first level of ontological instability, as  
Kuhn indicates, different paradigms install different sets of aesthetic- 
epistemological dimensions (aesthetic spaces), engendering specific questions 
for specific problems. They are incommensurable and irreconcilable.  
Proximity or simultaneity of paradigms does not guarantee a translation.  
There is no bridging between paradigms, only replacing. The lack of a space  
‘in between’ is exactly where the crisis lays: the impossibility of an economy  
to engage with an open state, the morphing of an open present. 
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The question must be pushed past a linear oppositional logic between separate 
models of thought. A crisis is experienced because simultaneous divergent 
series are irreconcilable. Indeed, Kuhn points out that the passing from the 
stable state of a paradigm (normal science) to the next happens while the 
paradigm is in function, throwing science into an extraordinary state. The 
traditional ‘in between’ must be seen instead as a moment of differentiation;  
not A and B (or A=A for this matter), but now and open, the open present.  
The crisis is indeed the impossibility of smooth conversion; the lack of a third 
place between paradigms; the absence of an external or absolute code that 
permits the translation-transmission of information. There is no possibility of 
translating tradition into modernity, or analogue into network whilst 
preserving the previous capabilities and values, the equation is incomplete:  
it is just (x), the present, and openness. Normality (stable paradigms) borders 
the open. The extraordinary is a moment of divergence, not a third place on 
the background of two ordinary paradigms; it does not constitute a dualistic 
alterity with normal science. Rather it is the paradoxical state where the whole 
distribution of the sensible and epistemology must be reconfigured, the 
horizon where the present appears as a finite and yet unbound surface.
What then is the place of difference? It is necessary to ask what happens 
between the open and the dimensions of the universe of meaning. Is the  
open simply void? If the crisis must be addressed from inside experience, the 
event must have all of its causes and possibilities inside what happens, not  
elsewhere. If the open is just the returning of difference, difference must be 
part of the event; not outside, not something else, but the very lack of  
boundary to the happening of the event.
The technologies and discourses that reciprocally expand and articulate  
in the present are the dimensions of its identity; an instrument is nothing  
but a set of limitations (folds / dimensions), an absolutely smooth space would 
not allow any meaning to emerge. Rather than an economy between signifier 
and signified (or language and the world) sense emerges from the play amongst  
the possibilities of the very technologies in action, their abilities, and the  
conceptual space opened by discourses,10 in an internal (restricted) economy  
whose values and meaning coincide with its grammar,11 This is an immersive 
10. Samuel Weber draws an interesting link between Benjamin and Derrida: iteration, the ability 
of a given technology to engender repetitions, becomes the motor that sets possible patterns in motion, 
allowing sense to take place. See Samuel Weber, Benjamin’s -abilities, (Cambridge, M A: Harvard  
University Press, 2008), 3-19.
11. In Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein describes meaning as grammar: the play of a language 
not representing an external sense, but whose only denotation is the working of its internal rules. In 
other words the rules of language constitute the dimensions of its aesthetic space, effectively showing 
that a language is a technology and conversely that technology is a language. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Grammar (Berkley: University of California Press, 1974).
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logic, which eludes the necessity of an external signification, and shows  
that technology is a discourse as much as discourses are sensual; the sensual  
as dimensions of meaning. 
The First Real Question: The Now, Retroactivity and Time 
Rather than concentrating on the dichotomy between aesthetics and  
epistemology (or technology and ideology) the focus should be the logic of 
emergence in the event: if the epistemological and aesthetic dimensions are 
generated in the event and if their logic is internal to it, that is, if 
epistemological and aesthetic dimensions coincide and expand in the  
extension of the event, then what happens to time? 
Indeed, production and generation are divergent logics: the first follows  
a linear separation of subject-object in a process of accumulation, while the  
second is the result of a ‘complex’ move: the emergence generated by complex 
interactions whose properties were not implicit in the previous state of the 
system; a network logic, whose primary mode of operation is to open new  
links where there were none. This, rather than implementing pre-existing 
values, implies a retroactive form of synthesis based on a regime of reciprocity 
without the determinism of a linear cause-effect economy between discourses 
and practices, or between epistemology and aesthetic; a move not growing  
from an origin, but always from the ‘now’ (the present). The teleological  
linear time of Benjamin’s expectations is here abandoned for the present as  
a moment of open transition. 
If for Benjamin “the present is defined as a time of crisis and transition,  
and philosophical experience (truth) is associated with the glimpse within  
the present, via the past, of an utopian future that would bring history to an 
end” ,12 this retaining the past into the future with a sublating synthesis  
postulates a teleological timeline where the present acts as a step in function  
to an end; ‘standing in’ on behalf of the future, representing it, effectively  
installing a economy between the past, the now, and what is yet to come. 
Whereas a process of emergence rather than containing these steps, reassembles 
the present into a new surface, in a process where statistical probability replaces 
necessity. Such emergence, a serialization or extension of patterns, is still 
mediation but retroactively, recognized as synthesis only from inside its  
specific dimensions once they are installed. Such new surface escapes both 
determinism and teleology and is incommensurable with the previous state. 
Here probability is not a time to come or a set of options to choose from,  
 
12. Zalta, “Walter Benjamin”, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/benjamin/.
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but openness. Emergence is the generation of a logic internal to the event, an 
event that takes place each time in different ways.
This implies an ecological move from teleology to a positive form of 
enframing. The redemption of experience that Benjamin sought cannot happen 
without a simultaneous reorganization of the forms of knowledge. That is, the 
logic of an event is the reciprocal organization of the distribution of the 
sensible and the articulation of epistemology in the extension of its dimensions. 
Here the enframing turns positive, it is an affirmative expansion of dimensions 
without ‘outside’; the ‘clearing’, the coming into light of an horizon as the 
organization of the world, no longer constitutes a simultaneous concealing 
move, because all references to authenticity are abandoned if favour of 
emerging surfaces. Moreover, if for Heidegger a horizon conceals the authentic 
relationship to Being, which as authentic is also unique, an open present, 
which expands from the reciprocity and simultaneity of a complex logic, does 
not need to rest on a ‘ground’, on the contrary its being ‘open’ implies a 
plurality of possibilities of arrangements and distributions. The heterogeneity 
of probability supersedes linear necessity; other possibilities, other universes 
are not affected by the happening of the present one. The topical logicof 
cohesion of surfaces is an ecology, a constant re-distribution of an open 
equilibrium.13
The present as crisis, the ‘now’ is open. In an environment where time is 
not an arrow travelling from the past into the future (or ‘present is not the  
future of a past’, as Deleuze put it) and the synthesis of serialization is  
retroactive, the present is always a state of crisis. The emergence from complex 
interactions figures as crisis, since it changes the self-representation of the  
existing order of things without ‘calling time’. It rearranges the present into a 
new paradigm, rather than answering previous questions. Thus the crisis is 
more than the impossibility of determinism, or unpredictability, it is  
heterogeneity seen from inside the paradigm of homogeneous representation. 
Therefore a paradigm is an ‘aesthetic space’ (an articulation of the sensible 
and of epistemology), a topos; it has inner dimensions, which it has generated 
and it is constantly reaffirming. A paradigm acts as a restricted economy, whose 
values and exchanges are valid and limited only to its internal dimensions. 
Such economies are the internal or ‘normal’ side of the paradigm; they require  
a denial of the possibility of a critical state. Crisis instead is that which cannot 
be calculated, represented inside the existing system; it is the extraordinary  
 
13. Regarding the notion of ecology, see Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitiques 2, (Paris:  
La Découverte, 1997).
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moment opening onto the ‘sovereign silence’ of a general economy,14 where 
incommensurability and heterogeneity are interrupting the equation. 
In passing from a restricted economy (of cause-effect, thesis-antithesis,  
sign-meaning, built around a “=” sign resolvable in a “zero sum” ),15 to a general 
economy where something is lost for the lack of outer boundary, there is a  
paradoxical economy, which yields a different value (else) than the one expected; 
a crisis that indicates loss and gain, waste and value at the same time, yet not 
symmetric, but divergent, incommensurable and therefore irreconcilable.  
As such the crisis exposes the limits of representation. The equilibrium of a 
new ecology is an economy of the else, or ana-economy. 
The crisis of experience is paradox rather than antithesis. Crisis is not an 
antithetic moment that lacks a synthetic solution, nor a matter of passing from 
state to state, but the moment of the same redistributing its dimensions. It is 
the paradox of a ‘thesis / now’ that changes without passing through an 
antithesis. Divergence reconceptualises the notion of crisis as de-territorializing  
while re-territorializing in a different direction. The paradox is not a return to 
a Humean scepticism, rather it stems from attempting to describe becoming 
from the point of view of being.
Paradoxes must be seen as moments of divergence and simultaneity.
Indeed, the simultaneity of series in the paradox conceals a remixing, which is 
the operation of a feedback loop. In this returning the ‘next round’ will be 
different; that is, divergence taking place while still converging, yet converging 
differently each time, or converging as difference.16 Kuhn had already seen this: 
“the decision to reject a paradigm is always the decision to accept another”.17 Out 
of the volatility of a delta of interpretations in a crisis only comes the 
restructuring of the question; a new ‘fold’, in the state of affairs, non-linear and 
non-necessary. Problems do not find synthetic solutions; rather they are 
superseded by new problems via a re-alignment of epistemological and aesthetic 
dimensions. A crisis is end and beginning at the same time, series diverging 
and converging on the same surface, in the same body-word. In the crisis the 
feedback loop generates new economies whose values are not measured against 
an absolute background but only internally. These are retroactive synthesis, not 
completions but the cohesion of a new ecological distribution / equilibrium, 
recognized as synthesis a posteriori, that is, only once they are installed. 
14. See Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy, an Hegelianism without  
reserve,” in Writing and Difference, (London: Routledge, 1967).
15. The concept of “zero sum” has been introduced by Prof. Sue Golding during a cycle of  
seminars in 2010-2011.
16. See Gilles Deleuze, “Nietzsche,” in Pure Immanence; Essays on a Life, 1965 (New York: Zone 
Books, 2001), 53-101.
17. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 77.
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Therefore the anomaly is not the moment of crisis, but the economical 
representation of reality. In fact, the present is an open state or ana-economy 
where the incommensurable else emerges. This leads to another question:
 
Second Question: Dimensions, Dirty Passages and the Logic of Elsewhere
How passing from one paradigm’s dimensions to another paradigm’s  
dimensions takes place? If the open equation of a ana-economy installs  
incommensurable dimensions each time it returns, what happens when one 
paradigm is reconfigured into another? While ‘sovereign silence’ is the  
ultimate ana-economy, do local shifts retain some continuity or each shift  
drifts off into the infinity of the extraordinary?
 The work of the feedback loop appears to be fuzzy. If experience  
cannot be ‘reduced’ to an absolute / transcendental code (that of a pure text, 
information code, or commodity); if there isn’t an a-priori equation that  
permits a complete and even economic exchange, nor a clean and clear  
demarcation, then the passage will always be dirty, breaking edges, wasteful 
and mismatching, wasting potential, not matching every plug, USB, or shape;  
Wand at the same time it will require more and generate else than that which 
the previous system’s dimensions could offer as potential or permit as limits.  
This breaking and meeting of different dimensions of meaning, is then as 
wasteful as it can be generative. Indeed, the crisis is not forever lost in a  
paradox; rather the emptiness of the sovereign silence of a general economy  
is the condition for the circulation of the feedback loop. The economical logic 
reconfigured as ecology shows a new distribution as open distribution, and  
the present as a state of disequilibrium. Yet, this does not make openness  
a resource as negativity is in Hegelian dialectic, nor it represents any form of 
dualism, rather it is the plain lack of the boundary of necessity. Ecology is the 
open equilibrium produced by change within the same and resting on 
disequilibrium; while productive and wasteful, it is always affirmative, poietic;  
it ‘makes sense’ (as Kuhn stated, there is no abandoning of one paradigm 
without already adopting another). Instead of a process of production based  
on cause-effect linearity, the ecology of a network is a matter of emergence;  
its logic is internal to the event, based on the event’s dimensions and 
articulating them at the same time. Identity, the surface, is synthetized / 
mediated in the present as ecology: an emergence of the present in the present  
(this is not to say that historical crisis are necessarily painless, ecologies are  
not a happy Disneyland parks but entangled redistributions).
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The present is open, in disequilibrium between time and chaosmos.18 If  
epistemology is the representation / projection of a world of Being, inevitably  
it will run into a crisis when encountering unexpected data that refer to 
Becoming. Deleuze introduced the concept of chaosmos to indicate what is 
outside the organized linearity of this time-universe. Yet, chaosmos is only 
probability, not virtual or future to come, an open present; it implies a  
non-linear, non-teleological time being created in the passing from chaos to  
order.19 The present is the heterogeneous moment where chaos and order  
coexist; a frontier between the organized / determined past (time) and chaos, 
which just for ease of description is called future. The open present is non  
representational and non economical (representation would be a present that 
must become future, or a future that must happen). Crisis is universality’s  
inability to calculate multiversality, where the economy of past-future,  
energy-entropy, is always broken / open; in fact it was never whole. It does not  
yield what it was expected to produce in the past and at the same time it is  
generating something that the past had no necessity for, something that was 
not implicit in it. The feedback loop between order and chaos generates  
something new without necessity; in it, the present and time are generated 
together retroactively. Moreover, here the open is not the postmodern  
lack of ground, or infinite deferral, or the ‘always-already’ of a trace. It  
completely reverses the Cartesian deterministic mechanicism, without  
reintroducing void in the equation. Therefore, a crisis of experience requires  
a phenomenology directed not towards the ‘thing itself’, but towards the  
present: a phenomenology of the surface.
The paradigm shift is a heterogeneous ‘portmanteau’ moment for  
different series, a domino turn where one tile allows several simultaneous 
different directions, a crossroad of practices; it escapes or exceeds the existing 
paradigm, which produced the existing logic. In it incommensurability is the 
logical chaos between probability and time. In the heterogeneous paradox  
of divergence shifts are progressive nuances or messy crushes, not translations. 
Moreover there is no original state from which divergence moves, or a state of 
nature, or total noise; the event of sense is the crisis of another sense. One is 
always already immersed in language, one learns to speak and think while 
learning the dimensions of language / grammar.20 
18. Gilles Deleuze, “Series 24,” The Logic of Sense, trans Charles Stivale (London:  
Continuum, 1990). 
19. Ilya Prigogine & Isabelle Stengers, From Chaos to Order, (London: HarperCollins, 1985). On 
this regard John Gribbin’s notion of multiverse is also interesting, in particular the description of time 
/ entropy in the second law of thermodynamics: without irreversible changes in the system there is no 
‘passing’ of time. See also: John Gribbing, In Search of the Multiverse, (Penguin: London, 2009).
20. See Lyotard’s critique of St. Augustine’s semiotic theory, in François Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
trans Iain Hamilton Grant, (London, Continuum, 2004), Chapter 2, 43-94. 
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The new surface generated by the simultaneous converging while  
diverging is in excess of an economy; converging-diverging act as vectors  
‘pulling’ in different directions from one point, which is not a centre at  
rest but is created by these tensions between disequilibrium and probability. 
These simultaneous movements generate time / space rather than being  
located in them. Interestingly Althusser had already approached the event  
of revolution as a critical threshold where the simultaneous alignment  
of several different segments or variables at their critical level of intensity  
generates change;21 yet, in spite of the similarity, topological emergence takes 
place without the support of an external timeline; in fact the synthesis a 
posteriori of complexity logic installs an aesthetic temporality which is a poietic 
form of time. Multiple vectors and disequilibrium create time and space. 
Indeed, heterogeneity escapes economies not on the background of time, 
but in making time. The passage between economy and economy exposes  
the open general economy or openness that (ana)envelops them. The present  
/ meaning is tangent to chaos, an extraordinary moment of quantum openness,  
which clashes with the paradigm of determinism and representation. It is not a  
matter of a leap into ‘nothing’, rather just reaching the ‘end’ of one paradigm’s 
set of dimensions. That is, the logic of becoming is internal to the event; it 
opens with it, yet with out the authenticity that Heidegger sought, rather each 
time differently. Such extraordinary leap threatens the authority of the 
language-paradigm for a multitude of meaningful practices, which, rather than 
seeking a ‘ground’, are finding local passages, internal links, and temporary 
bridges to generate value and escape. In this light, since it abandons both the 
ideology of the possibility of an ultimate object of knowledge and the notion of 
a noumenon, the articulation of epistemology not only coincides with the  
distribution of the sensible, but ~ as Rancière describes ~ shows that the  
aesthetic dimensions of the phenomenon are intrinsically political.22 
In writing the laws there is always a risk of foreclosing the present. If the 
heterogeneity of the event is not preserved, an installed theory in its process of 
normalization will pronounce laws representing the paradigm as a priori.  
A crisis will be regarded as an exception and normalization will re-close the 
open gap, re-mark the boundary of the paradigm-society, re-construct a  
whole; performing, that is, a process of inclusion-exclusion where the 
possibility of difference is entirely silenced, made not to exist. Questions that 
cannot be asked, that are outside the paradigm’s equation, become non-problems, 
invisible. However it is important to stress that this cannot be deemed the  
21. Luis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans Ben Brewster, 1970,  
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1968/reading-capital/index.htm. Accessed 14 
October 2012.
22.See Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, (London: Continuum, 2000).
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alienation of an originary state,23 rather it is the separation of thought from  
the sensible, or the separation of meaning from the language that produces it;  
a separation that will always create a political divide and limit access to  
the existing discourse to those who are already included, as Rancière shows  
in his discussion of the politics of aesthetics.24
Conclusions: A New Form of Materialism 
The question then focuses on the inside of the event, emergence is a logic in  
itself, which abandons the spatialization of time for the temporalization of  
an aesthetic space as incommensurable: a place that is without representing, a 
topos. Indeed, if the event is change /  becoming, rather than teleological 
development, then it does not need an ‘outside’. A ana-economy is an 
affirmative event, it is the moment that differentiate sense from silence, not from 
non-sense. The causes and elements of change are all internal to the event, and 
they can take place because of openness. This is at the same time more 
complex and simpler than the ‘returning of difference’. The specific / inner 
logic of incommensurable economies means that each event’s internal logic 
emerges from the interactions of the elements that constitute it; that is, the 
elements that constitute the present. Deleuze resorted to the ‘univocity of events’, 
a transcendental space of pure difference, to explain becoming.25 Yet, the fact 
that the event can happen rests only on it not being bound, open; the ‘cause’, how 
the event happens is site-specific, internal, and therefore retroactive. As such 
the eventum tantum excludes any totalizing argument, it is finite but not bound, 
a ana-totality.
In the case of the shift from analogue to digital operations, from  
production to generation, the passage must really be seen behaving in the light 
of the rhizome: a heterogeneity whose dimensions take place by subtraction: 
‘n-1’;26 where ‘n’ is the infinity of probability. As such the synthetic meaning / 
23. This is a problem that to some extent seems to taint Luce Irigaray’s argument in her critique 
of Heidegger, where logos’ rigour silences a fluid movement. See Luce Irigaray, The Forgetting of Air in 
Martin Heidegger, trans Mary Beth Mader (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999). A similar problem is 
at the base of Agamben’s analysis which finds ‘the exceptional’ always being present at both ‘ends’ of the 
law (i.e., at the origin and moment of application). See respectively Giorgio Agamben, Stato di Eccezione 
~ Homo Sacer 2, (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2003), and Che cos’è un Dispositivo, (Roma: Nottetempo, 
2006).
24. In this regard, Foucault’s continuity of regimes of power through the ~ alleged ~ exceptional 
state of war and the stable periods of peace is correct. Indeed, it is representation that makes the state 
appear, by marking a boundary, and installing an equation or code to guarantee the organization of 
an otherwise heterogeneous surface. See Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended, trans David Macey 
(London: Penguin, 2004), Seminar 2 and Seminar 3.
25. Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, Series 24, trans Charles Stivale (London, Continuum, 1990).
26. Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, “1. Rhizome: Introduction,” in A Thousands Plateaux, trans 
MAT TI A PAGANELLI | THE PAR ADOXICAL ECONOMY OF CRISIS
present is always mediated, but not teleological. The poietic logic of emergence 
introduces a new philosophy of history based on the affirmative logic of the 
medium / technology. This abandons both scientific determinism and the 
‘determinism’ of a strict materialistic analysis for a regime of emergence of the 
present in the present. A point in space, a moment in history, or a concept in  
thought are no longer anchored to a main meta-narrative nor lost in the abyss, 
rather self-generating it via resonances and interferences.
Postscript on Value: Definition of Value: Process Only ~ Network Economy
The passage from chaos to order as described by Prigogine-Stengers returns in 
Kuhn analysis of paradigm’s behaviour as something that has value not because 
it is absolute, or is measured against an absolute, but because it functions, it is 
cohesive; because, albeit for a while only, it creates links with other parts, which 
allow flow, exchange, circulation, correspondences and ~ most importantly ~ 
the creation of new links within the network. Process is all there is to the 
notion of value and meaning. Value is what is implementable in a discourse 
according to its dimensions and reciprocally as one of its dimensions.
Ultimately, Deleuze’s shift from traditional western logic, which based its 
hierarchy on nouns-subjects, to verbs (gerunds and infinitives) and their 
declinations converging on body / subjects is a logic of series and patterns that 
generates space / time rather than happening on their background. Hence 
individuation is the convergence, the temporary resonance of segments with the 
same frequency, the temporary alignment of different patterns. Economies, 
representations, translation are not between simultaneous values, but between 
the present and the past in the inner logic of each event: “one is always smaller 
than what one is becoming, and bigger than what one was”.27 Therefore, in the 
eventum tantum, the passing from chaos to order requires, or only permits, a 
phenomenology of the present. The ‘thing itself’ is the surface, the present, not a 
logical depth, while the past is the epistemological presupposition that tends to 
foreclose it. In the logic of heterogeneous emergence the artistic coincides with 
the political; indeed it should be noted that after the Logic of Sense Deleuze 
arrives at the Logic of Sensation not as a different kind of logic, but as the only 
logic possible: that of some specific works of a specific artist, rather than of art 
as a whole. 
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Abstract: Classical metaphysics requires a concept of the ethical that belies or erases 
certain forms of truth-telling, often pulling the ethical in the direction of more sterilized 
forms of reason and rationality in order to invoke its universal applicability as a kind of 
‘one-size-fits-all’ for any person, place, time, or thing. In so doing, not only does this tend 
to diminish or expunge the sensuous, carnal encounters of body and spirit, it pre-figures 
certain forms of courage, care and imagination so that the very core of what it means 
to make a community alive, responsive, and creative remains stuck in the old classical 
canons of thought and practice. In this way, the beliefs and ‘truths’ that tend to be 
reproduced serve only to strengthen the status quo’s status ~ somewhat of a problem if 
that status quo’s status is also mired in misogynist, homophobic, ethnic and  or racially 
divisive traditions. The 9th Technology of Otherness, building upon Foucault’s  
Courage of Truth, the last lecture series before his untimely death, seeks to show how 
an ethics drawn along the sensuous modalities (as Foucault positions them) of courage 
(parrhesia) and curiosity (zetesis), creates a certain form of community, a certain kind 
of self, and with it, a certain kind of debt. It is precisely this debt that Socrates reminds 
Crito ‘not to forget to remember to pay’ to Asclepius, and to do so with the now quite 
infamous gift of the bird-cock.
And the man who gave Socrates the poison now and then looked at 
his feet and legs and after a while he pressed his foot hard, and asked 
“him if he could feel; and he said, No; and then his leg, and so upwards 
and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And Socrates 
felt them himself, and said: When the poison reaches the heart that 
will be the end. He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when 
he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said ~ they 
were his last words ~ he said: Crito, I owe a cock [έναν κόκορα] to  




1. “The 9th Technology of Otherness” was commissioned by Henry Rogers for his edited collection, 
Queer Textualities, (London / Birmingham: ARTicle Press / OSB Publishing, 2013). It is gratefully reprinted 
here with the Editor’s permission. 
2. Plato, Phaedo: The Last Hours of Socrates, trans Benjamin Jowett, (The Project Gutenberg Ebook: 
2008). Updated Jan 15, 2013 at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1658/1658-h/1658-h.htm. Translations 
vary as to whether Socrates is purported to have used “I” or “we” with respect to the owing of the 
cock to Asclepius. We will keep the Gutenberg translation but later in the argument will draw upon 
Foucault’s use of ‘we’ to develop a more general point about the care of the self especially in relation to 
the true. 
The 9th Technology of Otherness: 










The question of debt, especially as the last words Socrates was purported to 
have whispered moments before he succumbed to the hemlock, remains a 
vexed and oddly intractable one; perhaps even more so when encountered 
initially amongst writings in a book on queer sensibilities. But it may not be as 
strange as it might at first appear and, indeed, as we shall see after dispatching 
with two of the more well-known interpretations, it may at least begin to 
provide an initial glimpse into a heterogeneic ‘post-’ postmodern ethics, one 
fuelled by a particular kind of debt, generated by a certain curiosity (zetesis), 
and propelled by a queer, strange, sexual-carnal / ethical-political-aesthetic truth 
(parrhesia).3 It is a blood-debt poetics, this oddly lubricated economy, with 
ethical difference at its core, courage as its trope and a communal ‘care of the 
self’ as its technology ~ what we will name as the 9
th technology of otherness.
Before developing that intricate claim, let us turn briefly to Nietzsche and 
then to Derrida. In one of the most famous interpretations of Socrates’ dying  
words, Nietzsche concludes, along with many others, that because Asclepi 
us was the God of Healing and because the very last words on the mind of 
Socrates was to ask Crito not to forget to pay off, as Nietzsche would phrase 
it, a “ridiculous debt” to this (and no other) god, Socrates seemed to have 
undergone a deathbed conversion ~ one born out of a fear of dying, belying, 
thought Nietzsche, a grave and deeply secretive pessimism. For Nietzsche, this 
was the complete reversal of all Socrates stood for during the whole of his life.
This ridiculous and terrible ‘last word’ means for those who have 
ears: “O Crito, life is a disease.” Is it possible that a man like him, who 
had lived cheerfully and like a soldier in the sight of everyone, should 
have been a pessimist? He had merely kept a cheerful mien whilst 
concealing all his life long his ultimate judgment, his inmost feeling. 
Socrates, Socrates suffered life! And then he still revenged himself 
~ with this veiled, gruesome, pious, and blasphemous saying. Did a 
Socrates need such revenge? Did his overrich virtue lack an ounce of 
magnanimity? ~ Alas, my friends, we must overcome even the Greeks!
 4
3. A point to which we will return momentarily, but see: Michel Foucault, “15 February, The First 
Hour,” in his The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and Others II, Lectures at the Collège de France 
1983-1984, trans Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011), 86-89. Note: the Socratic 
form of parrhesia (ethos) carefully sidesteps the carnal-knowledge practice of body, sex, sweat ~ but as 
we will see, this is not just an ‘interesting’ aspect of queer parrhesia, it is its verification.
4. Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Dying Socrates,” in his The Gay Science (with a Prelude in Rhymes and 
an Appendix of Songs), translated with commentary by W. Kaufman, (New York: Vintage, 1974), section 
340, 272. The earlier part of the aphorism gives the full sense of his disappointment: “I admire the  
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On a rather different note, Derrida’s interpretation(s) announce a multiple 
doubling of an inheritance / debt, an inscription of a last will and testament 
by a dying man (Socrates) whose words are recorded by someone (Plato) who, 
despite not even being present at the moment of utterance ~ apparently he was 
sick on the day ~ must nevertheless suppose a memory (or, in any case, a ‘not 
forgetting’) of an event which may or may not have taken place, by someone 
whose authority he wishes to break but, by writing those last words, instead 
immortalizes that very authority. Plato, caught as both receiver & sender, is 
now also con-joined to Socrates “from behind” by virtue of the reciprocating 
journeying inheritance of inscription.5 Here the end-game becomes a double 
entendre mid-game and in so doing, entirely changes the rules of the game. As 
Derrida so vividly (and oddly homo-cidally) enframes it: Socrates could be said 
to be eternally fucked by a Plato who may or may not be aware of what he is 
doing and indeed must do. Plato: the devoted pupil-inheritor on the one hand, 
the knowledge-transfer disseminator on the other; receiver and sender, Plato 
enacts the double-bind which looks a lot like an innocent placebo but generates 
the pleasure / pain sadomasochism of the pharmakon. And all the while, the 
debt-cock just keeps on growing.
Over to Derrida:
5 June 1977. […] I have not yet recovered from this revelatory 
catastrophe. Plato behind Socrates. Behind he has always been, as  
it is thought, but not like that. Me, I always knew it, and they did too,  
courage and wisdom of Socrates in everything he did, said ~ and did not say. This mocking and  
enamored monster and pied piper of Athens, who made the most overweening youths tremble and  
sob, was not only the wisest chatterer of all time: he was equally great in silence. I wish he had remained 
taciturn also at the last moment of his life; in that case he might belong to a still higher order of spirits. 
Whether it was death or the poison or piety or malice ~ something loosened his tongue at that moment 
and he said; “O Crito, I owe Asclepius a rooster.” This ridiculous and terrible ‘last word’ means for 
those who have ears: “O Crito, life is a disease.” 
5. See for example 4 September 1977 where Derrida explains: “When Being is thought on the  
basis of the gift of the es gibt (sorry for the simplifying stenography, this is only a letter), the gift itself is 
not something; it would be, hmmm, like an “envoi”, destination, the destinality, sorry, of an envoi,  
which of course does not send this or that, which sends nothing that is, nothing that is a “being,” a 
“present.” […] in Jacques Derrida, The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans by Alan Bass,  
(Chicago / London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 61. But for the multiplicity / doubling of 
inscription andits circulation see also Of Grammatology, trans G. Spivak, (Baltimore: The Johns  
Hopkins University Press, 1974 / 1997), especially Part I “Writing Before the Letter,” 3-94; The Gift of 
Death, trans David Wills (London / Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), especially Chapters 2 
and 3 (“Beyond: Giving for the Taking, Teaching and Learning to Give, Death,” and “Whom to Give 
to (Knowing Not to Know), 35-52 and 53-81, respectively. Also see The Politics of Friendship, trans George 
Collins, (London: Verso, 2005), especially Chapter 4, “The Phantom Friend Returning (in the name of  
Democracy), 75-112. Last but not least, his seminal Dissemination (New York: Continuum, 1981),  
especially regarding the pharmakon developed in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 67-122; and “The Double  
Session,” 187ff.
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those two I mean. What a couple. Socrates turns his back to Plato
who has made him write what he wanted while pretending to receive 
it from him. […] And since Plato writes, without writing, without 
wanting that a trace be preserved, since he writes, without writing, 
that Socrates, who passes for someone who has never written, in truth 
will have written, whether this is known (or not) and will have written 
just that which he will have written (but who, he?), you can try to 
forward the inheritance…
5 September 1977. […] P.S. I have again overloaded them with colors, 
look, I made up our couple, do you like it? Doubtless you will not be 
able to decipher the tattoo on plato’s prosthesis, the wooden third leg, 
the phantom-member that he is warming up under Socrates’ ass.6
Of course there are other interpretations to the last words of Socrates, though 
most of which, over the past two millennium+ of discussion thus far, tend 
to fall under the two broad headings as singled out above. That is, of a less 
than benign, suspicious or secretive ‘final thought confession’ or ‘deathbed 
conversion’; or, as expressing however enigmatically, a pharmakon-esque 
inscription of Being, woven into the very fabric of time, circulation, inheritance 
and debt, and therewith crucial to the (quasi-) transcendental movement of a 
trace, any trace ~ be it identity, sexuality, democracy, or indeed, life itself.
Changing the Value of Currency (a certain kind of courage)
Foucault proposes a wholly distinct approach from the broad outlines sketched 
above. It is one that, as we will see, not only introduces a methodological  
game-changer, but opens onto a completely different environ, quite distinct 
from the one encountered by Adam & Eve and their deeply troubled progeny. 
In the immediate months preceding his death in 1984, Foucault delivered 
a series of 18 lectures at the Collège de France, published posthumously  
(in French, 2008 and in English, 2011) as The Courage of Truth: The 
Government of Self and Others, II.7 These lectures were a continuation of the 
previous two years lectures (from 1982 and 1983) and were situated around 
four practice-knowledge hubs or modalities of truth: (1) the modality of 
prophecy / religiosity; (2) the modality of the order of things; that is, of being 
(phusis); (3) the modality of demonstrative technique or tekhne in the  
6. The Postcard, 12 and 65, respectively. Italicization in the original.
7. Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 89. 
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narrow sense of ‘expertise’ and finally, (4) the modality that polemicized the 
human condition (ethos).8 It was to this last economy of truth, itself a particular 
knowledge-practice form of parrhesia, that Foucault begins to tease out what 
is at stake in the elliptical demand of Socrates to Crito: that Crito ‘must 
remember not to forget’ to repay the debt owed to Asclepius in the manner of 
gifting the cock.9 As we shall see shortly, it is from the ‘certain kind of debt’ 
this fourth modality exposes, reiterates and promotes that the 9th technology of 
otherness is created and sustained.
Invoking the motto of Diogenes to re-situate the entire polemic of debt 
and the multitude interpretations of its meaning via Socrates, Crito, Asclepius 
and the cock, Foucault steps away from the iterative fact of exchange,  
circulation and debt ~ let’s just call it ‘the market community’ ~ and, instead 
demands, as did Diogenes, that if you (read: we) cannot alter the fact of 
exchange itself, then at least, to quote Diogenes, “change the value of the 
currency” [Αλλάξει την αξία του νομίσματος].10 The currency in question could 
be said to be the general economy of truth; its value: the polemical condition 
of being human (ethos). Its parrhesia, Foucault argues, is a truth forged from 
the complex and yet completely obvious mix of curiosity, sensate, invention, 
experimentation, practice, bodily knowledge, power, movement and risk. It is 
this truth that could (and did) change the currency; it is this truth that could 
(and did) emit a different kind of ethics; it is this truth that could (and did) 
draw a certain kind of debt; it is this truth that could (and did) shift the terrain 
of aesthetics from ‘the Beautiful and Sublime’ to that of an unquantifiable 
strange / estranged ethos. And it is this truth that required ~ and still requires 
~ courage, because it is this truth that could rock (and did rock and still does 
rock) the status quo.
“We can say then, very schematically, that the parrhesiast is not the 
prophet who speaks the truth when she reveals fate enigmatically in  
the name of someone else. The parrhesiast is not a sage who, when 
she wants to and, against the background of her silence, tells of being 
and nature (phusis) in the name of wisdom. The parrheisast is not the 
professor or teacher, the expert who speaks of tekhne in the name of a 
tradition. So she does not speak of fate, being or tekhne. Rather, 
 
8. See the whole of “1 February 1984: First Hour” and “1 February 1984: Second Hour,” The 
Courage of Truth, but particularly 15-19 and 25-27, respectively.
9. The general outlines of the concept parrhesia are developed throughout the series of lectures 
on The Courage of Truth, but for this point see in particular, “Lecture One: 1 February 1984: First Hour,” 
1-22, and especially 10ff, as well as the afterword “The Course Context,” The Courage of Truth, 343-358.
10. “7 March 1984, The Second Hour,” in The Courage of Truth, 226-228.
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inasmuch as she takes the risk of provoking war with others […] the  
parrhesiast brings into play the true discourse of what the Greeks 
called ethos.” 11
For parrhesia to exist in the sense Foucault is developing means first that there 
must be some kind of bond between the statement’s sender and the receiver. 
Second, there must be some kind of risk to the exposing of truth on the part 
of the speaking subject, ranging from the breaking up of a relationship to the 
violent retaliation of the State. Hence, the parrhesiast and the ethos ‘to tell it as 
it is’ requires a certain kind of courage and risk. It is the courage to speak out, 
to provoke, to incite into action without taking oneself out of the relationship; 
to invent anew by supposing ‘it could be otherwise’ and then figuring out  
what and how this ‘otherwise’ might become real, alive, take root and flouish,  
without preventing the ‘telling it as it is’ from being heard even if it might 
wound or destroy the ‘messenger’. Not shock for shock’s sake; not offence just 
because it could be done; not a sterile rationality backing any decision; but 
rather, a certain kind of connection, a certain kind of care and attention to 
detail; a certain kind of courage, curiosity, stylistics of existence, generosity, 
intellect, humour ~ call it what you will ~ a complex / heterogeneic logic of 
sense to make ‘it’ known; to make ‘it’ happen, to make manifest a ‘certain kind 
of practice-knowledge’ of that which may not ‘fit in’ exactly or precisely (or even 
at all), but in spite of that (or even because of it), may put one’s body and soul at 
risk to make that polemical condition of life itself accessible, hearable, readable, 
graspable, right here, right now.12 
11. “1 February 1984, The Second Hour,” The Courage of Truth, 25. The word ‘she’ has been used 
instead of the traditional translation of ‘he’ when the genitalia really should not matter to the  
argument; and, not to put too fine a point on it, in order to provoke ‘a war with others.’ (JG).
12. See “1 February 1984: The First Hour,” in The Courage of Truth, 11, where Foucault details it 
this way: “The parrhesiast gives his opinion, he says what he thinks, he personally signs, as it were, the 
truth he states, he binds himself to this truth, and he is consequently bound to it and by it. But this 
is not enough. For after all, a teacher, a grammarian or a geometer, may say something true about the 
grammar or geometry they teach, a truth which they believe, which they think. And yet we will not 
call this parrhesia. We will not say that the geometer and grammarian are parrhesiasts when they teach 
truths which they believe. For there to be parrhesia, you recall ~ I stressed this last year ~ the subject 
must be taking some kind of risk [in speaking] this truth which he signs as his opinion, his thought, 
his belief, a risk which concerns his relation with the person to whom he is speaking. For there to be 
parrhesia in speaking the truth one must open up, establish and confront the risk of offending the 
other person, of irritating him, of making him angry and provoking him to conduct which may even be 
extremely violent. […] In short, the act of truth, requires: first, the manifestation of a fundamental bond 
between the truth spoken and the thought of the person who spoke it; second, a challenge to the bond 
between to interlocutors… Hence this new feature of parrhesia: it involves some form of courage.”
ZETESIS VOL. 1, NO. 1
 
The Queering of Difference
Now this parrhesia, this ethical commitment ‘to tell it as it is’ was not, and 
could not, be made in isolation. In the example cited above, clearly the courage 
to speak was immersed in / born of a profound commitment, connectedness, a 
friendship of the self to (another / an-other) self. It required a courage buoyed 
or infused with the political, aesthetic, possibly dirty and unimaginable right 
‘to know’ (thyself) in relation to this self-other. In so knowing, telling, making, 
doing, a radical, slightly more subtle heterogeneic form of the ethical was now 
being advanced by Foucault, one where the veridiction of the parrhesiastic 
ethos, would be (and must be) maintained as an ‘always-already’ plurality of 
self-to-self collective connectedness.
This heterogeneic plurality of ‘self’ exposed yet another set of 
multiplicities. For parrhesia of the fourth modality encounter, requires in 
the founding / finding of this ethical multiplicity ~ this economy of living 
~ a recognition on both ‘sides’ of the self-to-self relation that a particular 
governance or care must take place. This governance not only concerned 
the quality of life itself: that in order for the (heterogeneic / pluralised) self to 
survive and, indeed, thrive, a radical governance or care of the self, brought 
to bear by ‘telling it as it is’, must always remain critically embedded into one’s 
relational being in the world. But it also meant that this embeddeness, this 
ethical ‘currency’ must somehow be repeated; must somehow be ‘circulated’ 
time after time. And as it was premised on, indeed required a public ‘other’ 
~ neither priest, nor teacher nor technician, nor police ~ but rather the 
parrahesiac ‘other’, to tend to and to nourish, this generative and pluralised 
‘self-to-self’ care, it was this recognition and insistence of this kind of care of 
self, that forms the context to Socrates’ elliptical remark ‘not to forget’ what 
most people tended to forget or did not even know it should be remembered: 
the pluralised ethical demand to care for the pluralised self. “No longer 
political bravery,” writes Foucault, “but … the introducing [of] a certain form 
of truth into a knowledge that men do not know they know, a form of truth 
which will lead them to take care of themselves.” Thus, he continues:
“I tried to show you how, in his Apology, Socrates defined his 
parrhesia, his courageous truth-telling, as a truth-telling whose final 
objective and constant concern was to teach men to take care of 
themselves. Socrates took care of men, but not in the political form:  
he wants to take care of them so that they will learn to take care of 
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themselves.” 13 
Returning, then to the curious debt owed to Asclepius, to be paid in terms of 
the bird-cock. As is well known, a debt of this nature is charged when and  
only when a specific body is known to be gravely ill, then healed (by Asclepius) 
and the resultant ‘thank you’ is manifested precisely as cited above. But in 
the last moments of Socrates’ life, there is no (apparent) diseased body; and 
thus there is no (apparent) healing; so why the payback, why the insistence 
to ‘remember not to forget’ and why link it to courage, the ‘courage to tell 
the truth (parrhesia)? It is because Socrates, as a living parrhesiast becomes 
in death, both parrhesiast and payback, the embodied ana-materiality of a 
polemicized ethics. 
To put this slightly differently, it is because, this ‘certain kind of truth’ 
is nothing more nor less than the Socratic prick that both lances the boil 
of a forgetting / concealing (with minor apologies to Heidegger), whilst 
simultaneously goading into action a pluralized ‘care of the self’, and with it, 
a profoundly heterogeneic economy of being, what could be called a ‘magic 
garden’ which must be tended to, cultivated, over and again. For magic gardens 
do not happen on their own; they require a profound willingness (courage) to 
engage in the dangerous game of ‘telling it as it is’, and remembering not to 
forget to pay the debt in the currency of a multi-dimensional, multi-relational 
9th technology of otherness. 
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Abstract: One of the key claims in Jean-François Lyotard’s Discourse, Figure is that 
the dialectical method (the backbone of Western philosophy) tends to obscure and hide 
all which is invisible, illegible and sensual. Lyotard’s strategy in exposing this rift within 
language (and philosophy) is by way of showing that the distance between the sign and 
the referent should not be thought of as negation but as a form of expression. Instead 
of the dialectical relation between the image and the object Lyotard proposes radical 
heterogeneity that he names ‘thickness’. This paper examines Lyotard’s non-dialectical 
approach in relation to the title of the book and argues that the comma is positioned as 
the sensual technology that creates the possibility of discursive continuity. 
One of the recurrent themes of the Western philosophical canon is the 
distinction between sensual perceptions and rational knowledge. Since Plato 
established the dialogue as the form of his philosophical method, discourse ~ 
in the twofold sense of an utterance and the toing and froing of an argument 
~ is the name of the technology that is able to extract true knowledge from 
experience. As the discussion in the Republic helps to explain, perceptions 
are inherently unreliable and deceptive because the senses are prone to errors 
and illusions. Only the rational discourse has the tools to overcome illusions 
and to point towards true knowledge. For instance, perception suggests that a 
figure in the distance is smaller than it really is. Yet, the application of logical 
reasoning will reveal that the figure only appears small because it obeys the 
laws of geometrical perspective. Nevertheless, even after the perspectival 
correction is applied, the figure still appears small and the truth of the matter 
is revealed not in the perception of the figure but in its rational representation 
in a discourse.
It is precisely because discourse is the guarantor of truth that it marks 
both the very possibility of knowledge and the limit beyond which knowledge 
cannot go. Whatever cannot be rationally represented in a discourse remains 
outside of knowledge and immune to it. To know the truth about something 
means to be able to represent it, and the proclivity for representation is an 
indication of a sound and rational mind. For this reason discourse carries 
within it the stamp of self-validating certainty: the subject of a discourse is 
rational because rationality is the technique of the discourse. On the other 
hand, precisely because the subject has to be validated through representation, 
whatever belongs to perception remains unknown to the subject.1 Therefore, 
1. Claire Colebrook speaks about the paradox of representation with exemplary clarity: “[…] the 
threshold of representation not only marks modernity off from its darker past (when law was imposed 
,
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discourse can be understood as the distillation of ideas from experience. 
Experience however is not made of ideas but of a mixture of ideas and 
perceptions and while ideas can be represented, perceptions can be  
only sensed.2 
In Discourse, Figure Lyotard is concerned to correct the one-sidedness 
of the western philosophical canon by suggesting that despite appearances, 
irrational forces are raging under the veneer of reason and discourse is  
unable to fully rid itself from dependence on fallible and unreliable 
perceptions. Taking up linguistics as the case in point, Lyotard seems to be 
saying that what is wrong with linguistics is not its tools or methods but that  
it considers language in terms of discourse: 
Linguistics marks the moment when language takes itself as object.  
So long as it positions itself at the tip of the aim [visée], it obscures itself as 
designated: linguistic discourse is thus a discourse that draws the night  
over discourse.3 
Understood correctly, language is precisely the product of the irresolvable 
tension between discourse and figure, or between representation and 
perception. A study of language worthy of its name must take account of this 
difference as the productive and creative force that holds discourse and figure 
in suspended animation. For this reason the “,” (comma) in the title of the 
book is ~ figurally speaking ~ the key to the book. Is the comma (“,”) part 
of the discourse or is it a figure? Can the comma be considered purely as a 
representation, or is it something other than a symbol? The comma appears to 
belong to both registers at once: it is a linguistic sign that operates according to 
the conventions of syntax and it is also something else entirely, it is a slowing 
down, a brief pause that introduces a rupture within the discursive continuity. 
The comma in Discourse, Figure exposes the inescapable paradox that 
indicates the limits of the discourse by suggesting that rationality can only be 
maintained through its dependence on the outside of rationality. The comma 
is a punctuation sign, it indicates a hiatus. The purpose of the discourse 
is to harness perceptions and to organise them in a way that allows for 
systemic and structured representation of knowledge. However, the comma 
from without); the threshold of representation scars modernity itself, occurring as a limit within the 
possibility of modernity. […] modern philosophy situates itself within the representational limits of 
the subject. Representation is a condition of finitude. Because knowledge is received from without 
it must be taken up and re-presented. What can be known is therefore determined and delimited by 
the representational powers of the subject.” Claire Colebrook, Ethics and Representation: From Kant to 
Post-structuralism. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 1.
2. On this point see Deleuze’s lectures on Spinoza “Lectures by Gilles Deleuze On Spinoza.” 
http://deleuzelectures.blogspot.co.uk/2007/02/on-spinoza.html (accessed July 16, 2012). 
3. Jean-François Lyotard, Discourse, Figure trans Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 100. 
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introduces a pause, the pause opens a gap and the gap allows for perception 
to sneak back into the discourse. What is being established by the comma is 
an opening that offers the possibility of play: it creates an interruption that 
makes it possible to have a choice. The choice is to continue with one series 
or with another. Chronologically the comma comes before the Figure, but it 
recovers a figure right inside the discourse. This sensual contraband is not 
imported into the discourse from outside but is found at the same place where 
the sign, representation and logos reside. For Lyotard this is a key strategy in 
dismantling the sovereignty of the logos: 
Are we talking about another sort of sign? Not in the slightest, they are 
the same as those with which the semiotician carries out his theory and textual 
practice. The first thing to avoid, comrades, is to claim that we have taken up a 
position somewhere else. We’re not moving out of anywhere, we’re staying right 
here, we occupy the terrain of signs […].4 
Discourse, Figure is a discourse about discourse, but it is not a meta-
discourse. There is no such thing as a representation of representation. Lyotard 
is not suggesting a meta-language with which to speak about “Discourse” 
because this would be tantamount to falling back into representation. Instead, 
he locates the sensible, the affective and the figurative in the pause indicated 
by this mark “,”. The comma is not the ground of the discourse, neither it 
is an Archimedean point located outside of it, rather it is the differential 
between logos and perception. Understood from the perspective of the 
comma, Discourse is not an articulation of externally given reality but a 
relation between two forces. It is the continuous variation in this relation, the 
modulation between logos and affect that accounts for the creation of sense. 
The comma situates multiplicity, affect and duration right inside the discourse. 
Association with the comma exposes discourse itself as infinitesimally variable 
and therefore undecidable. In the same time it also means that there is at least 
a part of the discourse that might resist being absorbed into representation. 
Questions such as “is this a true or false statement?” do not apply to the 
comma as it is neither true or false. Comma is almost ethical rather than 
aesthetic: it refuses to signify and yet it strives to be of use, to be put to work. 
What does it take to rethink the discourse from the perspective of the 
comma? In coming to address the paradoxical condition of the discourse 
Lyotard claims that what is required is nothing less than a revolution in 
language and philosophy. Rather then arguing for the domination of logos 
over sense or of sense over logos, Lyotard suggests that in order to prevent the 
triumph of idealism discourse has to be reconfigured as the difference between 
4. Jean-Francois Lyotard, Libidinal Economy trans Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Continuum, 
2004), 49. See also ‘Glossary: The Tensor’, Libidinal Economy, xiv-xv. 
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logos and sense. However, the admittance of difference must not be subsumed 
by the discourse, as this would re-establish the sovereignty of logos. This is the 
role of the figural: to guard from the imperialism of the logos. The writing of 
sense back into thought is accomplished by means of the rediscovery of the 
figure in the discourse. It is about restoring to the discourse its materiality 
by showing that a sign cannot fail to be also a figure. The figure within the 
discourse marks the parallelism of sense and logos. The forgetting of figure in 
the discourse is a symptom of a way of thinking that claims that the problem 
of the sign is the problem of representation. If the figure is forgotten it is all 
to easy to claim that representation is the site of ideological battles without 
however ever questioning the sovereignty of the logos that lies at the basis of all 
representation.5 
One more thing about the figure: it shouldn’t be thought of as arbitrary; 
rather, it is the non-transferable imprint that constitutes the relief and the 
thickness of the sign. Stripped of the signifying meaning of the sign, the 
figure is a mark of presence. The figure is a pause, it is the now. While the 
sign answers to the question “What is happening?” the figure simply asks “Is it 
happening?” 6 As discourse is inconceivable without pauses, the comma draws 
attention to its dependence on duration. This is because notions of time and 
space are conceived from the point of view of the subject who wishes for them 
to confirm to the measurable and linear logic of the discourse. The most 
subversive aspect of the pause is that it is both different and inseparable from 
discourse. But the very notion of difference introduced here knocks reason 
from its sit of sovereignty and installs undecidability and multiplicity in its 
place. 
By identifying multiplicity, or a folding, within the discourse, Lyotard 
is able to claim that difference is a quality internal to the sign. According to 
structuralism difference is expressed as the gap between the discourse (sign) 
and the object of discourse (referent) ~ note in passing that this is the Hegelian 
negation (the sign differs from what it is not). The sign and the referent 
cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Note also that this external 
difference presumes temporal and spatial linearity and abides by the exclusion 
principle (Aristotelian logic). For Lyotard difference is not external to the sign, 
rather it is what makes the sign as the tension between meaning and duration. 
Difference here does not mean separateness but the condition of collaboration. 
5. For Louis Althusser representation is the site where ideological wars are being fought:  
“Ideology is a ‘representation’ of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their Real conditions of 
Existence.” Louis Althusser, On Ideology, (London: New York: Verso, 2008), 36.
6. Jean-François Lyotard, “The Sublime and the Avant-garde.” In The Lyotard Reader. Edited by,   
Andrew Benjamin trans Lisa Liebmann, Geoff Bennington and Marian Hobson (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1984), 208-11. 
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Sense is always on the verge of becoming discourse, but discourse always 
requires something that cannot be explained rationally, yet the Aristotelian-
Hegelian formula refuses to acknowledge this debt to the calculus of forces  
that creates meaning as a relation between parallel entities.
Up to this point it might seem that Lyotard suggests a program for 
restoring the rights of experience, the sensory spectrum and intuition by 
recovering their place within discourse. His ultimate goal is however more 
far-reaching. Through the device of the comma, the title of the book reveals 
an irreconcilable paradox: The singularity of the pause is guarantied by the 
identity of logos. The pause / figure can exist as a singularity, as difference and  
as affect on the condition that this singularity is protected by the sovereignty  
of the discourse. Lyotard is not trying to replace Discourse with Figure, as 
doing so would be a reversal ~ yet another logical procedure. Instead he is 
demonstrating that Discourse has Figure embedded it from the start, and ipso 
facto that discourse is an undecidable game. Difference therefore is not to be 
thought outside of Discourse but belonging to it, devoured and sustained by it.
According to this understanding of the figure, images are not 
representations of an externally given formal reality but are themselves 
material processes or transmissions of energy. The comma opens the discourse 
to its outside, to the embodiment in experience. The joining together of 
“discourse” and “figure” is taking place in perception. Matter appears within 
discourse as non-mater (comma). The comma acts like a doorstop, it prevents 
the discourse from closing down on itself, from becoming homogenised. Every 
comma, every pause, is a manifestation of difference because each and every 
pause is an embodiment of duration. Yet this wild and untamed difference 
is often suppressed in favour of the homogeneity of the sign. Comma is the 
invisible rupture in the discourse, the inarticulate phrase, and the affect-
pause that prevents the discourse from shutting down, from collapsing into 
representation. The comma is not the negation of the discourse but the very 
element without which the discourse falls apart. Lyotard’s strategy in exposing 
the phenomenological foundation of language is by way of showing that the 
distance between sign and referent should not be thought of as negation but 
as a form of expression. Instead of the dialectical relation between the image 
and the object, Lyotard proposes radical heterogeneity that he names ‘thickness’ 
and locates in the first instance in the comma.
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Abstract: This paper examines the sexual politics of Richard Linklater’s film Tape  
(2001) in light of Cornelia Vismann’s work on legal media and Jacques Derrida’s 
critical revision of confession as a ‘machine-event.’ I demonstrate how Linklater’s Tape 
manages to avoid obliging the woman to ‘playback’ too familiar narratives of wounded 
victimhood, making it both unusual among films’ involving a narrative of sexual  
assault and innovative in thinking the technicity of experience. 
Probably we all recognise the vexed relation of woman to allegories of truth or 
justice. As Cornelia Vismann reminds us ‘either ‘women’ are truth (as allegory) 
or they betray it.’ 2 I am interested in a filmic sub-genre of the displaced 
tribunal, one that inherits but is not limited to the Rashomon effect in which 
the competing subjective viewpoints nevertheless seem to collude against the 
plausibility of a female witness.3 Worse, her lack of plausibility is so habitually 
woven together with questionable sexuality. My sub-genre concerns sexual 
assault. Not so much the certificate-challenges of the New French Extreme (?). 
Rather a selection in which the direction of language sets the stakes. My ‘out 
of court settlements’ archive of films include such as Patrick Stettner’s The 
Business of Strangers (a CEO and a younger woman who may or may not be on 
her staff are holed up in a hotel when their flight is cancelled: together they 
assault a man who the younger woman says is a rapist), Roman Polanski’s Death 
and the Maiden (a husband and wife offer shelter to a man stranded in a storm 
only for the woman ~ to her husband’s desperate disavowal ~ to recognise 
the man’s voice and his taste in music as that of the doctor who assaulted 
her during the reign of a corrupt regime) and Richard Linklater’s Tape (three 
former friends reunite some 10 years after high school, only to rake over the 
events of yesteryear after one of the men extracts a confession from his friend 
that he had raped the woman that, yes, they both dated). When writing about 
Tape an obvious reference point was Orit Kamir’s book Framed: Women in Law 
& Film. Yet while this book spoke to the topic it did not speak to any sense of 
textuality or problem of media. To get closer to those problems in general for 
me points to the work of Derrida, but to get to them specifically we have to 
1. This paper was presented at Legal Media: a Colloquium in Memory of Cornelia Vismann, Birkbeck / 
Goldsmiths / The Showroom, 10-11 June 2011. This conference is archived on the website of one of its 
organising bodies at www.forensicarchitecture.org.
Parts of the paper develop my earlier “Wind up: the performative speech acts of Tape” Camera 
Obscura, 64, (2007), 112-135.
2. Vismann, Cornelia, “Beyond Image” in Law, Text, Terror, Goodrich, Barshack, Schutz, eds. 
(Abingdon: Glass House Press, 2006), 43.
3. Orit Kamir discusses Rashomon at length in her Framed: Women in Law & Film, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 43-72.










turn to Cornelia Vismann. The paper today plays back some reflections on 
Tape in light of Vismann’s work on the competing interplay of media in the 
trial and the tribunal.
‘If television cameras are present in court proceedings, elements that 
have their origins in the disorder of the tribunal will of necessity seep  
into the court trial. The ritual of the legal search for justice will give 
way to the logic of the duel.’ 4 
Vismann is writing of the emergence of the televised trial, of the imposition 
of the order of televisuality and its requisite technologies upon the inherited 
order of the trial proper. The conceits of the camera take up both space and 
authority as point-of-view that they were not allotted. 
In the case of Tape, we do not have a televised trial. Rather we have a 
film, adapted from Stephen Belber’s play of the same name, shot by Richard 
Linklater over the course of 6 days with then novel digital video (no tape 
as such). The apparent use of real time ~ 86 minutes restricted to the 
rudimentary room 19 of the Motor Palace motel ~ is fictitious not only in 
the sense that the film does not labour to conceal its cuts or its handheld 
camerawork but also in the sense that the speech-intensive ‘action’ of this 
film so rewrites the events of 10 years previously that temporal questions like 
‘what happened?’ and ‘when?’ become difficult. Often matching the rapid and 
heated verbal exchanges with its own whip-pan volleys, the camera does not 
act as dispassionate judge but is involved. By extension, as Vismann notes, the 
camera teleports a whole other juridical audience into the scene, aligning and 
realigning identifications. 
Given Vismann’s combined investigation of law and visual culture, she 
also remarked on the insertion of cameras into the courtroom in cinema.  
A crisis is wrought or averted with the aid of the visual evidence supplied by 
the camera that, with a performative force par excellence, never lies. The diegetic 
insertion of technology as evidence, index, analogy is absent and present in 
Tape in several ways. This is a film in which a man is coerced into confessing 
a sexual assault that is surreptitiously recorded on tape, and the victim is 
summoned to receive the gift of apology, which she refuses. More literally 
legalistic films would not be able to refuse a flashback, would not be able to 
resist supplying the visual evidence signifying memory. They would restore 
the missing images, relieve us from the adult anxiety of room 19 and dally in 
the teenage tensions of a high school graduation party. Is it mere mediumistic 
4. Vismann, Cornelia, “Teletribunals: Anatomy of a Medium” in Grey Room, 10, (2003), 18.
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inheritance that leads tape to refuse the expectation of flashback? No, since 
Tape also sensibly dispenses with the optional prologue and epilogue from 
Belber’s original play. Tape refuses to play this game. The task of Tape is not to 
seek out the truth. Rather Tape stakes out the only too familiar trope of the 
exchange of women between men and were Amy to show and tell (executed 
cinematically as flashback) this would only pander to her place in their story. 
Whether victim or not, the one thing she is, is ‘hot.’ While some online  
reviews persist in misreading the narrative of Tape as one about two friends, 
with the woman already sequestered within their script, it is one of the 
strengths of the film that, through the making of a tape-recording, the trope 
of gender is exposed and not consolidated. It is not only that the displaced 
tribunal of Tape ironizes the trial and delivers a witty reversal of a ‘dumb guy 
and smart guy’ routine in so doing. Rather, it is the unexpected participation 
of the woman who blanks the script written for her as evidence or trophy or 
other object (a cassette tape even), and rather sends the legalistic performatives 
of the film into overdrive. Jon’s technical mediation in Tape is also at stake, not 
through visual flashback but through audio playback. 
For it is a cassette tape, rather than a camera, that is embedded within 
this film as the index of its archive fever. Upfront, the film’s title Tape takes 
an aspirational centre stage; unravelling magnetic tape is suggested as the 
titles snake across the screen bracketing the film; a cheap cassette circulates 
from hand to hand within the narrative. This cassette might be a legal object 
~ it does contain what appears to be the confession of a sexual assault never 
previously brought to justice. Yet Vince, who engineers the production of this 
tape, barely refers to it as something that might enter a legal environment other 
than the effective tribunal of room 19 of the Motor Palace. The tape, it seems, 
is not for the record. The two named trajectories for the tape are, firstly, that 
it could be given to Amy who might be ‘interested’ to hear its contents ~ this 
before the pair realise that Amy is now an Assistant District Attorney, and 
secondly that this might spark the beginning of Vince’s own movie career.  
Like the more socially-mobile Jon, who is screening his first film at the Lansing 
Film Festival ~ the ostensible occasion for this school reunion ~ Vince too 
might use art to transcend his life, to learn from his mistakes, and make 
something meaningful. 
Unlike a flashback that is used to convey memory, that is memory  
as cinematically configured according to a very narrow prescription of a reel 
that can more or less simply be rewound and replayed, in this temporally 
concentrated motel room, we see Vince manufacture the tape. It is quite the  
production. Though we learn that the subject of Amy always comes up 
whenever these two guys get together, this time, under the makeshift 
interrogation lights of Room 19, Vince will not let Jon off the hook and, in  
the manner of a belligerent prosecution, needles Jon into revealing ‘what 
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happened’ that night at the party after graduation. We should note that the 
conversation between the two of them has already set up the question of 
violence; of what merely amounts to a ‘threatening appearance’ and of what 
might constitute violence as such, and articulated in similar terms, whether 
one of them merely ‘acts in a phallic fashion’ or actually is ‘a dick’. Jon’s 
subsequent contorted concession that he applied ‘excessive linguistic pressure’ 
as the means with which to coerce Amy into having sex with him might be 
easily caricatured by Vince as ‘bullshit,’ but it is not the suggestion that the 
language of force is either the prequel to or the mask of violence in the world 
that is most interesting, rather it is that language is not signification alone  
but also force. 
Writing of the discrepant methods used by Michel Foucault and Pierre 
Legendre in their treatment of the trials of Pierre Rivière and Corporal Lortie 
respectively, Vismann pays attention to their understanding of the relation 
between writing, especially written confession and the deed of murder. In the 
case of Foucault, Rivière’s belated statement is yet understood by Foucault as 
predictive of his crime. Vismann writes that ‘Speech acts reveal their tragic 
dimension […]. Once let loose, they cannot be stopped in their tracks.’ 5 What 
is compelling about Tape is that while speech acts are indeed let loose and 
cannot in a sense be stopped, their tracks are not analogue, reference to ‘tape’ 
notwithstanding. They do not simply or irrefutably betray the one who made 
them, pointing them out. In spite of technology’s promise to capture that 
which it records ~ and the perfect copy made by the low-end Walmart tape 
recorder hidden in a bag under a table on the other side of the room gives the 
lie to this fantasy ~ every track remains beholden to the countersignature of 
the other. I’ll come to Amy’s devastating response to the trap in which she 
manages not to be set soon. First I will address the complex character of Jon’s 
confession and the concomitant stream of apologies by way of Vismann’s 
critical presentation of Legendre as well as Derrida’s attention to the 
performative genre of Confessions.
For Foucault as there would be for Derrida, there are multiple procedures 
of truthfinding at stake in a trial, which may ‘found’ rather than simply ‘find’ 
that which they seek. For Legendre attention is more narrowly focused upon 
the field of language, a field construed as having been wounded by a deed 
without a word, a crime without an accompanying sentence: this wound must 
be redressed by the court proceedings; the court must enjoin the accused to 
refer to the crime in the first person (‘I killed X…’). The restitution effected 
by the use of the first person is towards that of the institution of language. 
5. Vismann, Cornelia, “Rejouer les Crimes Theatre vs Video” in Cardozo Studies in Law & Literature, 
11:2. (1999), 165.
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Every trial addresses itself to this larger criteria through the sentence that the 
defendant must utter in the first person, thus the stakes always point beyond 
the individual crime. They point towards a ‘cure for the office of the father’ as 
Vismann says, suggesting that a paternal metaphor of language is at stake.6 
If we do not have ‘missing images’ supplied by Tape, if we cannot see ‘then,’ 
we have instead yet more words (Tape is already verbose). The forging of the 
tape produces an aural slippage in the otherwise visually consistent room:  
it is only played back once for verification, immediately after Jon eventually 
and crudely shouts, in the first person, that he ‘pinned her arms back and stuck 
[his] dick in.’ In Legendre’s terms, as presented by Vismann, we have a result. 
The tape repeats the most incriminating sentence; Jon is later to say, under 
pressure from Amy as to why he suddenly 10 years later wants to apologise, that 
after hearing what he said on the tape, what he did ‘hit him’ and he wanted to 
say that he was sorry. Not during the event, not during the confession, but on 
hearing himself speak on tape, Jon is struck by his own deed. 
Jon is also wounded in the heat of the exchange with Vince, not so much 
because he has now spoken about that night at the party, but because Vince so 
wound him up as to make him talk of it, and on tape too. His authority is in 
question, and Jon is the film-maker here. While Tape resists the temptation to 
have the outraged Jon literally complain of Vince taping him without consent, 
the association is in the air, and this between two men, one or more of who 
may be a dick.7 I say this not just to be contentious or flippant, but because I 
think the film is highly conscious of the phonetic and typographic similarity 
between the two words, tape and rape. Tape: an archival medium that 
should faithfully store the contents it captures. I’ve suggested already that the 
cheapness of Vince’s tape, not to mention its now antique status in the history 
of technology, and our generation’s memory of the ready fallibility of such 
media, suggest the reverse. But the problem is not simply that storage media 
might fall apart, be literally divisible, although it might. Rather the supplement 
that the recording donates to that which is recorded always reinscribes 
the event and does not simply re-present it. As Derrida writes, ‘the archive 
produces the event no less than it records or consigns it.’ 8 Likewise, rape as 
a meaningful inscription loses ground. In the singular case of this film, Jon’s 
actions, as well as his speech, are vulnerable to the countersignature of the 
other. Thus, in the face of Jon’s effusive, near endless, apologies, Amy says she 
was not raped. Again, while nervous laughter is prompted on numerous  
 
6. Vismann, “Rejouer” 167.
7. NB. ‘dick’ as colloquial for detective.
8. Derrida, “Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink II” in Without Alibi, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), 101.
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occasions, the film is not at all facetious about this subject matter, neither  
does it remove or belittle the criminality of sexual assault.
Rather than introduce Amy ~ the last one of the three to arrive at the 
Motor Palace ~ as the final witness to and guarantee of this rape narrative, 
Tape changes tack. Tape the film and the Walmart cassette part company. 
Rather than remain the ruse through which the relation between Jon and 
Vince is held in place, Amy undoes their authority. Rather than simply refuse 
the apology because she says she was not raped, Amy structurally recodes it as  
a speech act that does not have her as its object or the intention to apologise  
as its aim. 
Putting pressure on what is called apology, Amy’s effective re-write brings 
out Jon’s uncanny repetition of the genre of Confessions as diagnosed by Paul de 
Man and by Derrida.9 There should be no trace of repetition in such a thing 
as confession. De Man elaborates problems with the performative capacity of 
confession through Rousseau who, in writings 10 years apart, confesses to the 
same event twice (that event, famously, being putting the blame for the theft 
of a ribbon that Rousseau himself had stolen onto a convenient servant girl, 
Marion). De Man plots out these two instances, from Rousseau’s Reveries as 
well as the eponymous Confessions, such that the first registers as the confession 
of an event and the second as the machinic making of an excuse. The sinister 
insinuation of the latter manifests in the transference of the guilt from 
committing an offence, to the guilty pleasure in writing about it. 
Throwing out of court Jon’s professed sincerity of apology, Amy counters: 
‘You didn’t like what you said on the tape Jon, so you came back to say it little 
more eloquently.’ As with Rousseau, the apology serves only to prolong Jon’s 
airtime and to broadcast his guilt. For while it required substantial goading for 
Vince to sufficiently wind Jon up until his confession bursts out, once started, 
he can barely stop. He really is sorry! Truly. Genuinely. Sincerely. This windbag 
apologises something like 9 times, not to mention those uttered ‘in general’ 
before Amy arrives. 
Without detailing the breadth of Derrida’s intervention here, suffice to say 
he pulls De Man up for apparently forgetting that Rousseau is already in a state 
of repetition in his curious structural duplication of the confession of a minor 
crime as pivotal moment in that other inaugural work, Augustine’s Confessions. 
Moreover, Derrida finds De Man overly close to a duplication of the separation 
of constative from performative when he separates event of confession (in the 
first instance) to the machine of excuse or apology (in the second or any other 
instance). While event is traditionally conceived as spontaneous, affective 
9. See Derrida, “Typewriter Ribbon,” and Paul de Man “Excuses (Confessions)” in Allegories of 
Reading, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1979), 278-301.
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and organic and while the mechanical is thought of as repetitious, unfeeling, 
automata, Derrida comes to hyphenate the two. He recasts the performative 
that holds out so much temptation for the spontaneous, as machine-event.10 
The perversion that is pleasure in writing is there from the ‘first’. ‘First’ like 
‘when’ in the belated relays of Tape, is difficult to determine, and the archives of 
the confession are, as Derrida remarks, ‘interminable’.11 Thus speech acts  
cannot be stopped, not because they command unerring precision, but because 
their course can always be redirected… 
These remarks echo those of Vismann in her conclusion to the essay 
on the question of ‘replaying the crime’ (‘Rejouer les Crimes’). There, instead 
of magnifying a fear of media and calling a halt to the intercession of images 
in the name of the judge, Vismann points to the ‘play of gazes’ in the theatre 
of justice as already themselves citational ~ the machinic quality to which 
reprographic media draw attention and which De Man framed as secondary.12 
Citationality, in all senses, is exploited by Amy. It is not that only Amy 
constitutively can have the last word ~ and a last word that she explicitly denies 
to Jon ~ but rather that the force of surprise is so much on her side that neither 
man knows how to continue. 
Amy derails the authority of Jon’s actions as his apology retroactively 
positions them by saying that she was not raped, ruining the first person 
affirmation of his linguistic reparation. Jon may well have been ‘reckless’ as 
to Amy’s consent that night ~ and it comes as another shock for him to learn 
that she was then in love with him.13Putting his hand over her mouth certainly 
contributed to the lack of any accompanying speech on her part that night.  
But speaking now in room 19, Amy rewrites the place where she is expected 
to be as the passively functioning tape recording the inscriptions of the men. 
Tape decks the twin clichés of gender and technology ~ of inscription as phallic 
mark on virgin ground, and of passive feminine sexuality as inaugurated 
in reaction to the active ‘writing’ of masculine sexuality. In this light, Jon’s 
insistence that he really means what he says and his pleas for Amy to accept his 
apologies function as another attempted insemination.
Now Amy’s rewrite is not easy. Twice more she demonstrates her distance 
from their plot. Firstly, she lets rip a stream of lurid invective at Jon wishing 
a brutal assault upon his person, only to abruptly shift with disarming irony 
10. In this light we might think of the implications of the name of the Motor Palace.
11. Derrida, “Typewriter Ribbon”, 71.
12. Vismann, “Rejouer les Crimes”, 174.
13. Legal scholar Ngaire Naffine notes both that the UK Sexual Offences Act includes the codicil 
that a man may be judged guilty of rape if he is ‘reckless’ as to whether the woman consents (21, n.67), 
and that in Australian legislation the Victorian Parliament includes silence on the part of the woman as 
‘enough to show that the act took place without that person’s free agreement’ (37). See her “Possession: 
Erotic Love in the Law of Rape” in The Modern Law Review, 57:1, (1994), 10-37.
LY NN TURNER | TAPE PL AYS TELETRIBUNALS
into a smile, charging the men with having prescribed just such a performance. 
As they reel she delivers another blow. Mobilising the language of the law, 
she fakes a phone call to the police and appears to shop both Jon and Vince, 
the first for a ‘verified’ Criminal Sexual Conduct felony and the second for 
possession of illegal substances. Unable to marshall further apologies to a body 
for whom they cut no ice, Jon hands himself over to the judgement of the other. 
Meanwhile, Vince in panic flushes his drugs and destroys the tape he had so 
laboured to make. Revealing the hoax, Amy leaves the room, leaves Tape, and 
leaves the men without their alibi, both in the end the ‘dumb guy’.
Remarkable extradiegetically as it is that Robert Sean Leonard [Jon] in a 
cast interview still refers to Tape in comparison to Rashomon as if we end this 
film unable to decide between the testimonies of the two witnesses, and,  
that several years after the release of Tape, Uma Thurman was to front a 
number of execrable Virgin Media advertisements in which she personified 
exactly the kind of domesticated media that is deconstructed in Tape, Tape 
nevertheless displays the ‘ordeal’ of the decision, on which Vismann was to 
insist in her seminars on Derrida’s ‘Force of Law’ at Goldsmiths.14 It is not that 
Amy becomes identical with justice, fully present at such. The calls she  
makes, as I’ve suggested are shot through with citational precedent, yet her 
audience do not see this machine event coming. 
 
LY NN TURNER
14. Derrida, Jacques, “Force of Law” in Cornell, Drucilla et al eds. Deconstruction & the  
Possibility of Justice, (New York & London: Routledge, 1992), 24. I very much appreciated Cornelia’s  
kindness and brilliance in contributing seminars on “Force of Law” for the M A class on performativity 
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Abstract: In my contribution I want to address some of the texts by Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari (henceforth: D|G) and investigate their relationship to feminist theory. I 
would also like to make some suggestions concerning a possible theoretical development 
consisting of a queering of D|G’s positions. My critical reading of Deleuze is directed 
against some views taken by Judith Butler, not because I think her work is “too  
poststructuralist” or “too constructivist”, but because it is not poststructuralist and 
constructivist enough. My presentation also aims at a rematerialisation of the body, of 
gender and of sexuality, as it has been demanded by a growing number of scholars in 
recent times. Deleuzian concepts like “becoming woman” are located at the centre of this 
rematerialisation. A critical analysis of desire, as it is used by the authors of Anti- 
Oedipus and Thousand Plateaus, is crucial in order to think productively about a 
queering of D|G. 
Freudian Desire and Queer Criticism 
In 1972, Guy Hocquenghem, gay revolutionary activist and writer, published 
his manifesto, Le désir homosexuel, followed by another text, entitled L’après-mai  
des faunes. Both texts address the open persecution of homosexuals by the 
French state, but also talk about the homophobic paranoia of French society, 
which made homosexuals prisoners of heteronormative concepts of sexuality. 
In France, homosexuality was perceived either as a crime to be kept in check by 
the police and the courts or as a psychological abnormality that should be  
treated. An important part of his analysis of the homosexual condition of his 
time was an assault on Sigmund Freud and his school, and especially  
on Freud’s concept of desire and its further development by Jacques Lacan.  
Freudianism ~ according to Hocquenghem ~ maintains a privileged  
position, because it is both the discoverer of the mechanisms of desire and 
the institution of its control.2 Control is exercised by the inscription of  
homosexual energy (force) into the oedipal triangle, which is at the center of 
psychoanalysis and the linchpin of western culture.3 One thing is certain,  
1. I owe the title of this paper to Didier Eribon, Réflexions sur la question gay (Paris: Fayard,  
1999), 456. 
2. “Le freudisme joue un rôle privilégié : il est à la fois le découvreur des mécanismes du désir et 
l’organisme de leur contrôle.” Guy Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire, trans Daniella Dangoor (London: 
Allison & Busby, 1978), 59. See also: Lawrence R. Schehr, “Defense and Illustration of Gay Liberation,” 
Yale French Studies 90 (1996): 139-152, 140 f.
3. “At a time when capitalist individualisation is undermining the family by depriving it of its 
essential functions, the Oedipus complex represents the internalisation of the family institution […] 
This is only proper: the Oedipus complex is the only effective means of controlling the libido. Stages 
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if we believe the Freudians: homosexuals cannot escape their dominant, 
domineering and loving mothers. Did not Marcel Proust rewrite the diabolical 
passages in ‘A la recherche du temps perdu’ only after his mother’s death?  
According to Hocquenghem, the desire to maternalise (“materniser”) 
everything integrated homosexuals into the infernal oedipal ballet, assigning 
him the role of the damned in the process. This way, Freudianism was able 
to identify both the cause and the person responsible for homosexuality. As 
important as their libido is for the feelings of human beings, it is entangled in 
the oedipal privatization from which there is no getaway for homosexuals. In 
the seventies this fundamental discovery of the Freudian school had solidified 
discursively and even renowned French mass media started mother-bashing 
when it came to explanations of homosexuality. 
The astounding certainties provided by the Freudians not only secured 
the control mechanisms of homosexualities within the oedipal triangle, but 
included homosexuals also within a tyrannical dichotomy of active and  
passive. Every homosexual subject is called upon defining his sexual identity in 
relation to activism or passivism. The therapeutic drive is clearly focused on  
the allegedly passive homosexuals. Therapists define the character of the  
homosexual by looking through the lens of pathologic passivity. Passive  
homosexuals ~ according to the popularized version of Freudian theory ~ 
share hysteria and an unbalanced personality with women. Both, women and 
passive homosexuals, lack the phallus and the phallus is the only possible  
allocator of identity. Within the dominant discourse, the true, i.e. passive 
homosexual is nothing but an ersatz woman, an illusion of woman, a copy of 
woman. Homosexuals lack essence; it is a desperate void that characterizes 
/ designates homosexuals. This emptiness can be filled to some extent by 
sublimation, i.e. through art or the creation of cultural artefacts / objects. Since 
homosexuality is a form of emptiness, death equals homosexual desire, 
if not real death, then at least symbolical death. 
The introduction for Hocquenghem’s acerbic analysis of the homophobic 
structure in Freudian thought was written by Gilles Deleuze, who was very 
much inspired by the young gay author, especially by his critique of the  
oedipal triangle, the ‘restricted Trinitarian formula ~ oedipal, neurotic: papa 
~ mama ~ me’.
4 Deleuze, who published his monumental Anti-Oedipus with 
Felix Guattari in 1972, addressed the concept of desire in his foreword to 
Hocquenghem’s volume: 
 
need to be built, a pyramidal construction that will enclose homosexual desire within the three sides of 
the triangle.” Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire, 60; 65. 
4. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Ödipus: Kapitalismus und Schizophrenie I (Frankfurt / 
Main: Syndikat, 1986), 32 [my translation, N.F.].
ZETESIS VOL. 1, NO. 1
“Some of the more ridiculous pages Freud ever wrote are those on 
“fellatio”: such a bizarre and “shocking” desire can have no worth of 
its own; it must be traceable to a cow udder, and from there to the 
mother’s breast. Freud thinks we would get more pleasure sucking on 




“It is not the past but the present that determines whether one is 
homosexual, once we admit that childhood was already a presence 
that did not refer to a past. Because desire never represents anything, 
and it doesn’t refer back to something waiting in the wings of the 
familial or personal theatre. Desire makes connections, it assembles, 
it machines.” 6 
“Becoming Woman”
D|G’s thoughts and writing affect the topic at hand in a twofold way: First 
there is the line of flight of the “becoming woman” , a concept that was rather 
misunderstood and criticized than understood and accepted. D|G introduce 
this concept extensively in the tenth chapter of ‘A Thousand Plateaus’, which is 
entitled ‘Becoming Intense, Becoming Animal, Becoming Imperceptible’.7 As 
can be seen from the chapter’s title, it revolves around the crucial notion of the 
becoming, a concept that is diametrically opposed to the essentialist notion of 
the essence. D|G explain becoming by what it is not, at first. 
“A becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither  
is it a resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification. 
[…] To become is not to progress or regress along a series. Above 
all, becoming does not occur in the imagination, even when 
the imagination reaches the highest cosmic or dynamic level […]. 
Becoming-animal are neither dreams nor fantasies. They are perfectly 
real. But what reality is at issue here? For if becoming animal does not 
5. Gilles Deleuze, “Vorwort zu L’après-mai des faunes,” in Gilles Deleuze, Die einsame Insel:  
Texte und Gesprä-che 1953-1974 (Frankfurt / Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 412-418, 413.
6. Deleuze, “Vorwort zu L’après-mai des faunes,” 413. 
7. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Tausend Plateaus: Kapitalismus und Schizophrenie (Berlin: 
Merve, 1997), 317-422. 
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consist in playing animal or imitating an animal, it is clear that the 
human being does not really become an animal any more than the 
animal “really” becomes something else. Becoming produces nothing 
other than itself. We fall into a false alternative if we say that you 
either imitate or you are.8 […] Becoming can and should be qualified 
as becoming-animal in the absence of a term that would be the animal 
become.” 9 
And much later, in the same chapter, D|G ramble on: 
“Becoming animal is only one becoming among others. A kind  
of order or apparent progression can be established for the  
segments of becoming in which we find ourselves; becoming-woman,  
becoming-child; becoming animal, vegetable, or ~ mineral; becomings- 
molecular of all kinds, becoming particles. […] Singing or composing, 
painting, writing have no other aim: to unleash these becomings. 
Especially music; music is traversed by a becoming-woman,  
becoming-child, […]” 10 
I want to emphasize D|G’s observation that this Great Chain of Becoming only 
seemingly represents a progress from different segments of becoming. Music 
and writing for example cannot be placed into a definite stage of future  
progress.11 I will come back to this point later on. 
On the same page, D|G attempt a positive definition of becoming: 
“Starting from the form one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, 
or the functions one fulfills, becoming is to extract particles between 
which one establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and 
slowness that are closest to what is becoming, and through which 
one becomes. This is the sense in which becoming is the process of 
desire.” 12  
 
8. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis,  
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 262. 
9. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 262. 
10. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 300. 
11. “Futurus” is the PFA of the Latin verb fieri which means “to become”. 
12. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 300-301. 
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D|G differentiate between molar and molecular forms of subjects: The subject 
for D|G is the result of diverse force relations that constantly shape and shift 
its form. [D|G] call these two different states “molar” and “molecular”: molar 
means rigid, fixed and bulk headed sedimentations, whereas molecular denotes 
flexibility, liquidity, mobility and undecidability. The individual always moves 
between these two states, between being and becoming something other.13 The 
concept of becoming-woman is a contested and debated one. If one looks close 
enough at the text, however, the misunderstandings dissolve sooner or later. 
Since ‘all becomings are molecular’, D|G underscore the fact that there is ‘a 
becoming-woman, a becoming-child, that do not resemble the woman or the 
child as clearly distinct molar entities […] Becoming woman is not imitating 
[the molar entity] or even transforming oneself into it.’ Becoming-woman 
consists of ‘emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or 
the zone of proximity, of a microfeminity, in other words, that produce in us 
a molecular woman, create the molecular woman.’ 14 And in concluding the 
round dance of quotations: ‘Although all becomings are already molecular, 
including becoming-woman, it must be said that all becomings begin with and 
pass through becoming-woman. It is the key to all other becomings.’ 15 “Why 
are there so many becomings of man, but no becoming-man? First because 
man is majoritarian par excellence, whereas becomings are minoritarian; all 
becoming is a becoming-minoritarian. […] Even Blacks, as the Black Panthers 
said, must become-black.” 16  The opposition minoritarian ~ majoritarian is not 
a mathematical relation: “Majority implies a constant, of expression or content, 
serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it.” This constant is “the 
average adult-white-heterosexual-european-male speaking a standard language 
[…] even if he is less numerous than the mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, 
peasants, homosexuals, etc.” 17
In a conversation with Claire Parnet Deleuze explained the majoritarian 
man: “The adult male has no becoming. He may become woman, if he  
participates in minoritarian processes.” 18 ‘Becoming-woman’ is the act or the 
practice of embodying of female instability and multiplicity, the resistance 
13. “Postsexuelle Körper,” http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/themen/cyborg_bodies/postsexuelle_
koerper/11/, accessed 21.01.08 [my translation, N.F.]. 
14. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 303-304. 
15. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 306. 
16. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 320-321. 
17. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 116. 
18. “L’homme mâle adulte, il n’a pas un devenir. Il peut devenir femme, alors il s’engage dans les 
processus mino-ritaires. La gauche, c’est l’ensemble des processus de devenir minoritaires. Donc, je 
peux dire, à la lettre: la ma-jorité c’est personne, la minorité c’est tout le monde. C’est ça, être de gauche 
: savoir que la minorité, c’est tout le monde.” Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, L’Abécédiaire de Gilles 
Deleuze (Paris, 1996), video edition [my translation, N.F.]. 
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against the status of the solid and the representative which is defined as male. 
Brian Massumi describes becoming as a dispersed outside, as ‘the great  
dissipative outside stretching uncertainly on the wild side of the welcome 
mat’.19 Becoming woman therefore is a necessary state in the process of 
becoming, even if Massumi concedes, that the wording by D|G is sexist.20 “The 
feminine gender stereotype involves greater indeterminacy (‘fickle’) and 
movement (‘flighty’) and has been burdened by the patriarchal tradition with a 
disproportionate load of paradox (virgin / whore, mother / lover)”.21
These are, arguably, the most important positions taken by D|G with 
regard to becomimg-woman. They have been severely criticized by feminists. 
While feminist thinkers like Rosi Braidotti, Claire Colebrook, Elizabeth 
Grosz and others have attempted to connect D|G to feminist theory in order to 
develop a non-identitary definition of corporeality, there is probably no greater 
chasm in feminist thinking than between adherents of a Deleuzian concept 
of the body and Judith Butler. Butler’s implicit insistence on an opposition 
between sex and gender abolished the dualism between body and mind on 
the one hand, while preserving it on the other. By arguing that the so-called 
natural body is always already part of a discourse, she reduces every reference 
to the natural body to a discursive effect.22 “Accordingly, the attempt is made 
to ‘free’ gender from sex ~ to see gender not as cultural overlay of sex but as 
that which produces ‘sex’ as a discursive given […] Gender is not, then, the 
social construction of ‘sex’; ‘sex’ is yet one more discursive effect.” Any form 
of a pre-discursive outside is therefore cast aside. Although for Butler the body 
is a material body, this materiality is only existent within discourse and does 
not include a material raw form. Corporeality cannot be conceived of outside 
of discourse. “[…] Butler argues that corporeality may not be discursive […] but 
this status as prediscursive is an effect of discourse.” 23 According to Butler, any 
form of imagining the body as a given outside object would lead invariably to a 
biologist determinism. This assertion rests on the definition of representation 
in Butler’s work: Representation for Butler consists of a negation of materiality: 
“To posit a materiality outside of language is still to posit that materiality,  
19. Brian Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and 
Guattari (Cambridge, M A: MIT Press, 1992), 95. 
20. “Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of the concept of “becoming-woman” is indeed sexist. 
The burden of change is placed on women, since it is their cliché that is singled out.” Massumi, A User’s 
Guide, 89. 
21. Massumi, A User’s Guide, 86.
22. Abigail Bray and Claire Colebrook, “The Haunted Flesh: Corporeal Feminism and the Politics 
of (Dis)Embodiment,” Signs vol. 24, no. 1 (Autumn, 1998): 35-67, 42. The authors refer to Judith Butler, 
Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge, 1993), 22.
23. Bray and Colebrook, “The Haunted Flesh,” 42. Butler, Bodies That Matter, 30. In the German 
translation the quotation is found on page 32f. 
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and that materiality so posited will retain that positing as its constitutive  
condition.” 24 Abigail Bray and Claire Colebrook use this conception of  
representation as a departure for a critique of Butler: The harsh separation  
between representation and matter extends the Western Cartesian dualism  
and thus puts an end to debates about specific problems like eating disorders.  
“Eating disorders, for example, might not possess a single relation to 
representation, nor could they be exhaustively accounted for through some 
general theory of signification and its relation to the signified.” 25 One could 
transcend the critique by Bray and Colebrook by asking what kind of matter 
Butler talks about when she insists that materializations always constitute a 
stabilization, “to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call 
matter”? 26 I would polemically call this definition of matter a Newtonian,  
pre-thermodynamical essentialism that ignores the existence of fluid and  
gassy matter. This misconception of matter is enhanced by Butler’s insistence 
on the concept of sedimentation, i.e. residue of solid matter in different layers. 
Matter for Butler is a problem of solid body physics.27  
“It is still not acceptable for the flesh and boundaries of fluid, volatile, 
messy, leaky bodies to be included in [philosophical] discourse. […] 
When [philosophers] speak of the body they still often fail to talk 
about a body that breaks its boundaries ~ urinates, bleeds, vomits, 
farts, engulfs tampons, objects of sexual desire, ejaculates and gives 
birth.” 28 
 
Sedimentation without the defining influence of water and wind, however, is 
inconceivable. Currents, erosion, and the various shifting of the ground have a 
material power in the creation of sediments.29 Even if one wants to limit matter 
24. Butler, Bodies That Matter, 67-68.
25. Bray and Colebrook, “The Haunted Flesh,” 43.
26. Butler, Bodies That Matter, 9.
27. Solid body physics pretty much remains a domain of male physicists. Margaret W. Rossiter, 
“Which Science? Which Women?,” Osiris, vol. 12, Women, Gender, and Science: New Directions.  
(1997): 169-185, 174.
28. Robyn Longhurst, Bodies: Exploring Fluid Boundaries (London: Routledge, 2001), 223. Longhurst 
speaks about geographical discourses only and I have to confess that I alienated her quotation from  
its context in order to make a point about philosophy. This quote reads almost like D|G’s famous  
quotation in Anti-Oedipus: ”It is at work everywhere [… it] breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks.” 
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 1.
29. Lawrence P. Sanford, “New Sedimentation, Resuspension, and Burial,” Limnology and 
Oceanography vol. 37, no. 6. (Sep. 1992): 1164-1178. John McManus, “Temporal and Spatial Variations 
in Estuarine Sedimentation,” Estuaries vol. 21, no. 4, Part A: Dedicated Issue: Transport, Retention, 
Transformation Processes and Their Bio-logical Control in Estuarine and Coastal Systems: Second 
International Joint Conference, Estuarine and Coastal Sciences Association and Estuarine Research 
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to solid bodies “to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call 
matter” there are forces at work that can only be described in the etiology of 
becoming. Sedimentation requires by definition a force outside of the bodies 
that become layered sediments. “[…] by arguing that matter, while not purely 
discursive, is still other than discursive, Butler sustains an opposition between 
discourse and some‚ outside […]” 30
If we look at the Deleuzian concept of strata and layers, we discover a 
much more supple definition. A sedimentation, once it is achieved, is not fixed 
but almost fluid. 
 
“[…] there is no reason to think that all matter is confined to the 
physicochemical strata: there exists a submolecular, unformed Matter. 
Similarly, not all Life is confined to the organic strata: rather, the 
organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, 
and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being 
anorganic.” 31 
 
Elizabeth Grosz has taken up the idea of fluid and malleable matter in her 
collection of essays entitled Space, Time and Perversion (1995). According to her, 
the border between the inside and the outside cannot be drawn sharply but 
diffuse as pliable, fluid, and dynamic. Thus the border between the Self and 
the Other that is so constitutive for representation is exposed to a constant 
process of refiguration and negotiation.32 Deleuze, in explaining Foucault’s 
work, provided a formula that is even more penetrating: “The Outside is not 
a fixed limit but moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and 
foldings that altogether make up an inside: they are not something other than 
the outside, but precisely the inside of an outside.” 33 Where Butler’s model of 
performativity rests on the assumption of a materialization of the corporeal 
through repetition as sediments, Grosz insisted on the body’s and sexuality’s 
instability.34 According to her, bodies have to be conceived of as entities that 
can do more than society / culture acknowledge. Here we have a body with  
 
Federation. (Dec. 1998): 622-634. 
30. Bray and Colebrook, “The Haunted Flesh,” 43. 
31. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 554.
32. Elizabeth Grozs, Space, Time and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies (New York: Routledge, 
1995). See also Linda Martín Alcoff, “Philosophy Matters: A Review of Recent Works in Feminist 
Philosophy,” Signs vol. 25, no. 3 (Spring, 2000): 841-882, 860-868.
33. Deleuze, Foucault (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 97. 
34. Elizabeth Grozs, “Experimental Desire. Rethinking Queer Subjectivity,” in Supposing the 
Subject, ed. Joan Copjec (London, New York: Verso, 1994), 133-157. 
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extremely fluid borders, with the ability to cough up the interior and to 
incorporate the exterior. 
Let’s move back from Butler and Grosz to D|G: For some feminists, the 
concept of becoming-woman is just another example for the (all-too) well-
known process of female exclusion from representation by presenting this 
exclusion as the result of dissolution of representation. Luce Irigaray and 
Alice Jardine have argued that even if Deleuzian thinking is understood as 
innovative it contained an implicit rejection of femininity. Irigaray expressed 
strong reservations against the Deleuzian project, “arguing that fluidity,  
non-being, liminality and marginality, as well as a condition of symbolic exile 
are part and parcel of women’s history of oppression.” 35 One could sum up 
Irigaray’s und Jardine’s line of reasoning in one question: Does not ‘becoming-
woman’ risk to repeat the historical invisibility of women in the name of 
a literary and philosophical experiment by scraping out an indispensable 
category and by celebrating its disappearance? According to Jardine, in 
reference to animated materiality the concept of becoming turns women into 
simulacra, “a female figure caught in a whirling sea of male configurations”.36 
Rosi Braidotti, who identifies herself as a Deleuzian feminist and has fought for 
a feminist reinterpretation of D|G, concluded in 1994 “[…] no other specificity 
is granted to women’s struggles and discursivity: the highly specific theoretical 
and political itineraries of feminism are thus reduced to a generalised 
contribution to the final destruction of the knowing subject.” 37 It is important 
to note, however, that Braidotti does not refer to D|G’s major texts, but to 
a small article by Guattari and to the queer activist Hocquenghem, writing 
about the destruction of sexuality.38 This casualness is telling, since D|G write 
in A Thousand Plateaus about the indispensability of feminism: “It is, of course, 
indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view of winning 
back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity: ‘we as 
women…’ makes its appearance as a subject of enunciation.” 39 
Be that as it may, Braidotti seems to have shifted her position, because she 
noted an honest attempt at undermining the oedipal order by the concept of 
becoming. On the other hand she indicts D|G for taking the position of the,  
‘I know, but’: 
35. Rosi Braidotti, “Nomadism with a Difference: Deleuze’s Legacy in a Feminist Perspective,” 
Man and World, 29 (1996): 305-314, 310. 
36. Alice A. Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1985), 217.
37. Rosi Braidotti, “Patterns of Dissonance: Women and / in Philosophy,” in Feministische  
Philosophie, ed. Herta Nagl-Docekal (Wien: R. Oldenbourg, 1990), 108-122, 117. 
38. Braidotti, “Patterns of Dissonance,” fn 11. 
39. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 304. 
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“[…It] seems to me that Deleuze’s theory of becoming is obviously  
determined by his location as an embodied male subject for whom the  
dissolution of identities based on the phallus results in by-passing  
gender altogether, toward a multiple sexuality. This, however, may not 
be the option best suited to female embodied subjects.” 40  
 
Even if D|G’s position as molar men is not the best starting point for a 
feminist critique, Braidotti grants D|G that by abolishing the masculinist 
foundations of classical subjectivity they open up new potentials for feminist 
empowerment.41 The emphasis on thinking differently with the insistence 
on the de-essentializing of the body, of sexuality and sexual identity contains, 
according to Braidotti, the possibility of constructing of new desiring subjects.42 
“We need to learn how to think differently, especially about our own notion of 
the subject; this is one of the points where the Deleuzian project intersects with 
feminist theory.” 43
Desire as Lack 
Insofar as one wants to follow Judith Butler in her sympathetic attempt  
to de-essentialize the body and gender, for a deluded Deleuzian problems arise 
when Butler uses Lacanian psychoanalysis in order to clarify the corporeal 
foundations of subjectivity. Lacan’s theory of the imaginary is founded on the 
observation of the mirror stage in child development, the period between  
the 6th and the 18th month of life, when a child starts to recognize itself in front 
of a mirror. This self-identificatory act alters the perception of the self, in a 
way it is the precondition for the perception of the self: the partial objects 
of the body are never perceived as a totality; it is only the gaze from outside 
that shows the child as a complete body. According to Lacan, this mirror 
stages coincides with the birth of the Ego. On the other side, it constitutes 
the beginning of alienation, because in the mirror stage the child observes 
a corporeal unity that it does not feel. The child therefore identifies with 
something that it is not, i.e. with the ‘total form of the body’ in a location it 
40. Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist 
Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 122.
41. Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects, 149. 
42. Rosi Braidotti, “Toward a New Nomadism: Feminist Deleuzean Tracks; or, Metaphysics  
and Metabolism,” in Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy, eds. Constantin V. Boundas and  
Dorothea Olkowski (New York: Routeledge, 1994), 159-185, 163. See also Kimberly Lamm, “Writing  
Becoming-Woman: The Movement of Deleuzean Thought in Contemporary American Poetry,” in 
theory@buffalo 8, http://wings.buffalo.edu/theory/archive/archive.html, accessed January 19, 2008.
43. Rosi Braidotti, “Nomadism with a Difference,” 305-314, 308. 
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does not inhabit ~ the mirror. Therefore, recognition in the mirror is at the 
same time imaginary misrecognition (méconnaissance) and leads to a subject’s 
split between the imaginary subject ‘moi’ and the social ‘je’. This is the reason 
for the seemingly paradox sentence ‘The I is not the Me’, ‘Le je n’est pas le moi.’ 
Important objections have been raised against the importation of Lacanian 
categories into feminist theory ~ above all by those who resented the fact that 
Lacan’s approach contains and preserves ideas conceptualized by Sigmund 
Freud. By claiming the subject as the effect of a representative closure,  
corporeality becomes an outward appearance to which there is no access. 
Subjectivity thus is locatable in a psychoanalytic interpretation of the repressed, 
rejected or negated effects of corporeality only. Corporeal feminism ~ a term 
invented by Elizabeth Grosz ~ has very often engaged in an alliance with  
psychoanalysis in the past.44 The Lacanian subject suffers from an incurable 
defect from the start ~ it lacks. This lack starts with birth because the child is 
thrown out of the bliss of his embryonic existence. With the separation from  
its mother’s breast, the child experiences the second existential lack, which  
is reinforced by the alienation in the mirror image. This incompleteness has to 
be adjusted for provisionally ~ according to Lacan ~ by objects, even though 
the striving for objects cannot achive the abolition of incompleteness. This is 
the theoretical foundation of a theory of desire with Lacan. 
Without delving too deeply into the history of Lacan’s and Freud’s  
concepts within corporeal feminism, it may be important to emphasize the 
following: Following Freund and Lacan, representation, meaning and  
subjectivity are located around the notion of lack.45 Maternal, preoedipal,  
preconscious fullness is negated in the movement that creates the subject. 
Identity is the effect of difference that represents the negation of the original 
identity. For Lacan the subject remains alienated and this alienation is the 
consequence of the denial of fullness.46 Feminist theory has appropriated 
some parts of this theory, especially the metaphor of the castration as negative 
expression of fullness. Even Judith Butler’s discussion of the lesbian phallus  
 
44. Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, vii. Pertaining to the importance of 
psychoanalysis see Rosi Braidotti, “The Politics of Ontological Difference, ” in Between Feminism and 
Psychoanalysis, ed. Teresa Brennan (London, New York: Routledge, 1989), 89-105. Quoted in Bray and 
Colebrook, “The Haunted Flesh,” 47.
45. “L’objet de la psychanalyse n’est pas l’homme; c’est ce qui lui manque, ~ non pas manque 
absolu, mais manque d’un objet. Encore faut-il s’entendre sur le manque dont il s’agit, c’est celui qui met 
hors de question qu’on en mentionne l’objet.” Jacques Lacan, “Réponses à des étudiants en philosophie 
sur l’objet de la psychanalyse,” in Les Cahiers pour l’analyse, publiés par le cercle d’Epistémologie de 
l’Ecole Normale Supérieure, no. 3 (mai-juin 1966), http://www.lutecium.org/pro.wanadoo.fr/espace.
freud/topos/psycha/psysem/lacan66.htm, accessed January 15, 2008.
46. Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection (New York: Norton, 1977), 292-325; Jacques Lacan, The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (New York: Norton, 1978), 112-118; 244-246; 272-276.
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begins with a critical approval of the castration matrix. Prelinguistic fullness is 
sometimes equated with the principal of the maternal.47 
Feminist or queer theory that rejects the philosophy of lack has to be able 
to offer resistance to the territorializing forces of the lack, thereby setting free 
desire as disconnected from deficiency. Referring to D|G, Guy Hocquenghem 
wrote in 1972, 
 
“There is one organ, one sexual organ only, at the center of the Oedipal 
triangle, the One which determines the place to be occupied by the 
other three elements of the triangle. The One creates the lack; it 
determines the absence or presence; the penis envy of the little girl, 
or the castration fear of the little boy. As the signifying despot, it 
organizes the global situations of people. As the complete detached 
object, it plays, in the sexuality of out society, the role money plays in 
the capitalist economy; the fetish, the veritable universal reference of 
activity, economic in one case, desiring in the other.” 48
 
D|G offer such a post-Lacanian theory of desire, in which desire comes in as an 
autonomous force that not only opposes social determination but constructs 
the social realm in multiple ways.49 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak sympathetically 
calls Deleuze’s concept of desire a ‘nominalist catachresis.’ 50  Desire for D|G is 
a real, material, productive and overfilling force. It is dislodged from need. 
Needs are nothing but the effects of desire, thus making desire a self-propelling 
social energy.51 It is important to note that the Deleuzian désir must not be 
confounded with needs, lust or lack.52 Because it is not internal to the subject, 
47. Bray and Colebrook, “The Haunted Flesh,” 54.
48. “Il y a un organe, un organe sexuel seulement, qui est au centre de la triangulation oedipienne, 
le Un qui donne leur place aux trois élément du triangle. C’est lui qui construit le manque, c’est lui le 
signifiant despotique par rapport auquel se créent des personnes globales. Il est l’objet complet détaché 
qui joue dans la sexualité de notre société le rôle de l’argent dans l’économie capitaliste: le fétiche, la 
véritable référence universelle de l’activité, économique dans un cas, désirante dans l’autre.” Guy 
Hocquenghem, Le désir homosexuel (Paris: Fayard, 2000), 94 f. See Guy Hocquenghem, “Family, Capital, 
Anus,” URL http://www.semiotexte.com/documentPage/familyCapitalAnus.html, accessed 26 June 2009.
49. Stevie Schmiedel, “With or Without Lacan? Becoming-Woman between the Language of 
Organs and the Anorganism of Language,” in theory@buffalo 8, http://wings.buffalo.edu/theory/archive/
archive.html, accessed January 19, 2008. 
50. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing 
Present (Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press, 1999), 251. 
51. Teresa Ebert, “For a Red Pedagogy: Feminism, Desire, and Need,” College English, vol. 58, no. 7 
(1996): 795-819, 797. 
52. Alice Jardine, “Women in Limbo: Deleuze and His Brothers,” SubStance, vol. 13, no. 3-4, issues 
44-45 (1984): 46-60, 48. 
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desire cannot be related to lack.53 “[…D]esire is understood by Deleuze […] 
as immanent, as positive and productive, a fundamental, full and creative 
relation. […] desire is what produces the real.” 54 With the refutation of lack 
comes the dismissal of the phallus’s centrality and the Oedipus complex. Guy 
Hocquenghem has called this movement ‘la protestation contre le découpage 
oedipien’ or the protest against oedipal carving up.55 
 
“Castration is at once the common lot ~ that is, the prevalent and 
transcendent Phallus, and the exclusive distribution that presents 
itself in girls as desire for the penis, and in boys as fear of losing it or 
refusal of a passive attitude. This something in common must lay the 
foundation for the exclusive use of the disjunctions of the unconscious 
~ and teach us resignation […] ~ in short, ‘assumption of one’s sex.’”
 56  
 
‘Women’ and ‘Men’ according D|G are not subjects that lack, that suffer from 
penis envy or fear of castration, but machinic agencements, desiring machines 
or bodies without organs, configurations of the masculine and the feminine 
which communicate with each other constantly without having something 
in common.57 Instead of fixed sexes, according to D|G, there is a microscopic 
transsexuality that is produced by women incorporating integrating men and 
vice versa.58 This position dissolves gender duality on a molecular level. 
Becoming Gay ~ a stage in becoming-minoritarian?
 
Homosexuality is positioned centrally by both D|G and Deleuze as a single 
author. There are several more than passing remarks in Deleuze’s  
books on Sacher-Masoch and on Marcel Proust. In Proust et les signes Deleuze 
dedicated several pages to Proust’s homosexuality in order to underline his 
opposition to the run-of-the-mill interpretation of Proust’s homosexuality as 
inversion.59 Even if there is not one authorative text by Deleuze on  
53. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues (Paris: Champs, 1977), 108. 
54. Elizabeth Grosz, “A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics,” in Deleuze and  
Guattari: Critical As-sessments of Leading Philosophers, ed. Gary Genosko (London, New York: Routledge, 
2001), 1440-1463, 1448. 
55. Guy Hocquenghem, Le désir homosexuel, 162. 
56. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 67. 
57. “ [… ] neither is there anything in common between the two sexes, nor do they cease  
communicating with each other […]” Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 67. 
58. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 325; Jardine, “Women in Limbo,” 50. 
59. Didier Eribon, “Gilles Deleuze,” in Dictionnaire des cultures gays et lesbiennes (Paris:  
Larousse, 2003). 
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homosexuality, Deleuze has taken up a queer position in his practice of  
writing and his intimate cooperation with Felix Guattari and Claire Parnet.60
“Nous sommes hétérosexuels statistiquement ou molairement, mais  
homosexuels personnellement, sans le savoir ou en le sachant, et enfin  
trans-sexués élémentairement, moléculairement.” 61 “We are statistical and  
molar heterosexuals, but personal homosexuals, without knowing it, and  
finally elementary and molecular transsexuals.” Molarly, a human being may be 
a man or a woman, heterosexual or homosexual, but on a molecular level, this 
human entity is always polymorphously perverse, because its desire does not 
have a target. It goes without saying that Deleuze does not consider the term 
perverse a negative one. D|G perceive the homosexual as a minoritarian stage, 
but both authors fail to include homosexuality in their writing about  
becoming. D|G mention homosexuality in A Thousand Plateaus passingly 
and in a treacherous context that borders on homophobia. Speaking about 
imitation in the context of becoming-woman, the authors assert, “We are not, 
however, overlooking the importance of imitation, or moments of imitation, 
among certain homosexual males, muss less the prodigious attempt at a real 
transformation on the part of certain transvestites.” 62 This is where I see a 
problem: Deleuze’s works have been used over and over again by others who 
worked in the context of Queer Theory. (Grosz, 1995; Edelman, 1995; Giffney, 
2004); a special edition of Rhizomes even suggests that in consonance with 
Deleuze a new form of queerness can be defined. On the other hand, Deleuze 
refused to be identified as queer himself. This has been criticized by activists 
and theoreticians of Queer. Jeffrey Cohen and Todd Ramlow remarked 
recently: 
“The evidence for the queerness of Gilles Deleuze is scant. He 
collaborated passionately with Félix Guattari, radical psychoanalyst 
and activist for the rights of gays and lesbians. He shared his work and 
interpenetrated ideas with Michel Foucault, the founding figure of 
contemporary queer theory. Yet the philosopher spent his life happily 
married to his wife, Fanny. They raised two children in what looks to 
us like the predictable structure of a bourgeois family. He was not even 
an especially spiffy dresser.” 63 
60. Kitty Millet, “A Thousand Queer Plateaus: Deleuze’s ‘Imperceptibility’ as a Liberated
Mapping of Desire,” in Rhizomes 11, fall 2005, http://www.rhizomes.net/issue11/millet.html, 
accessed January 15, 2008.
61. “We are heterosexual statistically or in a molar sense, but homosexual personally, whether we 
know it or not, and finally transexual [sic] in an elementary or molecular sense”, Deleuze and Guattari, 
L’Anti-Oedipe, Capita-lisme et schizophrenie (Paris, 1972), cited in Hocquenghem, Le désir homosexuel, 182.
62. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 304. 
63. Jeffrey J. Cohen and Todd R. Ramlow, “Pink Vectors of Deleuze: Queer Theory and  
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Michel Cressole, gay activist, author of Une folle à sa fenêtre and one of the first 
scholars to publish a biographical essay on Deleuze in 1973, took a very  
critical stance on whether Deleuze’s work was adaptable to queer studies,  
especially given Deleuze’s own sexuality. Cressole attacked Deleuze for profiting 
from the experiments of others, homosexuals, drug addicts, alcoholics,  
masochists and insane people.64 With homosexuals on the top of his list 
of Deleuzian victims, he branded Deleuze as a theoretical parasite, who 
expropriated groups that led an already precarious existence. Cressole assaulted 
Deleuze, because he had refused to mark himself as consumer of other 
people’s social transgressions or as transgressor himself.65 Deleuze countered 
with a remarkable letter that was published under the title ‘I have nothing 
to admit’ and that even found its way into Cressole’s book on Deleuze in a 
somewhat altered form.66 Deleuze addressed the real problem: It was not about 
the acceptance of a gay identity, it was about the deterritorialization of the 
subject through the multiplicity of molecular sexes. What was there to know 
about Deleuze, since he believed in secrets and the power of deception, but 
not in representation? If he preferred to lead a stationary life, if he did not 
travel, then because he was on an internal voyage. According to Deleuze, the 
interesting question was not whether he profited from somebody else, but 
what people were doing on the corners and how all this was interrelated. “We 
have to counter people who think ‘I’m this, I’m that,’ and who do so, moreover, 
in psychoanalytic terms (relating everything to their childhood or fate), by 
thinking in strange, fluid, unusual terms: I don’t know what I am ~ I’d have 
to investigate and experiment with so many things in a non-narcissistic, non-
oedipal way ~ no gay can ever definitively say ‘I’m gay.’ It’s not a question of 
being this or that sort of human, but of becoming inhuman, of a universal 
animal becoming ~ not seeing yourself as some dumb animal, but unraveling 
your body’s human organization, exploring this or that zone of bodily 
intensity, with everyone discovering their own particular zones, and the groups, 
populations, species that inhabit them.” 67 
Confessing to be homosexual, bisexual, gay or queer was in direct 
contradiction to Deleuze’s understanding of practical philosophy, which aimed 
at becoming minoritarian. The obviously treacherous silence, the empty link 
Inhumanism,” in Rhizomes 11/12 fall 2005/spring 2006, http://www.rhizomes.net/issue11/cohenramlow.
html, accessed January 20, 2008. 
64. Michel Cressole, Deleuze (Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1973), 112.
65. Kitty Millet, “A Thousand Queer Plateaus”. 
66. Gilles Deleuze, “Cher Michel, je na’i rien a avouer,” in La Quinzaine litteraire, 116 (April 1-15, 
1973): 17-19. 
67. Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972-1990 (New York: Columbia University Press), 11. Also  
printed as Gilles Deleuze, “Letter to a Harsh Critic” http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpdeleuze4.
htm, accessed January 20, 2008. 
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“becoming-gay” in the branched-out chain of becomings, i.e. ‘becoming-woman, 
becoming-child, becoming-animal, etc.’ cannot be arranged within the chain, 
because it would have represented a visibility that D|G would have rejected. 
Nevertheless, becoming-gay could have a place in D|G and in queer theory: 
It opens a line of flight from heteronormativity that does not necessarily lead 
to a coming out but that releases practices that are arranged crosswise to the 
chain of signifiers ‘woman, child, animal, plant, mineral’, thus making possible 
a corporeal practice that embodies the dissolution of a majoritarian corporeal 
practice, thus leaving the logic of oedipal subjectivation. As a consequence, 
however, becoming-woman would lose its privileged position as a starting  
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Abstract: This paper recounts a joyful day that gives way to the quiet hostility of family 
relations. In turn this prompts an act of reclamation that gives voice to two men whose 
stories would otherwise be lost in familial shame. In trying to understand what we 
experience as shame the paper explores shame by drawing on Lynne Huffer’s exploration 
of Foucault’s use of the term bourgeois as correlative with Nietzsche’s ‘rise of the 
sovereign moral subject’. This leads to Didier Eribon’s reflection on the social power  
of ‘insult’ through which shame becomes an enduring process, the condition of the 
stigmatised subject.
Hopefully what is written here will be understood in the spirit of what is intended: 
a reflection on a happy day and an unhappy response. It is clearly autobiographical, 
a sort of boys own story, a reminiscence that is also a ‘sort of’ essay that is in turn 
a curious leap into language. Indeed a mixed response to some disturbingly strong 
emotions: my anger, my partner William’s disbelief and my mother’s shame. 
Making a Decision
We, my partner and I, had discussed the idea of civil partnership for a 
number of years with varying degrees of enthusiasm, politically opposed to 
anything that might forge what we perceive to be a normalisation of ‘relations’ 
such a formal recognition might afford to us (old lefties that we are) and 
simultaneously thinking about each other should either of us meet with our 
demise. Our concern was most certainly for the welfare of the other person 
and the fact that we know only too well how badly families can behave circling 
like wolves, when there is the possibility of financial gain. Eventually two 
incidents forced us to the edge: firstly William’s nephew Ian (also gay) died  
of leukaemia and much to our horror his longstanding partner of 10 years, 
Mark, was quickly marginalised by the rest of that particular family. He was  
excluded from being party to the settling Ian’s estate. Secondly William had 
a health scare and in view of his brother’s behaviour over his son, Ian’s death 
we made the decision to formalise our own longstanding, to use a very 1970s 
phrase, ‘affair’. We busied ourselves with imagining the when and the where of 
this event. Clearly for us it had to take place in Edinburgh, our shared ‘almost’ 
place of origin. We had no desire to engage in the often reported comedic 
campery that occasionally belies such public declarations. No performance, no 
palaver. No oaths, no pledges of allegiance or declarations of monogamy. We 
know each other way to well for that. No leather enhancing bodily forms of 
erotic posture or the revelatory fluidity of rubber ~ enhancing every crease 
of bound flesh, for these are bodies carefully crafted through the judicious 
intake of alcohol and good food ~ no, none of that. Once the official papers 
were inscribed it was to be a quiet, elegant affair at one of Edinburgh’s finest 






restaurants, the Witchery. We decided only to invite our immediate ‘queer 
family’ those proxy siblings with whom we share our lives, for neither of us 
is particularly close to those who’s familial claim is based on blood. Both 
William’s brother and my mother believe that ‘blood is thicker than water’ 
regardless of the fact that little effort has been made on their part over the 
years to foster any meaningful relations with us or to deepen such family 
ties. For them what this idea ‘family’ really means is that they have a right of 
inheritance regardless of their emotional distance, their lack of effort, their 
absence from our existence. And while I might want to invoke that old cliché 
and protest that blood is most certainly not thicker than water I will refrain 
from doing so in the usual way, for while this familiar queer cultural reiteration 
is an attempt to imagine other ways of defining who and what we are, blood is 
actually thicker than water for where water may quench our thirst, while it may 
soak us, dry and leave little or no trace, blood is materially viscous and sticky,  
it marks us and leaves an indelible stain that is harder to remove from our  
skin, from our hands and from our selves. 
 
Yet Another [Not] Coming Out Story
The blood of this story moves on two continents: Europe and North America. 
It involves the lives of two great-uncles: Peter Morison and Alexander Hamilton, 
one from either side of my family. I name them fully here as a recuperative act 
of remembrance for they deserve to be remembered. Peter lived in the small 
village I grew up in while Alexander, having left Scotland as a child in the 
1930s, lived his life in New York. I recount this because in a strange way both of 
them were somehow central to the families around them and yet not so. Both 
were simultaneously seen and unseen, hiding in plain view, which in an odd 
way makes me think of the story of Herculine Barbin1, quite different I know, 
as described in Oscar Panizza’s novella, A Scandal in the Convent. As recounted 
by Foucault Panizza’s main protagonist, Alexina, is described as inhabiting 
a ‘vast area of shadow’ at the centre of that particular story. This recollection 
has some purchase here for both Peter and Alexander could be understood as 
occupying the space of the family in a similar way, as being present to others if 
not wholly acknowledged by them. My own knowledge of them is fragmented. 
I know more about Peter than I do about Alexander simply because of our 
proximity in space and time, the social space of the village, the private space of 
the home and the time of my growing up. Alexander I only ever encountered 
when on his visits to Scotland in the 1970s and 80s when he would arrive 
1. M. Foucault, Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a 19th Century French Her-
maphrodite (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), xvi.
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on the QE2. It all seemed very glamorous to me, a working class boy, for he 
spoke with a strangely unfamiliar accent: Scottish-American I guess and as 
my olfactory memory permits me to recall, I think, he smoked strangely sweet 
cigarettes. He always travelled with his sister. 
I guess what is already written here hints at their comparable 
homosexuality if we make assumptions about ‘vast areas of shadow’ and 
travelling with sisters, but their homosexuality, which now seems to have been 
an open secret was never spoken about or alluded to in either family except in 
moments of oblique gossiping in which nothing in particular is addressed 
in order to maintain the denial of any such possibility of being. Peter’s ‘true 
love’, we were assured, ‘well apparently she died in the war [WWII]’ a comment 
that was very effective in halting any enquirer in their tracks, ‘Oh’, they would 
say. So no one would dare to ask Peter directly because the family’s assumed 
position on the subject, the narrative told, was that it was too painful for him 
to speak. It was best left alone. This was not borne out of a family’s decision to 
deliberately close ranks to protect the family’s reputation but rather it seemed 
to be something that was handed down generationally, something that was 
much more organic in form, something that coalesced over time. 
As I grew up I became attuned to Peter’s existence, to the stories of his 
youth in which as he said, ‘he took to ‘tap’’.2 I also became aware of the things 
he would say that didn’t quite make sense ~ or made another sense ~ and to 
the cryptic comments offered up in the silence that defined the family’s dinner 
times. I have a bricolage of memories that seem to add up to something that, 
of course, has never been verified by the two men I am speaking about but 
as I grew up I seemed to learn how to know. I ‘recognised’ them. For some 
reason I knew that I ‘knew’ them, well at least one of them, somehow. There 
are many moments that create these portraits, too many to mention here but 
there are two which seem to me to be significant: firstly when I first visited 
New York, 5 years after Alexander’s death, the family insisted on informing 
me of their progress from their point of arrival in the US in the 1930s until the 
then present day [1990]. We watched film after film on VHS, some of which was 
fascinating cine footage that had been transferred onto tape. But the moment 
of significance was that in a film from 1963 or thereabouts, in which Alexander 
is dancing with a woman, at what seemed to be a wedding or function, one of 
the assembled party exclaimed, ‘Look Alex did kiss that woman!’ There was a 
palpable sigh of relief from all in the room, from his 95 year old sister, from  
his nephews and nieces. It was a very odd moment, this need to re-affirm him 
2. One of his most relished stories was of when he decided to become a tap dancer and in order to 
practice received a tap dancing set, common in the 1950s, which consisted of a pair of tap shoes and a 
small square sheet of hardboard as an appropriate surface on which to tap.
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as a heterosexual man in front of this stranger, this relative who had come to 
visit from the homeland. Up until that point I hadn’t given it much thought, 
I wasn’t particularly looking for evidence but this moment was electrifying. I 
began to pay attention to every word about him and realised how little I knew. 
For example, I didn’t know he lived in Greenwich Village, nor that he walked 
rich people’s dogs to make a living, nor that he lived in a rather small grim 
apartment. The more I found out, the stylishly exotic figure cruising on the QE2 
slowly diminished. His solitary life style hadn’t really come to mind but the 
recounting of his story has left a residual mark. 
The second disturbingly telling moment concerns Peter for upon his 
death in 1992, my mother who had ~ strangely enough ~ been very close to 
him, phoned to tell me he had died. His estranged brother stepped in as next 
of kin and took control of what needed to be done. Peter left no will which was 
actually neither here nor there as there was very little of value to mark this life 
that was. He was not a materialist person. But she, who had looked after him 
at the behest of her own mother ~ his sister ~ for over 20 years suddenly found 
herself unwanted and closed out. She was afforded no respect, the emotional 
impact of his death on her was not acknowledged and she had no place in this 
familial reorientation. She phoned me a second time a few days later, to tell 
me that when she had gone to Peter’s home, she had walked in on his brother, 
Andrew (named here by me in order to shame his shameful behaviour) putting 
Peter’s photographic archive ~ of his life and that of the family ~ into the 
kitchen sink. He then covered the photographs in bleach. My mother’s protests 
were ignored. They both knew I wanted the archive. She was told that no one 
would have it. Peter was being erased from the ‘family’. This act of erasure was 
shameful and cruel and not unconnected, I would say, to the shame and the 
cruelty of the classical canon. Therefore, it is with these words I am trying to 
give a sense of him, it is with these words I am trying to write him back into 
existence for as Muriel Spark’s character, Jean Brodie might say ~ in a highly 
affected Morningside accent I might add ~ ‘There little girl, you are inscribed!’
The Shame of it All
Shame is a very powerful feeling regardless of the situation and retelling this 
story reminds me of something Lynne Huffer notes in the Queer Moralities 
chapter of her book, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory, 
in which she addresses Foucault’s treatise on madness. In her analysis she 
reminds us that in Madness Foucault repeatedly posits the word bourgeois as 
identifying a historical shift that she regards as corresponding to Nietzsche’s 
‘the rise of the sovereign moral subject’. In doing so she argues that we 
should consider the conceptualisation of the bourgeois in Foucault’s work, less 
in relationship to the work of Reich and Marcuse and the rhetoric of the 
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repressed libido but rather to view it through a ‘Nietzschean lens’ that allows 
for a reinterpretation of the term bourgeois as marking ‘the rise of the private 
sphere as the privileged site for the production of moral norms.’ With this in 
mind bourgeois for Huffer can be understood as meaning ‘family’ and as such 
it can be argued that this is linked to what she describes as today’s ‘ethico-
moral policing mechanisms of “family values”’, values predicated on scandal, 
guilt and shame.3 As Foucault reminds us the production of subjectivity is 
actually a matter of the ‘internalisation of man as shame’. A statement with 
which Foucault is following the Nietzschean description of bad conscience, 
the serious illness of bad conscience that is a ‘rejection of the body through 
its internalisation as shame’ which was understood as a reasonable bloody 
and cruel price to be paid for “the whole sombre thing called reflection”, 
for as Huffer recounts Nietzsche is preoccupied with self-repugnance, with 
the ‘swamp of shame’ which she characterises as playing out the ‘moral 
consequences of the Cartesian sacrifice of the body for the mind.’ The moral 
subject, as described by Nietzsche, therefore “holds his nose” at his own body.4 
Here it is also worth recalling that for Sartre shame marks the point at 
which the subject becomes an object not only to the other but also to itself. 
Shame is therefore the realisation of a schism, of a fundamental asymmetry 
in the shaping of any subjectivity and as Didier Eribon succinctly reminds us, 
‘It all begins with an insult.’ 5 Insult has a fundamental relationship to shame 
and as such a particular impact on the formation of the subject. To be publicly 
shamed, in the family or social setting, is a traumatic event, an event that 
lingers in the psyche for the insult is much more than that which it describes, 
an individual, it is also a judgement: ‘a verdict’. Insult is about power, the power 
that one person has, or wishes to have, over another for as Eribon declares,
“I discover that I am a person about whom something can be said, 
to whom something can be said, someone who can be looked at or 
talked about in a certain way and who is stigmatised by that gaze and 
those words. The act of naming produces an awareness of oneself as 
other, transformed by others into an object.” 6
 
The subject is wounded by words: faggot, dyke, nigger and so on, and perhaps 
more forcefully so when the word dirty is used as the prefix. Such insulting  
3. Lynne Huffer, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 105-106.
4. Huffer, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory, 105-106.
5. Didier Eribon, Insult and the Making of the Gay Self (London: Duke University Press, 2004), 15.
6. Eribon, Insult and the Making of the Gay Self, 16.
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remarks tell the subject that the perpetrator has the power to hurt them but 
not only that to indelibly mark them with hurt. The hurt subject is diminished, 
controlled, contained, reduced and reminded of his or her position as ‘not 
like others, not normal’, or to instantiate a more poetic gesture from Jean 
Genet’s La Galerie, ‘a dizzying word, arriving from the foundations of the 
world, destroyed its happy order’.7 What is set in motion here is the enactment 
of performative utterances that Eribon, while drawing on the work of J. L. 
Austin, identifies as injurious speech acts whose ‘function is to produce certain 
effects ~ notably, to establish or to renew the barrier between “normal” people 
and those [Erving] Goffman calls “stigmatised” people and to cause the 
internalisation of that barrier within the individual being insulted.’ As  
Eribon observes, ‘Insult tells me what I am to the extent that it makes me be 
what I am.’ 8
I cast my mind back to the open secret for rather than being a structure 
that protects ~ indeed whom does it protects? ~ it is also really a form of insult 
for the maintenance of silence, the acknowledged lack of acknowledgement, 
the knowing without saying is also an attempt to control, to have power over 
the subject and the situation. In one sense this is actually more insidious for 
it is perpetrated by those who are often closest to the individual concerned, 
those who have a vested interest in that person and in some respect those who 
perhaps perceive themselves as having more to lose within the wider society: 
those who constitute the ‘family’. However, insult as shame, or rather insult 
as the mechanism by which the internalisation of shame marks the condition 
of the subject’s formation, is also about fear and rarely simply fear about the 
difference of another but rather that of the perpetrating moral subject’s own 
sense of instability. As Huffer points out the moral subject learns to reject the 
hideous stink and filth of the body in order to maintain its own ‘reasoned’ 
sense of coherence.
The Dutiful Love of a Parent
When I undertook my own rite of passage, when my own story unfolded, my 
mother was the one who responded badly. To her it was she who, as a parent, 
had done something wrong. It was her who had nurtured her children badly. 
Of course she already knew, she must have known for my childhood was 
defined by adult conversations that I sometimes seemed to be ‘just like Uncle 
Peter’. No one ever really explained what this meant at the time, and I never 
7. Jean Genet, “La Galerie” in his Poemes, 51 as quoted in Eribon, Insult and the Making of the  
Gay Self, 356.
8. Eribon, Insult and the Making of the Gay Self, 17.
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asked what made me like him, but then I didn’t really have to. I now know that  
my mother didn’t want to know what she knew she didn’t want it to be true, 
this thing that was defined by an absence of speech. She didn’t want to believe  
it and if it remained unsaid it could never be true. But it was said and it 
is true. In 1987 I moved to London, I came out, I became militant. I was 
angry, I protested against the insidious Clause 28 and the wider injustices of 
a ‘democratic’ system that does not afford respect to all of its citizens. But the 
distance I had travelled was not enough. The journey was incomplete. I could 
speak publicly to close friends but not to my parents, and certainly not to my 
mother. I calculated her response, I told myself it would be fine, after all she 
was my mother and she loves me. I called to say I had something to say and 
that I would visit them. She said ‘ok’. I travelled 462 miles. When I arrived they 
were waiting, watching television in front of an open coal fire. I sat in front of 
them. I looked at them, they looked at me. My father urged me to ‘spit it out’. 
I said what I had to say. My father raised his newspaper, grunted and said no 
more. My mother cried. I returned to London. 
Over the next year or so I maintained periodic contact as my mother 
decided that she loved me but did not like me, in that she did not like what I 
was but loved me because as she said, ‘you are my son’, a statement of fact but 
also words that described a burden that she bears. I told her that to me the 
love she spoke of was a duty love, a matter of blood, an obligation. It was not 
the unconditional love that a parent has for a child. There was no response. 
Of course what was at stake here was not the experience of a child as an adult, 
coming to terms with their own sense of self, but rather my declaration was 
something that she had decided was happening to her, something that, if 
people knew, would diminish her status as a person in the community she 
is part of. She feared being ostracised which is understandable, but as good 
Scottish Calvinists and Catholics do, she wore her shame well. 
Over time we seemed to be able to speak to each other on the phone, or at 
the very least we seemed to be able to be civil and upon meeting William, and 
because he was based in Edinburgh, she seemed to accept us as we are. In a way 
as our relationship developed, she (indeed they) seemed to delight in our visits 
and in our weekend forays into parts of Scotland and Northumbria neither 
had never taken the time to visit. I was being, indeed we were being, the dutiful 
sons. But upon the registering of our civil partnership and upon revealing this 
to my immediate family my mother’s response was chilling and the word  
‘congratulations’ was a word she could not utter, a word she did not  
understand. After my sister’s intervention my mother called again. She was 
conciliatory but her voice was trembling. Eventually it became apparent that 
she was fearful that others in the village of my birth would ‘find out’ on social 
media, on Facebook, which she imagines to be beyond her control. In the 
end, while angered by her response and yet in recognising her fear, I promised 
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we wouldn’t ‘advertise’ our happy day with our ‘other family’ of stigmatised 
friends. What is interesting here is not that my mother is ashamed but rather 
that she too has become a stigmatised subject, for the parent of a gay, lesbian 
or trans child often imagines her or himself to be relocated in the social 
structure, for society, or at least the society of such small and closely knit and 
vaguely religious communities will undoubtedly attribute blame. Her fear is 
primarily a fear of being cast as a ‘bad mother’, as having allowed something 
to go wrong, or of not recognising that something had indeed gone very wrong. 
But this is not simply a matter of external pressure for what this story tells us 
is that she has always already accepted responsibility, she has responded to her 
sense of shame as a burden she must carry, as she now often tells us ‘to her 
grave’, which is also a process of internalisation. My mother is a woman with 
melodramatic tendencies. What is significant is that her shame simultaneously 
prefigures and is prefigured by my shame, the shame she, as a moral subject 
who is filled with shame, believes I should feel above and beyond the shame 
that she is responding to: a shame that we might define as mine, the primary 
shameful experience voiced. However, this dual and perhaps dynamic sense 
of shame that has defined our relationship demands its renegotiation for only 
then can we move beyond the physiological prefigured effects of ‘our shame’ 
that enables both subjects, moral and stigmatised, to effect change. What has 
become apparent is that this shame, our shame, is not necessarily something 
that we can ‘get over’ for it is the foundation of what we are, and in that respect 
it is similar to ‘coming out’ in that it is not a single traumatic event, it is, as is 
the subject of insults, an enduring process. 
The idea that shame is always somehow prefigured reminds us that ‘the 
world of insults pre-exist the birth of the stigmatised subject’ and if we recall 
Judith Butler’s discussion of hate speech it is less a question of the stigmatised 
subject as the object of someone else’s hateful speech but rather that it is a 
matter of recognition, ‘one does not exist because one is “recognised” but 
because one is “recognisable”.’ 9 And this is for Butler ~ with regard to language 
~ as it was for Louis Althusser before her ~ with regard to ideology ~ a matter  
of ‘interpellation’.10 Here the ‘subject’ is simultaneously recognised as the  
 9. Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997), 5-6. 10. Eribon, Insult and the Making of the Gay Self, 56. The following is paraphrased from Eribon’s 
commentary, ‘For Althusser “ideology interpellates individuals as subjects” which he explains through 
what he calls a “little theoretical theatre” in which he imagines a police agent yell at someone: “Hey, you 
there!” Althusser goes on to say, “Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in 
the street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and eighty-degree physical 
conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognised that the hail was ‘really’ addressed 
to him, and that ‘it was really him who was hailed’ (and not someone else).” What Althusser is getting 
at here is that ‘in the real functioning of ideology’ it is clear that “the existence of ideology and the 
hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing” and what he gives us 
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‘subjected’, in that the subject is always already subjected to that which it is 
born into that which lies in wait ~ ‘the subjectivity and the social imprint 
are one and the same: the individual “subject” is produced by interpellation, 
that is to say, by cognitive (and therefore social) structures’ ~ and as Eribon 
goes on to remind us, ‘insult is one of the most remarkable (or most concrete) 
forms of what Althusser has (abstractly and metaphorically) designated as 
interpellation.’ 11 But does this really mean, as Sartre suggests in speaking of 
the young Gustave Flaubert that ‘processes lie in wait’ for us ‘as do the role to 
be played’? 12 Is the world “insulting” as Eribon claims, ‘because it is structured 
according to hierarchies that carry with them the possibility of insult’?  
While these questions are rhetorical it is clear that the interruption, the 
interpellation in the normalised structure demands more for when I think 
of my mother and me we are both marked by language and the emotional 
impact of words in many different and often contradictory ways. Insult, shame, 
anger, bitterness and love are therefore bound together as the condition of the 
interpellated stigmatised subject. Sometimes it is difficult to understand how 
love can accommodate shame, bitterness and anger but can I assure you dear 
friends it does. 
 
HENRY ROGERS 
is an understanding that the subject is always already born into that which always already is: a world 
shaped by ideology.’ 
11. Eribon, Insult and the Making of the Gay Self, 57.
12. Eribon, Insult and the Making of the Gay Self, 61.
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Abstract: Echostate is the result of a paper given as part of the Oscillation Series  
(http://sonictheory.com/?p=427) organised by the Sonic Theory group at Humboldt 
University in Berlin and moderated by Jan Thoben and Shintaro Miyazake. The 
presentation was in the form of a virtual interactive performance that also included an 
original score (http://vimeo.com/24087954). The piece follows the anti-ocular logic of 
Jean Luc Nancy and coins a new term Echostate that is intended to offer an alternative 
to static representational thinking. The main aim is to argue that the formation of 
materiality in digital environment is a sonic rather than a visual phenomenon. 
Echostate is a term related to Michel Foucault’s category ‘statement’, in 
combination with Gaston Bachelard’s use of ‘reverberation’ and ‘echo’ in 
his introduction to The Poetics of Space. The term expands the scope of the 
original concepts by examining how statements are echoed and amplified 
across a range of media that now exist in multiple simultaneous forms ~ 
repeatable but not always identical in as much as they can take on numerous 
different digitally enabled forms. 
Statements are more than abstract signs, they are operational 
performances that cohere with objects to create a kind of materiality that 
is repeatable and, melodic rhythmic and harmonious. They are not to be 
cited themselves as examples for fear of rendering them static, and creating 
empty signifiers. Instead they must be recognised as modulating incessantly 
in a dispersed fashion that makes them difficult to tie down and to have 
representational meaning assigned to them. This is why they are so significant 
and powerful. They very definitely exist but not always in the way that we 
expect them to.
“We will call statement the modality of existence proper to that 
group of signs: a modality that allows it to be something more than 
a series of traces, something more than a succession of marks on a 
substance, something more than a mere object made by a human 
being; a modality that allows it to be in relation with a domain of 
objects, to prescribe a definite position to any possible subject, to be 
situated among other verbal performances, and to be endowed with a 
repeatable materiality.” 1 
 
 








It is the being ‘in relation with’ that is important here. Statements move 
through objective space forming bonds with other statements to create
conditions of possibility or frameworks, a kind of coherent space within which  
individuals become accustomed or attuned as to how to operate. He goes on  
to say that:
“the term discourse can be defined as the group of statements that 
belong to a single system of formation…” 2 
These systems of formation, despite appearing stable in so far as they 
represent a common sense reality, are in a perpetual state of uncertainty. Both 
statements and discourses move and return as echoes ~ sometimes clear and 
intact, recognizable and coherent, but always possessing the possibility that 
they will come back altered or rearranged, or less recognizable, allowing a new 
or different common sense to prevail.
In so far as the coherence of statements operate to form discourses and 
conditions of possibility, they are witnessed as echoes identifiable in what Nigel 
Thrift calls ‘practice’ which as the third tenet of non representational theory 
serves to sustain a veneer of stability whilst simultaneously serving as a means 
of identifying the changing state of things.
Practices like discourses can be identified and analysed in order to make 
sense of the moment that we find ourselves in and to assess how it differs from 
previous moments as well as moments to come. Thrift describes this saying:
“…material bodies are continually being rewritten as unusual 
circumstances arise, and new bodies are continually making an 
entrance but, if we are looking for something that approximates 
to a stable feature of a world that is continually in meltdown, that 
is continually bringing forth new hybrids, then I take the practice 
to be it. Practices are productive concatenations that have been 
constructed out of all manner of resources and which provide the 
basic intelligibility of the world: they are not therefore the properties 
of actors but of the practices themselves. Actions presuppose practices 
and not vice versa…as practices lose their place in a historical form  
of life, they may leave abandoned wreckage behind them which can 
then take on new life, generating new hybrids or simply leavings  
which still have resonance.” 3 
2. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 121. 
3. Nigel Thrift, Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect, (London: Routledge, 2007), 8-9. 
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Resonant ‘leavings’ or echoes work as acoustic refrains with disparate and 
uncertain forms coalescing to create discourses that once identified can melt 
into air, undergoing a quantum leap before reforming in a newer, or indeed an 
older, space and time (or spacetime). To understand such complex patterning 
and re-patterning requires a methodology that does not rely solely on visual 
stimuli. According to such an approach,4 specific discursive phenomenon 
traverse what might be called ‘mediated environments’, where objects as 
things, words, concepts, percepts, or Bachelard’s poetic images operate in what 
McLuhan has called an anti-environment that uncouples the figure / ground 
relationship to focus on the ground alone. This ground is not present on the 
visual register.5 It can be described as having the characteristics of a statement 
without operating as an exemplar or as fixed representation.6 
Practices become manifest at the point at which statements cohere and 
begin to reverberate and echo with the ‘repeatable materiality’ that Foucault 
identified, only now in a range of guises or forms that may not always be 
clearly visible. Like Bachelard’s poetic image they are formations that are not 
determined in any causal linear sense by the arrangements that precede them 
(Minkowski’s well spring in Bachelard).7 Not objects, not substitutes for objects, 
but resonances that are to be understood on their own terms as real and 
material but with an as yet uncertain form.
“The poetic image is not subject to an inner thrust. It is not an echo 
of the past. On the contrary: through the brilliance of an image, the 
distant past resounds with echoes, and it is hard to know at what 
depth these echoes will reverberate and die away.” 8 
Bachalard makes the dialectical distinction between soul and mind with the 
poetic image residing in the former before it is formalized as representation in 
the latter. “Forces are manifested [He says] in poems that do not pass through 
4. Sonic Economy: http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=649 
5. Marshall McLuhan and Eric McLuhan, Laws of Media: The New Science, (Toronto: University  
of Toronto Press, 1992), 3.
6. Foucault’s refusal to be drawn into providing examples was an important stance that  
highlighted the fluid nature of his method that must always be in process and not static in terms of 
citing fixed examples against which all other cases might be judged. Such a generic taxonomy of  
statements would be so busy allotting phenomena to their rightful place that it would miss the  
formation of new discourses as statements moved out of view or as they morphed within and  
between strict categories. 
7. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Boston, Beacon, 1994), X VI. 
8. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, X VI. 
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the circuits of knowledge”.9 So artists and poets as well as those who engage 
with their work dwell in the nonrepresentational realm of the soul where  
affect reigns. The dichotomy of mind and soul like McLuhan’s environment  
/ anti environment seems problematic in so far as the artist is situated outside 
of the so-called real world. In contrast to this the argument is made here that 
the usefulness of such pursuits is to open up, as Foucault has done, avenues 
of exploration into social and political formations that are themselves not 
indifferent or immune to artistic expression. 
So established circuits of knowledge in relation to art and other supposedly 
less creative practices only tell part of any story. But the point is not to separate 
them off from one another but to recognize the constant interplay between them.
The formation of a discourse, like the poetic image, is equally not caused 
by or linked to the past in a linear fashion but is rather a process that might 
appropriate elements of the past ~ re animating them or amplifying an echo 
that had been dying away or that had been silenced in an archive. Identifying 
such formations is what Foucault does and it is a process that can be further 
attuned by the introduction of the sonic so that the dispersed invisibility  
of arrangements, their stealth, does not render them inaccessible and therefore 
beyond critique. When obscured by shadows statements may still be heard. 
This is why a critical understanding of what is happening in terms of music  
~ past, present and future ~ should be taken to be a serious political endeavour. 
Adorno knew this, and Attali still does, but they both have clung to a 
dialectical approach to some degree. To counter this we should recognise 
statements as having an amplitude that is significant enough to mark them  
as recognizable practices whilst also acknowledging that they can dissipate  
and fragment at any time, or when the ‘moment’ is right.10
So the problem seems to be with representation. Beginning with the 
question of representation as a field of philosophical inquiry that impacts 
directly on the ways in which contemporary mediated environments are 
understood, sonority is presented here as non-representational and as 
embodying movement.11 This idea is pivotal if we are to progress beyond what  
Heidegger calls the ontic, to the ontological as a process that is always in  
motion and is capable of accounting for the fluid complexities of the 
contemporary age.12 To do so is to engage with some fundamental  
9. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, X XI. 
10. Stuart Elden, “Rhythmanalysis: An Introduction,” in Henry Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis: Space, 
Time and Everyday Life, trans Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore, (London: Continuum, 2004), x.
11. For a longer discussion on movement as a leitmotif of non-representational theory, please see: 
Thrift, Non-Representational Theory, 5ff.
12. The digital information age is itself a discourse formed of statements born of Western  
scientific rationalism with echoes of classical liberalism and the hippy ideals of the 1960’s. It is emitted 
and returned as it spreads. As we watch the second world industrialize in our own ‘image’ however, 
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philosophical questions that go back to classical Greek philosophy and its 
emphasis on visuality.13 
In Plato’s simile of the cave the light of the sun is proposed as a threshold 
beyond which the knowing subject cannot progress. Levels of reality are 
unfolded in a manner that suggests only a theoretical conception of Being.  
All that can be known is quantitatively present and visible. That which cannot 
be seen can never be known in any meaningful sense. It was a bias that was 
reinforced by Aristotle;
“Above all we value sight because sight is the principle source of 
knowledge…” 14 
This privileging of the visual realm produces a particular kind of knowledge; 
a representational kind that names and fixes and renders concepts and 
phenomena stationary. And it is a system of thought that works, it is reliable 
and we have grown accustomed to it. But it is also limited. It leaves out much 
of the important information or is simply incapable of mediating the intensity 
of feeling that may be present yet difficult to communicate. 
As Marco Polo explains to Kublai Kahn when describing a scene from his 
travels in Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities: 
“I could tell you how many steps make up the streets rising like 
stairways, and the degree of the arcades’ curves, and what kind of 
zinc scales cover the roofs; but I already know this would be the 
same as telling you nothing. The City does not consist of this, but of 
relationships between the measurements of its space and the events of 
its past…” 15 
To communicate the multiplicity of the lived moment that resounds with 
echoes may require more than simple representational devices. The space 
between measurements is not an in between as ‘in between point a and b’ 
or ‘from a to z’; it is a thoroughfare or a medium that is alive and relational, 
through which sound vibrates and echoes. It is a space where possibilities 
we run the risk of missing something. The sound of science has emanated from the west and has 
resounded in the East before rebounding as an echo of vindication, reflected; self congratulatory and 
isomorphic. 
13. McLuhan & McLuhan, Laws of Media, 4. 
14. Don Hide. Listening and Voice: Phenomenologies of Sound, (New York, SUNY, 2007), 7. 
15. Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities, (New York: Harcourt, 1978), 9.
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abound and where multidimensional elements or statements resound, 
compiling combining, cohering as practices or discourses. We are aided in the 
task of understanding this by Heidegger in so far as he offers the possibility of 
a challenge to the dominance of Platonic logic that came to dominate Western 
philosophy and science, by proposing a re-focused critique of Being or a 
‘fundamental ontology’. Such a proposal takes us into the realm of the invisible 
or the not so visible world of shadows where contemplation rather than a 
gazing upon, prevail. 
Junichiro Tanizaki takes up this point in his essay In Praise of Shadows 
wherein he highlights, in a manner comparable to Heidegger, the Western 
obsession with light and seeing, (a process of getting nature ‘in hand’ that 
Heidegger calls Enframing)16 that took Eastern science and technology in a 
direction that was not its own. “Imagine,” he asks: 
“If we in the Orient had developed our own science. Suppose for 
instance that we had developed our own physics and chemistry: 
would not the techniques and industries based on them have taken 
a different form, would not our myriads of everyday gadgets, our 
medicines, the products of our industrial art ~ would they not have 
suited our national temper better than they do? In fact our conception 
of physics itself, and even the principles of chemistry, would probably 
differ from that of Westerners; and the facts we are now taught 
concerning the nature and function of light, electricity, and atoms 
might well have presented themselves in different form.” 17 
Even fundamental scientific principles then are subject to the fluid interplay 
of statements within discourses, to the arbitrary formation and amplification 
of ways of thinking that are heard above all others and seen in practices 
that come to dominate at the expense of dissonant expressions struggling to 
establish themselves as statements. 
The emphasis on light and vision and observation impacts on all aspects 
of scientific, artistic and cultural life and has even imposed itself as statement, 
or an echo of a statement (echostate) where contrary conditions of possibility 
existed but failed to take or keep hold. 
Tanizaki goes on to say:
 
16. Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”, in The Question Concerning  
Technology and Other Essays, trans W. Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). 
17. Junichiro Tanizaki, In Praise of Shadows (Frankfurt: Springer-Verlag, 1933 / 2010), 14. 
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“It has been said of Japanese food that it is a cuisine to be looked at.  
I would go further and say that it is to be meditated upon, a kind of 
silent music evoked by the combination of lacquerware and the light 
of the candle flickering in the dark.” 18 
There is much to be gained from entering this shadowy realm, and listening to 
the silent music of contemplation. If embraced it can prompt a revealing.
As Heidegger says in his essay The Question Concerning Technology:
“Always the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a way of 
revealing. Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over 
man. But that destining is never a fate that compels. For man becomes 
truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and 
so becomes one who listens and hears, and not one who is simply 
constrained to obey.” 19 
The realm of visual representation and its limited dimensionality then is 
a philosophical conundrum to which we must return again and again. We 
might do so by returning not only to Heidegger but also to Schopenhauer and 
his distinction between representation and the will and to Nietzsche and his 
Apollonian and Dionysian duality where respectively sonority / music is a copy 
of the will and an intoxicating force that does not reveal itself on a visual plane. 
Music for both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche operates on an existential plane or 
in a parallel world where different rules apply and where alternative realities lie.
Hence if we are to fully understand the nature of our being and by 
necessity our current plight we need to move out of what Marshall McLuhan 
called 180 degree visual space and into the 360 degree acoustic / sonic post 
Euclidian realm. 
Drawing on the acoustic / sonic serves to support Foucault in terms 
of identifying links within a dispersed system of power that relies on its 
invisibility, its stealth, for its continued success? For Foucault the formation of 
discourses and their constituent parts are not conveniently and quantifiably 
visible; they cannot be simply mapped in gridded space that is absolute and 
static. Rather their movement must be tracked across relative space in all its 
multidimensional forms. 
As Jean Luc Nancy states: 
18. Tanizaki, In Praise of Shadows, 26. 
19. Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”, 25. 
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“There is, at least potentially, more isomorphism between the visual 
and the conceptual, even if only by virtue of the fact that the morphe, 
the form implied in the idea of isomorphism is immediately thought 
or grasped on the visual plane. The sonorous, on the other hand, 
outweighs form. It does not dissolve it, but rather enlarges it; it gives 
it an amplitude, a density and a vibration or an undulation whose 
outline never does anything but approach. The visual persists until 
its disappearance; the sonorous appears and fades away into its 
permanence.” 20 
Foucault’s statements like sound traverse qualitative space ~ fading into 
permanence to one day be returned as echo. In so being they can be identified 
along a diagonal vector somewhere between the vertical and horizontal axes  
of propositions and phrases ~ mobile and atonal. 
21
Unconstrained by the isomorphic extended body, statements come into 
relation with one another in ways that are not restricted by spatial proximity 
nor constrained by notions of sensible similarity or difference. In this respect 
they are qualitative not quantitative.
On this matter Leibniz said in his Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics:
“Quantity or magnitude is that in things which can be known only 
through their simultaneous compresence ~ or by their simultaneous 
perception… Quality on the other hand, is what can be known in 
things when they are observed singly, without requiring compresence.” 22 
The absence of compresence is equivalent to Foucault’s dispersion or Nancy’s 
qualitative ‘fading away into permanence’. 
Statements move, echo, bounce, collide, connect and disconnect across 
space and time; not constrained by a knowing subject in Schopenhauer’s 
representational field, not constrained by the body or the soundproof  
room but released beyond its extension in space ~ escaped from its solidity  
like the sound from the throat that the speaker does not recognize as their  
own (Lyotard, 2002). Such formations are acoustic / sonic in ways both literal 
20. Jean Luc Nancy, Listening, trans Charlotte Mandell (New York: Fordham University  
Press, 2007), 2.
21. Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990, trans Martin Joughin (London: Black Dog  
Press, 1999), 3.
22. Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Los Angeles: University  
of California Press, 1998), 171. 
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and non-literal, dealing specifically with sound but also by using sound as a non-
representational model of organization for a multiple range of significant factors. 
Such a model could arrange phenomena without fixing them in either 
space or time ~ allowing them to move in relation to one another, to create 
narratives without beginning middle or end, to construct archaeologies of 
the present in the knowledge that at some future point they will need to be 
constructed anew. The patterns may not be neat, may not follow strict tonal 
logic, they may not even be patterns that are recognizable in any conventional 
sense, not ordered according to received notions of difference or similarity, 
not present in the corridors of power, not attributable to single individuals, 
not part of a consensual understanding. Yet they are there and they should be 
understood as being there without having to provide locational evidence. They 
are capable of evading such techniques and might only be knowable via recourse 
to, or a drawing upon, the sonic, acoustic, poetic realm of the artist (as creative 
practitioner in multiple fields) who can create a necessary anti-environment.  
Yet the idea of the artist itself may need some considerable rethinking. 
As phenomena, statements move in relation to one another across  
three realms of space: Collateral ~ which invokes the relationship between 
statements in terms of similarity and / or proximity / distance that gets over 
the problem of compresence in both spatial and temporal terms; Correlative 
~ that assess the relationship between statements and their subject; and 
Associate ~ that assesses the internal institutional logic of statements and the 
circumstances of their production (Deleuze, The New Archivist).23 Only by 
employing each will the complexities of the current age be able to be accounted 
for. To pursue this task is to respond to Deleuze’s comment that:
“If things aren’t going too well in contemporary thought, its because 
there’s a return under the name of ‘modernism’ to abstractions, 
back to the problem of origins, all that sort of thing…” [modernism 




“Any analysis in terms of movements, vectors is blocked. We’re in a very 
weak phase, a period of reaction. Yet philosophy thought it had done  
23. Heidegger prioritises language in The Question Concerning Technology to the extent  
that the materiality of the environment in which linguistic practices take place are marginalised. 
Foucault may also be guilty of this. Deleuze & Guattari reinvigorate the material as words and things 
interrelate within spatialised realms, mileus or territories where rhythms reconcile the discursive  
and non-discursive.
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with the problem of origins. It was no longer a question of starting or  
finishing. The question was rather, what happens in between?” 24 
 
 
What happens in these spaces is the mediation of statements, and it is a  
process that is in constant motion as they correspond with discourses.  
This involves engaging with sometimes invisible discursive formations or 
arrangements, statements that are neither compresent or tethered, that operate 
not in a Platonic transcendent or theoretical realm but in an immanent sensory 
one. Not only words and things and the causal relationship in either direction, 
but the intercausal relationship back and forth. Visibilities Deleuze tells us, 
must be found in things and the way in which we do this is crucial: it is the 
finding that is important here as a process. For finding implies something is 
hidden or not immediately present. The manner of a coming into appearance, 
like the fire that casts the shadow in Plato’s cave may not present itself to 
the observer, thus language and form as medium and or technology ~ or as 
technologies of power ~ contribute to the way things are lit but they themselves 
may not always be visible. 
We need to find the ways in which statements move and form from the 
shadowy representations in Plato’s Cave to the digital realm. The way this is 
and has been done can be seen in archives that are themselves audio-visual 
as language lights up what it is we see and what we see gives rise to language 
formations in many new forms.25 Contemporary developments in production 
storage and distribution of information bring statements into new relations 
with each other that are not amenable to static representation.
The contemporary lived environment as mediated space invokes 
dimensionality and a non linear understanding of events that are not simply  
superseded but remain always as echoes in the audio visual archive ~ 
sometimes dormant sometimes hyperactive, like musical notes ready to  
cohere with others in a multiplicity of ways to form scores; not written down 
but set free. Never stationary but always fluid.26 Explaining how discourses 
operate in this way allows us to recognise them not only as regimes of power  
or as examples of negative dialectics but as sonic components that configure 
and reconfigure in multidimensional spacetime. 
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24. Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990, 121. 
25. The description of the archive as audio visual is important here in justifying the wide range of 
sources / statements that one might draw upon in order to identify a discourse. 
26. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, F. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans 
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Abstract: Hegel, in his Aesthetics, proposes the Tower of Babel as an architectural 
symbol that is foundational in the establishment of social unity. This article argues that 
Babel is a paradoxical symbol for unity, and is emblematic of the difficulty that Hegel’s 
philosophical system presents for understanding community. This problem is shown to be 
structural, deriving from the essentially architectonic logic of dialectics, and connected 
to language at a fundamental level. Drawing on the thought of Bataille, Blanchot and 
Nancy, the spatiality of Hegel’s system is turned inside-out, with an “anarchitectural” 
topology proposed, instead, as the ground of community.
“In the wide plains of the Euphrates an enormous architectural work 
was erected; […] The ensemble of all the peoples at that period worked 
at this task and since they all came together to complete an immense 
work like this, the product of their labour was to be a bond which was 
to link them together by means of the excavated site and ground, the 
assembled blocks of stone, and the as it were architectural cultivation 
of the country.” ~ G. W. F. Hegel
1
“Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the LORD did there 
confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the  
LORD scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.” ~ Genesis
2
Hegel, in his Aesthetics, locates the origin of art in symbolic architecture, and 
the first example he offers of such architecture is the Tower of Babel. He says 
that the tower, “was built in common, and the aim and content of the work 
was at the same time the community of those who constructed it.” 3 This 
structure, that according to Hegel functions as a symbol of national unity, 
forms the foundation of his aesthetics, which describes a dialectical telos 
that moves towards the total conceptual and social unification of Absolute 
Reason. However, Babel is a strange symbol for teleological unity considering 
that, according to myth, its construction was never completed, and the project 
resulted in the confounding of tongues whereby a people who had previously  
had one language could no longer understand one another, and were scattered 
across the earth.
1. G. W. F. Hegel, “Architectural Works built for National Unification”, Aesthetics,
Lectures on Fine Art, trans T. M. Knox (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975), 638.
2. Genesis 11:9, The Bible: Authorised King James Version (Middlesex: Penguin Classics, 2006).
3. Hegel, “Architectural Works built for National Unification”, Aesthetics, 638.
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In this article I will argue that the choice of Babel as an exemplary symbol 
of national unity is emblematic of the difficulty that Hegel’s unifying 
philosophical system presents for understanding community. This problem 
is structural, deriving from the essentially architectonic logic of dialectics, 
and connected to language at a fundamental level. This article excavates the 
uncertain foundations of the dialectic, calling into question the integrity of  
Hegel’s system. In place of the dialectical structure, an ‘anarchitectural’ space  
will be proposed as the ground of community.4 This reorientation suggests 
that the dialectical telos, like the Babylonian tower, is constitutively incomplete 
and reveals an intrinsic opacity to language. As such, Babel is shown to be an 
appropriate symbol for community ~ not for its unifying function, but  
because of its impossibility as a project, and the failure of communication  
that it represents.
In his Aesthetics, Hegel proposes that symbolic architecture is the origin of 
art ~ both historically, as the first kind of art that came into realisation, and 
philosophically, as the necessary first step in the conceptual development of the 
aesthetics telos.5 He proposes that “the primary and original need of art is that 
an idea or thought generated by the spirit shall be produced by man as his own 
work and presented by him, just as in a language there are ideas which man 
communicates as such and makes intelligible to others.” 6 
But where language communicates at the level of the sign, in which 
meaning is external and arbitrary in relation to the material form of the 
expression, Hegel argues that art has a sensuous presence that corresponds to 
its meaning.7 This correspondence between essence and appearance defines the 
symbol, which “is no purely arbitrary sign, but a sign which in its externality 
comprises in itself at the same time the content of the idea which it brings into 
appearance.” 8 Art consists precisely in this kinship of meaning and shape. It is 
therefore able to make visible essential thoughts that are universal in nature.
The symbolic names the first of three aesthetic moments, which each 
of the five particular arts passes through in the development of aesthetics. 
Through the dialectical movement of the Aufhebung, the symbolic is 
4. This article is extracted from my doctoral research, which is concerned with articulating a 
non-essential ontology of community. I use the term ‘anarchitectural’ in two complimentary senses: 
firstly, to evoke a construction that is anarchic ~ implying a lack of centre or origin, as well as something 
of the political meaning of ‘anarchy’; secondly, the word can be read as ana-architectural, by which I 
mean to indicate the return to a state prior to the architectonic logic of identity thinking, from where 
the ground of community can be thought anew. This is related to Heidegger’s claim that metaphysical 
thought is built on a “groundless ground”. cf. Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans Joan  
Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
5. Hegel, “Independent or Symbolic Architecture”, Aesthetics, 630.
6. Hegel, “Independent or Symbolic Architecture”, Aesthetics, 635.
7. Ibid.
8. Hegel, “The Symbolic Form of Art” Aesthetics, 305.
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superseded by the classical and then the romantic: first in architecture, then  
in sculpture, painting, music and poetry. The telos reaches its completion when 
all of these sensuous forms of art are sublated by aesthetics itself ~ that is, by  
philosophical reflection about art. As such, art is incorporated into spirit as it  
progresses to fully-formed Universal Reason.9 
Being a linear unfolding, every telos must have a beginning, and this 
beginning has an essential correspondence with its end. The movement of 
the Aufhebung preserves what it supersedes, allowing the origin to reappear as 
a foundation in each successive stage of dialectical development. So Hegel’s 
choice to put architecture at the origin reveals much about the nature of 
the system as a whole. I say ‘choice’, because in spite of certain initial claims, 
the text suggests that the identity between the historical beginning and 
the conceptual origin of art are not self-evident. Directly after stating that 
architecture’s priority in the sequence is not only determined by the nature 
of art, but also because “it comes first in the existence of art in the world”, 
Hegel seems to disavow this ‘fact’, claiming that “we must throughout exclude 
[…] the empirical facts of history”.10 Instead, what he wishes to demonstrate is 
the conceptual or essential nature of art, and Hegel proposes that “the first 
task of art consists in giving shape to what is objective in itself.” 11 Strikingly, 
and in line with Denis Hollier’s remarks on architecture’s inaugural value for 
aesthetics as a whole, we find the reverse is true. Hollier writes, “instead of a 
serenely confident description of his object, we find the anxiety of someone 
attempting to grasp at an object that is elusive.” 12 
First, Hegel identifies “the earliest beginnings of architecture, the first 
things that can be accepted as its commencement, [as being] a hut as a human  
dwelling, and a temple as an enclosure for the god and his community.” 13 But 
he then rejects these structures as the origin of aesthetics because,  
9. Hegel describes the process whereby the subject accedes to Universal Reason in the 
\Phenomenology. Art is linked to religion as it plays a role in the development of spirit, but along 
with all sensuous experience it is eventually superseded by knowledge in its pure / total form. cf. G. W. 
F. Hegel, “Religion in the form of Art” and “The Revealed Religion”, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans 
A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 424-479.
10. Hegel, “Independent or Symbolic Architecture”, 630.
11. Hegel, “Independent or Symbolic Architecture”, Aesthetics, 631.
12. Denis Hollier, Against Architecture, the Writings of Georges Bataille, trans Betsy Wing (Cambridge 
M A: MIT Press, 1989), 5. Hollier proposes that resistance to “architecture”, which names an ordering and 
hence dominating form of logic, functions as an organising thread that runs through Bataille’s oeuvre, 
and I should acknowledge Bataille’s influence in this work. However, my challenge to the totalising 
claims of the Hegelian dialectic differs from Bataille’s due to varying ontological approaches. Bataille 
breaches the totality by posing a question (‘why?’) after the completion of the telos, whereas I am 
claiming that the dialectic is always already incomplete from the beginning, because of the uncertain 
foundations on which it is built. cf. Georges Bataille, “Hegel”, Inner Experience, trans Leslie Anne Boldt 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 108-111.
13. Hegel, “Independent or Symbolic Architecture”, Aesthetics, 631.
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“such erections are mere means, presupposing a purpose external to them.” 14 
Whereas art is a pertinent concept only for objects that have as their end 
the manifestation of the idea of beauty. However, the distinction between 
internality and externality, means and ends, is continually called into question 
throughout this foundational section of the text.
In order to find the beginnings of aesthetics Hegel looks for examples 
of buildings that are pure symbols, independent of any external aims or 
needs (in other words, of any usefulness), those which stand “like works of 
sculpture, and which carry their meaning in themselves.” 15 One might ask 
what exactly differentiates a ‘building’ that has no practical use from a ‘work 
of sculpture’. Hegel’s text does not make this entirely clear. Sculpture follows 
after architecture in the aesthetic telos, but serves as a controlling model for 
it. Hollier points out that “this paradoxical situation [leads] Hegel to define, 
contrary to any proper hierarchy, architecture, the first of arts, as a type of the 
second, sculpture”.16
However, as already observed, the telos must have a beginning, and if the 
first task of art is to give shape to what is objective, then this beginning must 
be an object. The object that Hegel identifies as the originary type of symbolic 
architecture is a work built for national unification: “the primary purpose 
behind explicitly independent buildings is only the erection of something 
which is a unifying point for a nation or nations, a place where they assemble.” 17 
And the example he gives as the very first of such structures is the biblical story 
of the Tower of Babylonia, or Babel.18 The Tower of Babel is distinguished 
from utilitarian architecture by the fact that it is a solid structure without an 
internal cavity, so there is no possibility of the ‘external aims or needs’ which 
most buildings are mediated by penetrating into the inside. The structure is 
able to function ideologically as a pure symbol because its solidity gives it a 
homogeneous self-presence, ensuring that there is no risk of confusion between 
forms, between interiority and exteriority.19  
 
14. Ibid.
15. Hegel, “Independent or Symbolic Architecture”, Aesthetics, 632.
16. Hollier, 8.
17. Hegel, “Independent or Symbolic Architecture”, Aesthetics, 637.
18. Hegel, “Architectural Works built for National Unification”, 638-9.
19. Hollier, 9. A relation can be seen between the homogeneous self-presence of the architectural 
symbol and the structure of the metaphysical subject. Jean-Luc Nancy proposes that thinking in terms 
of the subject as interiority is what thwarts a thinking of community, suggesting instead that beings 
be thought as surfaces that are constituted as they are exposed to the outside. Although he does not 
discuss architecture in this context, Nancy’s ontology is based on a topological spatiality which  
does not conform to the euclidean logic on which architecture is based, thus implying the kind of  
anarchitectural ground that I am proposing here. cf. Jean-Luc-Nancy, The Inoperative Community, edited 
Peter Connor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 1-42.
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But on another level, the separation of interiority from exteriority is not 
so simple. If the primary purpose of the Tower, and structures like it, is to 
function as a place of assembly, this would seem to make them precisely a 
means to an end which is external to that of beauty. And this was the very 
reason that the hut and the temple were disqualified from being categorised as  
aesthetic objects. The aim of constituting human community seems to take  
precedence over the properly aesthetic aspect of the symbol, even in the 
chapter in which Hegel describes what corresponds to the purest form of 
symbolism in art.20 Indeed, as Hollier observes “[t]he word ‘symbolic’ is 
scarcely used.” 21 The fact that community predominates over the symbol in 
this discussion emphasises the importance of sociality in Hegel’s ideas about 
Reason. If community is the purpose of the architectural symbol this is 
because, for Hegel, it is only in the life of a people or nation that self-conscious 
Reason’s actualisation (the result of the telos) has its reality.22 But the question 
remains as to the value of the architectural symbol as a purely aesthetic object.
At the opening of the section entitled “Architectural Works built for 
National Unification”, Hegel cites Goethe, who says that “[w]hat is holy” is  
“[w]hat links many souls together”.23 And Hegel suggests that “the holy, with the 
aim of this concord, and as this concord, [is] the first content of independent 
architecture.” 24 Which is to say that ‘holy concord’ is both the aim of the 
architecture and what it already contains, indicating some confusion, or at 
least conflation, between present and future, between what is and what will be. 
And this confusion continues-throughout the section on symbolic architecture, 
the result of the process is presupposed as a requirement for its beginning. 
This produces a kind of circular agitation, which is what makes it so difficult 
for Hegel to locate a stable origin. This circularity, I would argue, is the sort 
of movement that is generated by a paradox ~ which is quite different from a 
contradiction. All of which suggests that the paradox, rather than dialectical 
negation serves as a foundation for this architecture.25
Hegel says that the Tower of Babel, his first actual example of independent 
architecture, “was built in common, and the aim and content of the work was  
20. Hegel, “Independent or Symbolic Architecture”, Aesthetics, 635-659.
21. Hollier, 11.
22. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 350, 212.
23. Hegel, “Architectural Works built for National Unification”, Aesthetics, 638.
24. Ibid. 
25. For Deleuze, the paradox forms the ground of sense. In contrast to the negativity of Hegelian 
contradiction, he proposes that sense is produced in the affirmation of a positive distance, which is 
characteristic of the surface, not of depth. cf. Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans Mark Lester. 
(London / New York: Continuum, 2004), 197. This surface is topological, hence Deleuzian sense can be 
related to the ontological sociality proposed by Nancy (Supra n. 19). The paradox, as that which,  
“destroys good sense as the only direction, but is also that which destroys common sense as the  
assignation of fixed identities”, always implies an anarchitectural spatiality. (Deleuze, Negatiations, 5).
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at the same time the community of those who constructed it.” 26 Now, in  
order for this project to commence, to be built ‘in common’, there must 
already be a social bond, the foundation of which, Hegel tells us, had already 
superseded unification on patriarchal lines.27 This means that a social unity, 
which results from familial ties being sublated into a wider whole, exists prior 
to the architectural work of National Unification. Hegel offers no account of 
how the “purely family unity [that] has already been superseded” itself came 
into being ~ patriarchal unification is presupposed. But if the family unit 
comprises a number of individual subjects fused into a greater whole, then 
it seems that (at least) two levels of communal unification have already been 
passed through prior to the commencement of the architectural project. 
Which suggests a certain complexity in the sociality that is a prerequisite for 
the architectural work. 
All of this means that community precedes nation, and indeed serves as 
its ground. What the architectural work builds onto this communal ground  
is a symbol, which represents the identity of the nation. So architecture brings 
a pre-existing, intuitive communal bond into the realm of representation, of 
language. This association between architecture and language is not unique 
to Hegel ~ structural linguistics, for example, uses an architectural vocabulary 
to explain the workings of language. In this sense, linguistics seems to owe a 
debt of foundation to architecture. Indeed, as Hollier comments, “Viollet-le-
Duc’s Dictionnaire de l’architecture Française followed a structuralist analytical 
method (one since developed by Saussure and the linguists) before the term 
was invented.” 28 Similarly, for Jacques Lacan, it is an edifice that, “remind[s] us 
of what distinguishes architecture from building: namely, a logical power that 
governs the architecture beyond what the building allows for by way of possible 
utilization.” 29 Architecture, then, as distinct from mere building, has a logical 
power ~ the power of the logos ~ which governs language as such, and systems 
more generally. Consequently, as Hollier observes:
“There is no way to describe a system without resorting to a vocabulary 
of architecture. When structure defines the general form of legibility, 
nothing becomes legible unless it is submitted to the architectural  
grid. Architecture under these conditions becomes archistructure,  
 
 
26. Hegel, “Architectural Works built for National Unification”, Aesthetics, 638.
27. Ibid. 
28. Hollier, 32.
29. Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans Bruce Fink (New York / London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006), 
[698] 586.
ZETESIS VOL. 1, NO. 1
the system of systems. The keystone of systematicity in general, 
it organizes the concord of languages and guarantees universal 
legibility.” 30
And yet, returning again to the beginning ~ this time, to the account of the 
Babylonian tower in Genesis ~ the foundational position of architecture in 
relation to language is, once again, called into question. Because before the  
inaugural architectural project commenced, as the Bible tells us: 
“ […] the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech. […] 
And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower, whose top may  
reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered 
abroad across the face of the whole earth.” 31
Universal legibility and concord of language were, it seems, already in existence 
prior to the originary work of architecture. Architecture comes after language. 
What the edifice aimed to create was not language-in-general, but ‘a name’ 
~ an identity. Hegel suggests that the product of building this symbol of identity 
was to be a bond that linked the workers together “as we are linked together 
by manners, customs, and the legal constitution of the state”.32 But is language 
not the condition that allows manners, customs and legal structures to be 
instituted (not to mention the expression of identity)? If so, the community was 
already unified by its shared language; indeed it must have been, or the tower 
would never have been built. Which makes Babel a paradoxical symbol for 
unity, if one considers the end of the tale (and in a telos the meaning is always 
to be found as / at the end): 
“And the LORD said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all 
one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be 
restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.
Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that 
they may not understand one another’s speech.
So the LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of 
all the earth.” 33
 
30. Hollier, 33.
31. “Genesis”, 11:1, 11:4, The Bible, 2006.
32. Hegel, ‘Architectural Works built for National Unification’, Aesthetics, 638. 
33. Genesis, 11:6-8, The Bible, 2006. 
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Far from organizing concord and legibility, the so-called inaugural 
architectural work provoked an irreparable fragmentation in a people that had 
formerly been united by their shared language. This confounding of language, 
the medium of rational discourse, means that far from being a symbol of unity, 
Babel represents the origin of opacity and confusion in communication, which 
would seem to cause disjunction in the community.
Hegel attributes the failure of the tower to unify the people to the fact that 
it was only in an external way that it was able to express what is holy, that it 
could only hint at the social bond. Here again, he contradicts himself, if we  
recall that earlier, the symbol was defined as a sign in which the sensuous 
manifestation corresponds with the essential idea that it represents. Time and 
again, the foundation seems to unwork itself, and I argue that Hegel’s difficulty 
in identifying the architectural object, and establishing its originary position, 
derives from a blind-spot in the architectonic logic of his own edifice ~ that is, 
the dialectical telos as a hierarchical and totalising system. And this blind-spot, 
in turn, makes it impossible for him to think community as such. 
The problem is that Hegel wants to define community according to 
what comes after it in the teleological process ~ the nation, unified by an 
identity concept that is constituted through the work of construction, and 
manifested as an architectural symbol. But community, as that which 
necessarily precedes this process, is neither a work, nor an identity concept. 
Unable to conceptualise this prior state of sociality in its complexity, because 
it doesn’t conform to the structural logic of his system, Hegel can only project 
a symbolic meaning backwards onto it, designating it as origin with hindsight. 
By attributing architecture with the status of origin, Hegel conceals what 
came before it ~ which would be the beginning, properly speaking; the same 
beginning that Hegel seems unable to locate. And so community is excluded 
from architectural space, and remains an excess in relation to the dialectic, 
consigned to an exteriority that precedes the space of representation. 
All of this means that Hegel is unable to see the foundation on which his 
own, dialectical edifice is built: this exteriority, which is ‘anarchitectural’ in 
nature ~ de-centred and structured according to a spatial logic that is entirely 
heterogeneous to the Euclidean principles on which architecture is based.  
This anarchic space, which forms the groundless ground of the system, poses a 
threat to the integrity of the edifice and must remain excluded, lest it cause the 
structure to unravel. And so the dialectic, which is claimed to accede to a  
total Knowledge from which nothing is excluded, is constitutively incomplete. 
In this sense, the Hegelian edifice resembles the Tower of Babel, as a  
folly that could never have been completed ~ a work that attempted to unite 
the people by transcending the horizontality of the mortal world and  
making them equal with God, building a route to transcendence in bricks  
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and mortar. Hegel, too, claims to have conceived a system, an architecture, 
that can reach the height of transcendence, an Absolute Knowledge that could 
be characterised as divine. In this architectonic system language is presented 
as a transparent medium that is able to communicate all ideas. But as long as 
the anarchitectural ground is obscured by the assumed completeness of the 
structure, there remains an opacity at the root of communication. The same 
opacity of language inaugurated by the communal project of the Tower. On a 
certain level, community is nothing other than this failure of communication, 
the excess that cannot be incorporated by the structure that is dependent on it. 
So the myth of Babel can be seen as a symbol, not of unity, but of the  
founding of community through the confounding of tongues. 
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Abstract: This work is an engagement with the experiential. Mimesis and the work of 
Theodor Adorno was always already going to be just an occasion for a presumptive use 
value rather than another straw exchange for those who would break a camel’s back. 
The piece asks questions after the nature of ‘what in’, ‘how and why is’ the lead voice in 
written work is to be sanctified and thereafter dictates its own amendment to the puzzle. 
The absent voice (Pharmakos) could be said to be reiterating earlier attempts at a merger 
of the Derridian and Adornian into a regulative orthodoxy. Nothing could be further 
from the case. The relational tensors mask a radical orthodoxy, a mimetic specification 
before judgement and understanding, becomes presence in absence. The development 
of forms leads to this exchangemerger of the organic with the inorganic. And all this set 
against the injunction forbidding the pouring of new wine into old bottles.
The developmental process that Hegel describes, the sublation of one nature 
by another nature qualified by its fit to the functional context of society, the 
movement from awakening consciousness to social and institutional constructs 
(family, school, church, and state, that kind of thing but also friendship, shared 
interests, civility, etc.,) echoes the more anthropological, speculative and 
productive history of mimesis and rationality found within Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, which posits three phases 
in the development of mimesis and rationality: the pre-historical, the magical, 
and the historical.1 At the earliest phase there is an adaptation to environment, 
a self-conscious following of the course of nature carried out in order to 
avoid the contingency and excesses of the world. In the magical phase there 
is developed an organized control of mimesis. Confrontations with what is 
ordered as amorphous and immediate nature, bolster a mimetic taboo against 
the immediate, sensed. The taboo is maintained and developed by a dictatorial 
minority with fatal means that projects Stoic virtues as virtuous nature. Since 
the mimetic taboo art became the organ of mimesis. Art now defines an area 
tolerantly reserved for mimesis.2
Adaptation to nature, to the seasons, migration of animals, etc., a 
veritable becoming other, is an aspect of archaic mimesis adaptation to the 
inanimate and inorganic another. Mimesis of inorganic nature as a way to 
1. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans John Cumming,  
(London: Verso, 1997). 
2. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 180. Cf. Theodor Adorno. “Expression 
and Dissonance,” Aesthetic Theory, trans Robert Hullot-Kentor, (United States of America: The Athlone 
Press, 1997), 110. ‘Mimetic comportment ~ an attitude towards reality distinct from the fixed antithesis 
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escape the terrors of nature, a nature from which the animate self with no 
little effort had recently estranged itself is in aspect, an adaptation to death 
(implying a reversion of the self to a mere state of nature).3 Playing dead, hiding 
out of terror, incorporating death into life, are ways of avoiding external 
confrontation. This becomes much more important in the mythical / magical 
mimetic phase where the notion of sacrifice is advanced (the present moment 
to the future). This contains a form of rationality whereby prescriptive 
scenarios, rites, rituals, myths, and sacrifices are performed in the belief that 
nature will look favourably upon human goals. In performance or enactment 
something is consummated, but also something new / addendum can be 
generated. The Shaman copies something in the future. What we have come to 
know as art has its roots here in the magical, and intentionally or not and to a 
greater or lesser extent it retains the power of prescription. Once the doubling 
of nature becomes intentional then self-empowerment is optimized through 
a mode of rational interaction. Mimesis of the hardened and estranged is 
reproduction of an earlier state: adaptation is repeated adaptation. 
Each time a conscious decision is made it more or less reflects the 
moments it consistently has access to. All productive thought that does not 
simply reconstruct or recapitulate to what has come before and wants to 
gain knowledge of something without covering categories has to surrender to 
it without reservation. This itself is not a recipe for success. To succeed the 
knowledge that is actualised through immersion in the object would have to 
potentiate theory, ready and waiting however concealed with sudden flashes 
of illumination. Philosophical knowledge begins where it opens up what 
traditional thought considers opaque, impenetrable and individual. “For the 
right practice and for the good itself, there is really no other authority than the 
most advanced state of theory.” 4 
Theory prevents the mind from becoming an absolute. Critical  
self-reflection keeps the subject open, keeps it from building walls between 
itself and its object, from constricting the abundance of ways to react. The 
mobility of consciousness, one of its best features, points to a double mode of 
conduct: On the one hand an immanent dialectical process that criticizes the 
system and recalls what would be outside of it, and on the other, free unbound, 
unregimented thought that allows us to step outside of the dialectic. Both 
aspects of consciousness are linked by the non-compromising and critical  
attitudes they take to each other.5 Their elective affinity lies in the fact that,  
 
3. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 31.
4. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans E.B Ashton, (Great Britain: Routledge, 1996), 242. 
5. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 31.
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the force that liberates the dialectical movement in cognition is the very same 
that rebels against the system.
Whatever subjectively ‘is’ includes an objectivity that has yet to be 
established. The element of objective reason internal to subjective reason, the 
ratio that transcends its subjective place holders is rational identity. Its moment 
of universality, linked to the realm of pure purpose, cannot be divorced from 
a plethora of drives, natures, mortalities, etc. The most subjective, naïve 
immediacy, eludes for a brief spell the interventionist intentions of the subject 
and presents us with an opportunity to see something as it really is.6 However 
the immediacy of insight, the receptivity within synthesizing consciousness is 
a phenomenon not to be denied. It gives rise in the judgement to a recognition 
and configuration of both example and comparison. Without the moment of 
insight the particular could not be the universal. It is only its hypostasis that is 
to be denied. 
In terms of essence the permanent exercise of caution in both directions, 
the implicit and the explicit, points to the non-dimensional in Being. Being is 
compressed into a point. As a procedure this has its fundament in re. Categorical 
vision, the growing awareness of a concept, must have a corresponding 
moment beyond the sensory matter. Spontaneous thoughts are phenomenon. 
Categorical vision has an immediacy that resembles visuality, this makes it, 
arguably, a self-adjustment rather than an activity. Traditional epistemology 
knew this as a synthesis, as categorically constituted facts. The factual moment 
isolated and hypostatized, a protest against the split between concept and 
entity, ceases to be a moment and becomes a thing: the separation and 
reduction of phenomenal and spontaneous thought to a thought deemed both 
scientific and necessary. Categorical vision, despite its fallibility, contributes 
to the understanding of the thing itself not its classification. That mental facts 
can be purely described, isolated, accepted as what they claim to be is both a 
dogma and a demand.7 
The view of sensory things in their not being absolute or irrefutable 
corresponds to a moment of direct vision. What is astir in this seemingly 
directness of the given is the experience, the congealed transmission, of what 
has come to be. The sense of evolved objectivity in things that supposedly 
merely are, is an awareness of the break between a things identity and its  
concept: “in this respect essence perception is close to allegorical  
6. Cf. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 38-40. “To receive something as it is offered at a time, dispens-
ing with reflection, is potentially always tantamount to recognizing it the way it is; virtually all thoughts, 
on the other hand, cause a negative motion.[…] The most subjective, the immediate datum, eludes 
the subject’s interventions. Yet such immediate consciousness is neither consciously maintainable nor 
downright positive.”
7. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 81.
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consciousness.” 8 This allows for a binding physiognomy of the mind, a 
physiognomic flash, or essence perception that does not simply attribute 
mental objectivity to projections of a contemplating subject.9
As the physiological primordial form of spirit, mimesis and its 
modification is the process whereby reason sets itself up as the psychologically 
real self, the I of self-consciousness and self-preservation. “In the constitution of 
the ego reflective mimesis becomes controlled reflection. ‘Recognition in the 
concept,’ the absorption of the different by the same, takes the place of physical 
adaptation to nature.” 10 As the non-identical within the rational, mimesis 
expresses a refusal to reflect the categorizing order, it splits asunder the idea of 
a rationalisation of reason calling everything to account from the preserve of 
a single aspect viewpoint. The substance of a changed philosophy would lie in 
the diversity of the objects that impinge upon it and of the objects it seeks, a 
diversity not wrought by any schema. “To those objects philosophy would truly 
give itself rather than use them as a mirror in which to reread itself, mistaking 
its own image for concretion.” 11 
Objects that impinge on philosophy: a positive dialectics uses them as 
a mirror in which to reread itself, mistaking its own image and power of 
representation as guarantee for concretion. The capacity for representation 
(Vorstellung) is both progressive and regressive: the capacity of representation 
is the measure of domination and in performance domination is the most 
powerful thing that can be represented. Adaptation to the power of progress 
involves the progress of power in its capacity for representation. For the 
dominant to survive it must not be tempted by that which is unrepeatable. 
The fixed order of time, the three fold schema of past, present and future, is 
intended to free the present from the clutches of the past. The power of the 
past is referred behind the absolute barrier of the unrepeatable.12 Nevertheless, 
the past is placed at the disposal of the present as practicable knowledge. The 
practical by directly invoking the recent past with the irresistible promise 
of pleasure turns the temptation of self-abandonment into a mere object of 
contemplation: becomes art. 
“The subjective impulse that registers what is to be done is the  
appearance of something objective transpiring back of this impulse, the 
8. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 82.
9. See for example where they write: “Essence perception is our word for the physiognomic view  
of mental facts-a legitimate view because things of the mind are not constituted by the cognitive  
intentionality of consciousness but are based objectively, far beyond the individual author, on the  
collective life of the mind, in accordance with its immanent laws.”, 82.
10. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 181.
11. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 13.
12. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 32-33.
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development of productive forces, which art in its innermost has in common  
with society and at the same time opposes through its own development. In art, 
development has multiple meanings”.13 
The absorption of art alien techniques external to art but originating in 
society is one of art’s developing means, and part of its autarchy. In practice 
impulses must be doggedly sublimated in an additional effort, an addendum, 
which must ignore the drive that impels to diversion. But all unification 
remains deception and so thought becomes illusionary wherever it seeks to 
deny its divisive / decisive function. As a specific undertaking integration 
binds the centrifugal counter-forces, absorbs the manifold and creates abstract 
unity by removing the antithetical element, by virtue of which the unity came 
to be in the first place. Released from the empirical as from the totality of 
the heteronomous subjective pleasure, the happiness in artworks, would be 
the feeling of holding firm.14 Art appeases the compulsion to rescue the past 
as something living. Instead of using the past as the material of progress art 
appertains to a presentation of past life which is not cognition. This separates 
it from social practice which merely tolerates art as it tolerates pleasure.15 
 The transposition of impulses, the plenipotentiary in the aesthetic 
continuum of extra-aesthetic nature, is in effect a claim that by virtue of the 
artistic integration the impulses are no longer incarnate as the extra-aesthetic 
nature’s afterimage. Aesthetic structures create a continuum that is totally 
spirit. In that way they become the semblance of a blocked being-in-itself in 
whose reality the intentions of the subject would be fulfilled and extinguished.16 
Art develops this act through the work that, mollifying the pain, modifies 
mimesis through imagination. 
The subject as the only adequate instrument of expression is itself 
mediated. The impulses are those of the subject and yet participating in the 
integrative power of the ego they nevertheless remain nonidentical with respect 
to the ego formation. Even though it resembles the subject the expressed is the 
nonsubjective in the subject. Expression is a priori imitation that having been 
objectified endures. The expression of artworks is not so much the subject’s 
expression as its copy.
“Expression, by which nature seeps most deeply into art, is at the same 
time what is not literally nature, a memento of what expression itself is not, 
of what could not have become concrete except through the how of that 
expression.” 17  
13. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 192.
14. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory. 15.
15. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 32.
16. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 113.
17. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory. 113-114.
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With regards to the question of how (of expression) the key position for the 
subject in cognition is experience, and not the constituent form. Knowledge 
steps up and comes close where the subject as agent and entrusting itself 
to its own experiences acts, rendering the veil it weaves about the object 
without anxiety. For example, the fact that music as a whole has its source in 
the collective practices of cult and dance is no mere point of departure. The 
historical source remains the unique sensory subjective impulse of music, 
something that continues to weave its spell on the collective practice. 
The more art expels the pre-established the more it is thrown back 
on the dimensionless point of pure subjectivity. In art’s secularization of 
transcendence, the tendency of the subjective point to expel the pre-established 
leads to an absence of social resonance, a contraction of the accessible. The 
resulting impoverished powerless gesture, the scream of the destitute, is a 
confession concerning the impossibility of artistic objectivation: a postulate 
common to all artistic manifestations. The aesthetic concept of anti-art 
anticipates this dialectic and constantly tries to abrogate its postulate. The 
implication being that art must go beyond its own concept in order to remain 
faithful to that concept.18 
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Abstract: Morton insists that ecology requires intimacy between ecosystems and 
organisms, living and non-living entities. Paradoxically, Morton suggests that intimacy 
incurs a sense of strangeness between things. As a predecessor of queer theory, Foucault 
commends human intimacy as an act of resistance against institutionalized sexuality. 
Such intimacy, Foucault suggests, enhances our sense of strangeness to ourselves. I not 
only grant that queer theory and ecology share an emphasis on intimacy but I argue 
this intimacy must be defined as the transmutation of distance, a drawing close that 
simultaneously estranges. Through Bachelard, I link this account to a poetics of  
intimate space. 
Although a certain environmental philosophy inflected with queer theory has 
been alive for over a decade now, and far longer if one were to count its early 
development within ecofeminism, the term ‘queer ecology’ still strikes many as 
fundamentally awkward and perhaps even perverse. What does a queer theory, 
for which Medusa represents the perils of phallogocentrism, have to do with an 
ecology, which would rather just talk about snakes? And what does an ecology, 
which is pre-eminently concerned with the planet’s survival, have to do with 
a strand of queer theory, which can hardly give the future a second glance? 1 
On the face of it, these disciplines share very little. Ecology and queer theory 
appear to be but distant cousins. No doubt this is one of the reasons the queer 
ecological movement has been called a “Frankensteinian meme splice.” 2 It is a 
little incongruous and slightly monstrous. 
Despite the apparent monstrosity of a discipline like queer ecology,  
however, many scholars have developed convincing accounts of the  
co-reverberations between queer theory and ecology. This work is being done 
in and across a number of fields, including biology, literary criticism, and 
cultural studies.3 These accounts, moreover, are far from mere intellectual 
experiments. In their introduction to Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire,4 
1. See Lee Edelman’s No Future (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), and the long tradition  
of responses to it.
2. Timothy Morton, “Queer Ecology”, Publication of the Modern Languages Association (PMLA),  
125, no. 2 (2010): 273.
3. See, for example, Robert Azzarello, Queer Environmentality: Ecology, Evolution, and Sexuality in 
American Literature, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012); Bruce Bagemihl, Biological Exuberance: Animal  
Homosexuality and Natural Diversity, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Joan Roughgarden, Evolution’s 
Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and Sexuality in Nature and People (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2009); Nicole Seymour, Strange Natures: Futurity, Empathy, and the Queer Ecological Imagination,  
(Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2013); and Noel Sturgeon, Environmentalism in Popular Culture: 
Gender, Race, Sexuality, and the Politics of the Natural, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2008).
4. Catriona Sandilands and Bruce Erickson, Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire,  









living and non-living ecologies 
institutionalised sexuality
Catriona Sandilands and Bruce Erickson offer a genealogy of the discipline; 
that is, they trace several ways queer theory and ecology have been not only 
theoretically co-considered, but historically intertwined. Sandilands and 
Erickson observe, for instance, that the discourses of sex and the discourses of 
nature have consistently informed one another. One can think, most basically, 
of Darwin and Krafft-Ebing. They also, however, mark that the construction 
of natural spaces ~ like parks, camping sites, forest preserves, wilderness areas, 
etc. ~ has entailed a concomitant construction of sexuality in space. By tracing 
these connections, Sandilands and Erickson intimate that queer ecology is a  
necessary analysis of the historical and material overlap between nature and  
sex. In this essay, I contribute to this work of identifying the theoretical basis 
of queer ecology. I analyse two accounts which suggest that queer theory and 
ecology are commensurate insofar as they both appeal to a radical intimacy 
between entities. First, I consider Timothy Morton’s account of ecology, which 
insists that ecology appeals to a structural intimacy one also finds in queer  
theory. Morton then defines intimacy as the breakdown of binaries by which 
we can experience the neighbour as stranger. Second, I consider one of the 
grounding stories of queer theory: Michel Foucault’s account of sexuality. He 
suggests that, in the 19th century, both sexuality and the environment became 
special objects of governmentality. He claims that institutionalized sexuality 
~ and by implication, institutionalized environmentalism ~ can be resisted 
through the exercise of intimacy. In the context of sexuality, Foucault defines 
intimacy as a physicality by which we can experience ourselves as stranger. 
Based on Morton and Foucault’s accounts, I theorize that ecological and queer 
theoretical intimacy is the transmutation of distance or the intimate nearing 
that is also a strange distancing. Queer ecology, then, is a discipline concerned 
with what one might call the poetics of intimate / uncanny space. I then  
develop this poetics with reference to the work of Gaston Bachelard, who 
suggests, in The Poetics of Space, that intimate space collapses and expands in a 
spiral. Finally, I draw implications for the work of interdisciplinarity, whether 
as queer ecology or otherwise. 
Ecology as Intimacy 
Timothy Morton, author of Ecology without Nature and The Ecological Thought, 
argues for the necessity of queer ecology. His defence is not historical in nature, 
but rather structural. In “Queer Ecology,” Morton suggests that the mechanics 
by which ecology and queer theory function, the rhetoric on which they both 
rely, and indeed the very logic upon which they both rest, have one thing in 
common: an appeal to intimacy. He argues that both disciplines appeal to an 
intimacy across and against boundaries, under the conviction that the great 
distance between you and me, between here and there, between that one and 
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this one is just an illusion that we can re-imagine over and over again. Ecology, 
Morton writes, “demands intimacies with other beings that queer theory also 
demands, in another key.” 5 
In keeping with his structural analysis, Morton elucidates this shared  
demand for intimacy by first detailing the theoretical ‘death of nature’ and  
then developing its epistemological and ethical implications. He encapsulate 
these implications in two elemental concepts: the ‘mesh’ and the ‘strange  
stranger.’ Throughout, Morton builds his account of intimacy primarily with 
reference to ecology, and thereby leaves somewhat vague the content and extent 
of answering reverberations in queer theory. 
Although Morton marks the death of nature in “Queer Ecology,” he 
develops it at much greater length in Ecology without Nature. There, Morton 
heralds the death of nature specifically as the demise of a nature conceived of 
as outside, over there, transcendent and independent of human existence. It is 
Morton’s suspicion that the ‘late’ transcendent nature comes too quickly to the 
aid of empty decrees about what is and isn’t natural, what is and isn’t ‘born this 
way.’ But it also never quite arrives up against or inside human entities enough 
to make what appears natural an utter mystery, or what appears inborn to be 
still quite unknown. Because the concept of nature thus undergirds untenable 
claims of strict taxonomy, it necessarily defies relationality and defeats, from 
the outset, the sort of being-with requisite for ecological ethics. Thankfully, for 
Morton, that concept is itself untenable in light of an increasingly intimate 
world.
In place of a dead nature, Morton proposes, in The Ecological Thought, 
something called the ‘mesh.’ Think of chainmail or fishnets. A mesh in this 
sense is composed of both threads and holes. Morton suggests that this  
observation is born out etymologically, with ‘mesh’ having both the words 
‘mass’ and ‘mask’ in its history.6 Mesh, then, would simultaneously signify 
densely networked threads and the deceptive, or perhaps seductive, spaces 
between them. For Morton, the illusion of nature, which stands aloof from  
humans and non-living things alike, must be replaced by the reality of a mesh: 
the broad interconnection of the living and the dead, presence and absence. 
This mesh is marked by two things. First, the mesh involves everything that 
exists. If there is no outside, then everything is here. “All life forms,” he writes, 
“are the mesh,” but “so are all the dead ones, as are their habitats, which are 
5. Morton, “Queer Ecology,” 273. See also: Timothy Morton, Ecology without Nature (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 13.
6. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, this is one of two possible etymologies.  
See further: The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Main Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
2011), 944.
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also made up of living and non-living beings.” 7 Second, the mesh entails the 
blurring of everything that exists. It is “a non-totalizable, open-ended  
concatenation of interrelations that blur and confound boundaries at any 
practical level.” 8 What was once nature over there is now an endlessly muddied 
mesh right here. 
If all that exists, exists in a mesh, then certainly the so-called ‘other’ ~ the 
other outside, over there, transcendent and independent of the self ~ must  
have gone the way of nature. Instead of selves and others, each existent exists 
in a sea of what Morton calls ‘strange strangers.’ The term ‘strange stranger’ is, 
as Morton states, “my bad translation of Derrida’s arrivant.” 9 Jacques Derrida’s  
arrivant, in turn, is a term that signifies ‘the one who comes.’ Since the one 
who comes never actually arrives, the arrivant cannot be identified as either this 
sort of creature or that, human or non-human, alive or dead. Morton’s ‘strange 
stranger,’ however, is already here, all around us. Nevertheless, it maintains the 
arrivant’s sense of utter strangeness for at least two reasons. First, it is not me, 
or not just me, or not exactly me, and in this sense it will always be a stranger. 
Second, it is not itself, or not just itself, or not exactly itself, and in this  
sense it will always be strange. When one takes the mesh seriously, with all 
the interconnections and interdependence it requires, one realizes that things 
become at once less and more than they ever were before. The more of a mesh 
one has, the less one has ~ less substances, less bodies, less lines and identities, 
but also the more of everything in between and underneath. What could be 
stranger than that?
Morton’s concepts of the ‘mesh’ and the ‘strange stranger’ have a direct 
bearing on ecological ethics. Contrary to the reigning call for inclusive ethics, 
Morton demands an ethics of intimacy. Under the old theory of nature,  
where the inside and the outside were carefully maintained, ethics meant 
enlarging the inside ~ including animals, farms, or variously excluded others 
within the circle of legitimized and legislated subjects. These subjects, however, 
maintained their own insides and outsides, so that ethics meant preserving a 
respectful distance between equal entities. Morton’s mesh, however, messes 
with that. It demonstrates that distance itself has broken down; the outside and 
the inside are no longer traditionally distinguishable. In this state, “rather than 
a vision of inclusion,” he writes, “we need a vision of intimacy:” an intimacy 
that “necessitates thinking and practicing weakness rather than mastery,  
fragmentariness rather than holism, and deconstructive tentativeness rather 
than aggressive assertion.” 10  
7. Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought, 29.
8. Morton, “Queer Ecology”, 275-276.
9. Morton, “Queer Ecology”, 277.
10. Morton, “Queer Ecology”, 278. 
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Now, Morton’s ultimate claim is that ecology and queer theory share a  
call to intimacy or a commitment to meshy strangeness. Morton’s arguments 
from the side of queer theory, however, are all too brief. Here, I present them as 
schematically as possible. First, Morton claims that the death of nature entails 
the demise of the binary between nature and culture. As such, it also entails 
the demise of the correlative binaries of man and woman, masculine and 
feminine, heterosexual and homosexual. If the former cannot be held apart, 
neither can the latter.11 The death of nature, then, must be consistent with, if 
not constitutive of, queer theory. Second, Morton glosses Judith Butler’s theory 
of performativity, according to which gender is defined as a series of iterated 
signs. Morton then observes that DNA is equally iterative. If performativity, 
then, is the mark of the queer, and if DNA is performative, then DNA is queer. 
Thus, queer theory and ecology are concerned with the same objects.12 Third, 
Morton mentions Darwin’s argument that sexuality is attributable to sheer 
aesthetic display. Sexual overtures, whether officially queer or not queer, are 
merely the expression of pleasure and not the fulfilment of some innate 
demand for survival. If aesthetic pleasure is the mark of the queer, and if all sex 
is aesthetically driven, then all sex is queer.13 Morton concludes that, “Ecology 
is queer theory and queer theory is ecology: queer ecology.” 14 
By leaning in toward the mesh, or the ‘is,’ and away from the strange 
stranger, or the ‘is not,’ Morton’s structural argument has certain limitations: 
1) it obscures the historical vicissitudes to the relationship between nature and 
sex, and 2) it obscures the uncanniness that still separates queer theory from 
ecology. Thus, for instance, the way in which queer performativity is unique to 
queer theory and the divergent ways in which performativity may or may not 
have been discursively considered in evolutionary theory are passed over.  
I turn, therefore, to the work of Michel Foucault both to balance structural  
analysis with genealogy, and to further explore the claim that intimacy 
transmutes distance into meshy strangeness. 
Queer Theory as Intimacy 
Michel Foucault is widely considered to be at the root of queer theory, while his 
perhaps equally significant (if not extensive) contributions to ecological analysis 
have gone relatively unnoticed. Most introductions to queer theory mention 
11. Morton, “Queer Ecology”, 274.
12. As Morton says, in his “Queer Ecology”, “DNA itself is performative […] If you want a queer 
monument, look around you.” 276.
13. As Morton clarifies, “Because Darwin reduces sexuality to sheer aesthetic display [his work]  
is as anti-homophobic as it is antiracist.” 278.
14. Morton, “Queer Ecology”, 281.
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the significance of Foucault’s History of Sexuality, especially its characterization 
of sexuality as a regime of power and knowledge.15 Recently, Lynne Huffer  
has extended that debt to History of Madness, in which, as she argues, sexuality 
is cast as “a category of moral and political exclusion.” 16 If, in some sense, queer  
theory is concerned with the resistance to institutionalized sexuality, then  
Foucault’s diagnosis of that institutionalization is one of queer theory’s 
beginnings. By no means, however, was Foucault solely concerned with  
sexuality. He was concerned more broadly with any instance of 
institutionalization. For this reason, several scholars have developed his  
much briefer analyses of the institution of nature, the governing of natural 
spaces, and environmental discourses.17 
Here, I will trace Foucault’s contribution to a theory of queer ecology, 
specifically one that resonates with Morton’s account. First, I will review 
Foucault’s history of natural science, wherein he demonstrates that the policing 
of sexuality and the policing of species are equally tied up in the 19th century 
turn to life-management or biopower. Then, I will mark Foucault’s history of 
sexuality, where he proffers a resistant ethics of transformative intimacy. 
By inference, I argue, the sort of intimacy that defeats the policing of 
sexuality must be related to the intimacy required by ecology. In this way, I 
conclude with a revised description of the sort of intimacy that anchors queer 
theory in ecology, and vice versa.
Throughout his histories of sexuality and natural science, Foucault is 
quite aware not only of the length of these histories but also of the divergent 
ways in which ‘sex’ and ‘the environment’ have been treated.18 Nevertheless, 
Foucault argues that today’s push for sexual identities and for environmental 
projects stems from a relatively recent socio-political impetus: the need to 
produce and manage life. This need developed in the late 18th century, with the 
very introduction of life as a tractable concept. When Cuvier founded biology, 
life replaced taxonomy as the salient mark of entities. “The living being now 
wraps itself in its own existence,” Foucault explains, and is determined not by 
taxonomic locality but rather by its “conditions of life.” 19 With Darwin’s work 
15. Take, for example, Corber and Valocchi, Queer Studies: An Interdisciplinary Reader (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2006). See also Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle (Editors), The Transgender Studies Reader, 
(New York: Routledge, 2006).
16. Lynne Huffer, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory (New York:  
Columbia University Press, 2010). 
17. See, for instance, Eric Darier, Discourses of the Environment, (Malden: Blackwell, 1999), and the 
more recent Stephanie Rutherford, Governing of the Wild: Ecotours of Power (Minneapolis: University  
of Minnesota Press, 2011).
18. Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as Practice of Freedom,” Ethics,  
Subjectivity and Truth, (New York: The New Press, 1994), 295. See also: Michel Foucault, The History  
of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, (New York: Vintage, 1976).
19. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, (New York: Vintage 1966), 274.
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in the 19th century, those conditions of life began to signify conditions of the  
population.20 Increasingly, society did not only treat human or other bodies as 
mere brute realities or even mechanistic capacities. It further saw human or 
other populations as centres of life-force, to be gripped and governed  
according to specifications relative to their species. Foucault terms this tactical 
turn ‘biopower.’ 21It is as an object of biopower that both nature and sex  
become increasingly institutionalized. After all, the population must 
be controlled both externally and internally, through its milieu and its 
reproductive habits. It is no wonder, then, that sexual identity is so rampantly 
prompted and policed by the norms of heterosexual reproduction. And it is 
no wonder that much environmental activity relies upon the reproducibility 
of identifiable subjects, species, and systems. Both sexuality and nature are 
increasingly institutionalized throughout a biopolitical structure intent to 
produce and manage life.
Although quite suggestive, this is the extent of Foucault’s direct  
contribution to ecological critique. His contribution to a critique of sexuality, 
however, goes much farther. In The History of Sexuality, for instance, Foucault 
takes sexuality as a target of biopower and places it within the context of 
power’s institutionalization and resistance thereto. In several late interviews, 
Foucault further identifies human intimacy as a salient form of that resistance. 
Throughout his investigations, Foucault is interested in demonstrating not 
only that the institutionalization of sexuality involves the constitution of 
the subject through its confession to a sexual identity, but that resistance to 
this institutionalization demands the deconstruction of the subject through 
practices of physical intimacy. This deconstruction of the subject, I argue, lends 
a sense of strangeness to Foucault’s intimacy that is reminiscent of Morton’s 
account.
Consider first the constitution of the subject through its confession to 
identity, especial sexual identity. Today, Foucault muses, the educational,  
medical, and juridical realms demand that the subject speak. And, just as 
Christian confession proclaimed freedom but really constrained its  
participants, contemporary confession chains the subject to society’s system 
of norms. The demand that a subject speak is a demand that it speak itself 
into subject-hood and thereby into a position of subjugation to the system 
determining subjects. Sexual confession is no exception. The question, ‘what 
is my secret desire’ directly corresponds to ‘who am I.’ Social media platforms 
and online surveys, for instance, typically prompt people to capture their 
identity by claiming a sex and a sexual orientation: usually male or female, 
20. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, and Population (New York: Palgrave, 1977-78), 78-79. 
21. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 147.
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straight, gay, or bisexual. In claiming an identity, people acquiesce both to 
its prior construction and future use in the calculation of populations. For 
Foucault, ‘I’ am but a node in the nest of bureaucracy. The only way to 
disengage from the mores to which my sexual identity confines me is through 
the volatility of intimacy.
Foucault recommends intimate pleasure as a technique of resistance to 
the institutional subjugation enacted through confessional self subjectivation.22 
Pleasure, he writes, is “nothing other than an event, an event that happens, 
that happens, I would say, outside the subject, or at the limit of the subject,  
or between two subjects, in this something that is neither of the body nor of 
the soul, neither outside nor inside.” 23 As such, it resists subjectivation on  
two levels. First, intimate pleasure disrupts self-identity. Pleasure, Foucault 
observes, is a transgressive, fragmented explosion. It reinstates the unsteady 
excesses of the body at the expense of self-unity. Second, intimate pleasure 
disrupts institutionalised identity. It creates affective alliances between  
people that subvert their categorical localities. Intimacy thereby fashions 
strands of excess in society which have the capacity to unhinge its mores.24 
“The intensities of pleasure,” Foucault writes, “are linked to the fact that you  
de-subjugate yourself, that you cease to be a subject.” 25 Through intimacy, ‘I’ 
find myself far from myself, having suddenly awoken to the strangeness of  
(not) being me. This is Foucault’s call to deconstructive activity. It is a  
proposal of transformative intimacy. 
Now, this call to intimacy, lying at the base of queer theory, has 
important implications for ecology and, ultimately, queer ecology. If queer 
intimacy strikes at the root of what makes sexual identity oppressive, and 
if environmental projects share the same root in a biopolitical regime, then 
intimacy must also upset environmental institutionalization and instigate 
a turn toward ecology. Sandilands argues precisely this point in “Sex at the 
Limits.” Resistance to sexual regulation through non-normative intimacy, 
she states, is in fact tied to practicing transformative ecology.26 In either case, 
intimacy necessarily includes estrangement. Just as Morton’s mesh requires  
the strange stranger, so Foucault’s pleasure requires the radical disruption  
of identity. I find myself an intimate stranger to myself and among  
intimate strangers. 
22. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 157. 
23. Michel Foucault, “The Gay Science”, Critical Inquiry 37.3 (2011), 389.
24. Michel Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life”, in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (London: 
Penguin, 1998), 136 and 138.
25. Foucault, “The Gay Science”, 399-400.
26. Catriona Sandilands, “Sex at the Limits,” in Discourses of the Environment, Eric Darier  
(Editor), (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 91.
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Queer Ecological Intimacy: A Poetics of Space / A Poetics of Spice
Morton’s account of intimacy as requisite to ecological ethics and Foucault’s 
account of intimacy as requisite to sexual ethics together suggest that intimacy 
is in fact a viable theoretical basis for something like queer ecology. Before  
culling a theory of intimacy here, it is helpful to review their accounts very  
schematically. Their conceptions of intimacy bear different emphases.  
Morton’s account is heavily descriptive, whereas Foucault’s is mildly  
prescriptive. But, more deeply, Morton focuses on intimacy between living  
and non-living entities, and therefore revels in its awkwardness, while  
Foucault focuses on intimacy between same-sex bodies, and therefore  
eulogizes its euphoric elements. Nevertheless, ultimately their accounts are  
commensurate. Not only does Morton acknowledge the desire and Foucault 
the milieu of intimacy, but, more importantly, both Morton and Foucault 
consider intimacy to be an experience of the limit in which beings and their 
boundaries are equally indistinguishable. For them, intimacy disrespects 
borders and detonates identities. Certainly, then, Morton is justified in 
asserting that ecology “demands intimacies with other beings that queer  
theory also demands, in another key.” 
Together, however, these accounts suggest something more than simply 
the viability of a composite term or even a discipline like ‘queer ecology.’ 
Consider them again in greater detail. On the one hand, Morton dispels the 
myth of Nature, at a distance from the subject, by pointing out the enmeshed 
or already intimate character of existence. As an implication of this existence, 
Morton then notes a disillusionment with Nature and an estrangement among 
things. On the other hand, Foucault dispels the myth of the subject, at a 
distance from Nature, by pointing out its already constructed character and 
calling for a deconstructive intimacy. As a reverberation of this deconstructive 
intimacy, moreover, Foucault observes a certain disillusionment with systems 
of subjectivation and an estrangement from oneself. Collectively, then, both 
Morton and Foucault counter a false distance between subject and object with 
a commendation to intimacy; and both consequently suppose that intimacy 
inaugurates disillusionment and estrangement. But what is disillusionment and 
what is estrangement if it is not some form of distance? I therefore argue that 
Morton and Foucault counter distance with intimacy only to get more distance 
~ a different distance. The distance they dispel is false and impersonal,  
whereas the distance they inaugurate is not. What this essay affords, then, is 
not merely a confirmation of the term ‘queer ecology’ but a definition of  
intimacy. This is intimacy: the transmutation of distance ~ a transmutation 
from illusory distance to a distance of disillusionment ~ or, again, from a 
distance between strangers to an estranged distance.  
PERRY ZURN | INTIM ATE STR ATEGIES
In order to elucidate my proposal that intimacy is the transmutation of 
distance, I turn to Gaston Bachelard. Bachelard, an important inspiration  
for both Morton and Foucault,27 concerned himself directly with the question 
of intimacy in space. In his book The Poetics of Space, he analyses different 
images of intimate space, one of which is perhaps the intimate space par 
excellence: the home. One might think that the home protects me from the 
outside, serving as a cocoon to keep the world at bay, but Bachelard suggests 
this is a gross oversimplification. The home, he insists, is never just a home; 
it is always not itself, not exactly itself, not quite itself. Every home opens 
out to the universe and onto the very world from which it supposedly keeps 
one safe. “In this dynamic rivalry between house and universe,” Bachelard 
writes, “inhabited space transcends geometrical space;” “a house that has been 
experienced is not an inert box.” 28 He then goes on to consider the home as 
a ‘spiral,’ a ‘surface,’ a ‘threshold’ which of necessity creates a vortex between 
insides and outsides. 
The home’s intimate character has as much to do with its closures as its  
openings. The home is familiar and it is uncanny; it is a place of rest and a 
space for awful reverie. As such, the home demonstrates that intimacy does 
not mean privacy or self-same unity, but rather signifies a rearrangement of 
geographical space in phenomenological space. In this way, Bachelard not  
only confirms my proposal that intimacy is the transmutation of distance but 
contributes the illustrative metaphor of a spiral. 
In closing, let me draw just one implication from the preceding argument. 
Recall that Morton asserts, following his defence of intimacy as equally  
important for ecology and queer theory, that “fully and properly, ecology 
is queer theory and queer theory is ecology: queer ecology.” 29 I have already 
remarked that this emphasis on the ‘is’ over the ‘is not’ privileges the mesh over 
the strange stranger, identification over disidentification. Indeed, by collapsing 
these disciplines into one another, Morton enervates the revolutionary  
character of his intimate proposal. If intimate things just are one another, we 
risk devolving into tautological nonsense. But Morton is astute to suspect that 
the significance of intimacy bears dramatic implications not just for subjects 
and objects, queer theory and ecology, but even more broadly for the nature of  
interdisciplinarity. Having argued that intimacy is the transmutation of 
distance, I suggest that intimacy between disciplines must mean at least two 
27. See Timothy Morton Poetics of Spice: Romantic Consumerism and the Exotic, (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2006), and Foucault’s “Interview with Michel Foucault,” Power  
(The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984), by Michel Foucault, James D. Faubion, and Robert Hurley,  
(New York: New Press, 2001).
28. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 47, 225.
29. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, Ibid.
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things. First, neither discipline is wholly distinct or set at a distance from the 
other. Second, neither discipline is wholly indistinct, or made to dissolve into 
the other. Instead, both are awkwardly porous entities. Ideally, interdisciplinary 
research makes disciplines intimate with one another not by claiming that  
they are each other but rather by drawing them together to such a degree 
that each might be disenchanted and estranged. Interdisciplinarity, then, will 
function in a spiralling manner, producing ever greater alignment as well as 
distinctive clarity.
In this essay, I have proposed that intimacy, defined as the transmutation 
of distance, is not only a theoretical element of queer theory and ecology, 
respectively, but also a necessary condition of queer ecology. I have further 
taken this intimacy to be, in the case of queer ecology, both transformative 
and resistant to institutionalization. I do not claim that intimacy is a sufficient 
condition for queer ecology. I do, however, trust that a robust definition of
intimacy is an important contribution along the way. 
 
PERRY ZURN
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Abstract: In his Plato or Paul: The Origins of Western Homophobia, Theodore  
W. Jennings reveals the late Plato’s Laws as a set of homophobic texts, in contrast to  
earlier writings, such as the Phaedrus, that celebrate man’s love of boys as a 
philosophical means of attaining to the ideal of Beauty. Both the lover / beloved 
structure of this love, and Plato’s late exiling of same-sex sex from the ideal state (as went 
the poet before it), leaves queer sex in a pickle. My project asks three questions, prompted 
by Jennings’ careful scholarship: first, how might queer erotic practices transform the 
lover / beloved relationship; second, how might one wrest the capital “B” from “Beauty” 
to cultivate philosophical-erotic work and play that transforms singularities, eradicating 
the alienating and homogenizing Ideal; and third, what precisely are we doing when we 
philosophize and perform practices that the Laws suggests are “unthinkable”?
“As wolves love lambs so lovers love their beloveds.” ~ Plato, Phaedrus.
If hierarchical love is an old effect of grammar, and the distinction between 
lover and beloved potentially undecidable, how lone of a she-wolf am I? Once 
one destabilizes the distinction, is there indeed, as Menexenus mockingly 
suggests, no friend (in love) at all? Further, in the philosophical-sexual 
movement toward beauty, if I must leave behind each beloved or be left behind 
by each lover once mine, how greatly does my loneliness increase in proportion 
to my philosophical venture? Plato would have me dropping or dropped love 
like flies to grow the plumage necessary to achieve the Ideal; I want to taste and 
watch die the feathers in each of my beddings, as Barbara Johnson translates 
Derrida’s pun on to seed and to fuck in “Plato’s Pharmacy.” 
In the interstices of the Platonic homophobic turn that Jennings 
articulates, queer sex, or to put it slightly differently, Foucault’s “bodies and 
pleasures,” disorganizes, rebecomes, twisting to fit its gradual eviction from 
human society. The subject of this sex(uality or ~ ies) is rendered increasingly 
animal to the point, almost, of inexpressability: even in (dubious) companioned 
ascent toward the Ideal, lover and beloved “share” the same plumage because of 
their love; the more hierarchical view renders the lover a wolf seducing a lamb. 
What Jill Johnston calls “lesbian chauvinism,” what Virgil W. Brower might 
call a kind of “wolfishness,” is at best undecidable in Plato’s renderings of  
same-sex sexing. Given the impossibility of sexual equality in his Laws, O wolf, 
O rap-tor who seizes me, what becomes of your beastialized identity when I,  
in turn, seize you?
 
She-Wolf:
                    I Want (to be Come on (to))) the (she)-wolf, or,                           
How Many Aphorisms Does it Take to Reverse Platonism? 1








If you hang me from your ceiling; if you beat long leaving heaving lashes into 
the curve of my back until I scream: I seek, O anonymous Athenian, I seek a 
certain rap-tor. I am a lovely shepherd boy; I’ll tell you my Greek nom de plume 
if through this rape, this rap-ture, O my raptor, we can wrest Beauty down 
from the sky in a double-reversal of Platonism:
First, rather than swimming in Diotima’s absolute “sea of beauty,” we 
must lap it up, opposing the cult of generality until we arrive at the particular; 
scratch that, the singular; scratch that, what I mean to say is that I want each 
scratch of the wolf at my back as I come to fucking count as immanently 
beautiful. This time around reversing Platonism means that every strike 
across my ass undoes the “process of abstraction from the imperious and… 
inconvenient insistence of the body” (Jennings). 
Second: The inculcation of “common fame” prescribed in the Laws 
renders anything other than the same-sex taboo “unthinkable,” making sex 
and philosophy, making queer philosophy a secret, a practice of secrets in a 
closet. Plato’s homogeneous prescription for society exiles the “what if it were 
otherwise” of our illustrious keynote (Golding); exiles to the unthinkable his, 
or his Socrates’ own fuck-until-you-sweat-philosophy scenario.
Without this, I am alone. In the wake of fuck-philosophy, the only practice 
left for me? To sex that unthinkable with which he formed society. The only 
remaining practice for a she-wolf stripped of bedding-beauty is to fuck the 
law(s) themselves until she wrings water from stone. 
 
SAR AH MANN O’DONNELL
1. A response to Theodore W. Jennings’ Plato or Paul: The Origins of Western Homophobia  
(Cleveland, The Pilgrim Press, 2009). Presented in the roundtable “The Platonic Invention of the  
Closet,” in collaboration with the Paul of Tarsus Working Interdisciplinary Group, at Queer(ing) Poetics: 
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Taken from the text, Brower writes: The crux of Jenning’s argument is his reading of 
Plato’s Laws, showing how the tolerance of same-sex relations in the earlier Platonic 
dialogues is called into question, if not utterly condemned and rejected in this, one of  
his later ones. Jennings offers insightful historical and political motivations as to why 
this Platonic anomaly may have come about. If you think you know your Plato (or 
would like to) and have swallowed the standard talking-points served up by so many 
university-level Introduction to Philosophy classes (including some of my own) about how 
open and friendly Platonic philosophy is to homosexuality (if such a word can be used 
here) or homophilia (for lack of a better word), then the first 50 pages of Jenning’s book 
is a must-read. You must read it, like: tonight. The image of the de facto gay-friendly 
Plato is all the more dangerous because it is so tacitly presupposed ~ so uncritically 
accepted ~ that it seems almost genetically to pass down through the educated classes. 
And at the very least, regardless of the Christian apologetics he seems at times to slip 
into for better or worse, Jennings’ text is a remarkable success insofar as he makes a very 
strong case in very few pages, rendering accessible to a wide audience (at least those  
with ears to hear) all the tools necessary to overcome this crippling naïveté. To out  
Plato: he, who very well may have invented the closet, as, himself, a closet-homophobe  
is utterly scandalous and utterly necessary and for that Ted [Jennings] deserves our 
attention and applause.
In the case of attentat sans violence, the offense in which the police have 
been unable to find anything, nothing at all, in that case the criminal 
is simply a criminal because he is criminal, because he has those tastes. 
~ Guy Hocquenghem
1
      
But Christianity can also be so lenient or flavoured with sweetness 
that all the attempts to perk up the appetite and give people a taste for 
it…are futile and end up making people disgusted with it. No, there 
must be salt in the food. And the New Testament really takes care of 




1. Guy Hocquenghem, “The Danger of Child Sexuality,” trans Alan Sheridan in Foucault Live: 
Collected Interviews, 1961-1984, (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), 268.
2. Søren Kierkegaard, “Judge for Yourself! For Self-Examination Recommended to the Present Age” in Kierkegaard’s Writings, Vol. X XI For Self-Examination / Judge For Yourself!, trans Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong. Hong, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 203.
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I relish my reading of this text, Plato or Paul?: The Origins of Western  
Homophobia,3 which I believe deserves to be placed alongside Peter Brown’s  
The Body and Society as a dangerous supplement to The History of Sexuality 
project set in motion by Michel Foucault. It is a genealogy of morals in every 
sense. (Or, maybe more so in one specific sense than the other senses.) It is 
difficult to respond critically ~ or remain truly critical in one’s response ~ to a 
book with which one is in so much agreement; a sentiment I have experienced 
than once when engaging a text by Ted Jennings. So what follows is often more 
response than criticism; detours, in the Heideggerian sense. As Heidegger says 
when responding to Hölderlin, what follows are merely remarks; trying to 
attend-to a text worth attending-to. One of the most useful things you learn 
in seminary is to criticize those you adore. Criticism is the only way to take 
someone seriously. And if at times I bear my teeth, or even bite, it is with the 
same mouth that kisses. 
In one of Hélène Cixous recent novels, entitled Philippines, one finds a 
discussion between mother and daughter in which the-writer-that-Cixous-is  
discloses the taste of the letter and remarks how letters, themselves, have a 
taste:
I rang up my daughter straightaway. I wanted to share this with her… 
~ Philippine, I said, do you know what it is?
~ Philippine? No, I don’t. Do you know? …Is it something 
obscene? she suggested.
I laughed. She laughed. Something obscene? Who knows?
Then I said:
~ The almond. It’s the almond. (I meant to say: it’s the almond’s lover 
[amant] perhaps).
~ It’s an almond? How could I know this? Oh! it’s an amande written 
with an e…
~ If you write it with an a, you’ll enjoy its taste.
Rewriting a word with the letter a, of course, invokes Jacques Derrida’s 
respelling of difference. The aftertaste or foretaste of differance lingers about the 
taste of the letter a, which, itself, renders the word or name of an almond  
more enjoyable; an almond, which already has an ambiguous taste (both bitter 
3. Jennings, T. W. Plato or Paul?: The Origins of Western Homophobia, (Cleveland, The Pilgrim  
Press, 2009).
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and sweet; both male and female; the very fruit of Cixousian bisexuality: a 
hard and bitter seminal seed with an inner milky maternal sweetness). This has 
something to do with the taste of a lover; specifically a French kind of lover; 
amant. And let’s not lose track of this taste of letters and lovers shared between 
mother and daughter as we encounter Jennings’ reading of a certain Roman 
love letter about the relation between man and boy; which is to say between 
father and son; god and Jesus. (We would do well to add a few more women, 
mothers, and daughters to Jennings’ treatise, when we can.) 
As Jennings investigates the genealogy of homophobia, he displays certain 
sapience for the taste of love and letters. It is on an anonymous letter addressed 
to Diognetes (that is even speculated to be a pseudonym of the Roman emperor, 
Hadrian) that Jennings writes of a kind of savouring. The intent of the letter 
in question, written sometime in the second century of the common era, is 
“to persuade the reader that Christianity, far from being a threat to the public 
weal of the empire, is the very salt and savor of that empire.” Jennings’ reading is 
that the writer of the Diognetes letter finds a kind of Christianity to be the salt 
and savour of Rome. Jennings then emphasizes certain sections of the letter to 
illuminate this thing called “Christianity” at its most salty and savoury. 
(While I’m on the subject, I must say that I find this particular text of Jennings 
to be his most blatant apologetic for what Nietzsche calls “that stroke of genius called 
Christianity.” In other texts and on other occasions, the salt and savor of Ted Jennings 
comes across not so much as Christianity, proper, but rather more palatable entities, 
such as the gospel, or the Pauline tradition; the kind of entities that one can find 
defended by folks as diverse, atheistic, and irreligious as Heidegger, Badiou, Lacan, 
Freud, Kristeva, Derrida, or Engels. The overarching thesis of Jennings text is that 
homophobia is not so much Christian as Greek. It is the result of the bastardization  
of Paul or the gospel through the legacy of Hellenization that is apostate from their true 
textual tradition. Does this thing called Christianity deserve to be so defended? The 
very structure, title, and architectonic of the Jenning’s argument is not so much that 
homophobia isn’t Christian but that it isn’t Pauline; isn’t true to more than a very few 
scant references throughout the whole of the Hebrew Bible, nor the gospel of Matthew. 
But that’s what “Christianity” is, isn’t it?: nothing but the mutation of the gospel and 
Pauline theory by Greco-Latin thinkers and ideas.)
But back to the letter to Diognetes. The letter reads: “What the soul is to 
the body, Christians are to the world.” The god of such a world-soul acts “as 
one who saves by persuasion, not compulsion, for compulsion is no attribute  
of God.” What comes about is a relation between saving and savouring;  
between the soteriology of Diognetes and the tongue of Jennings. The salt of  
Ted Jennings is the savour of a kind of Christianity; one which seems to taste 
more savoury than sweet; more seminal than milky.
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It would be the taste of a love tradition that savours beloveds; one which 
does so by way of persuasion rather than compulsion. One of the key issues 
in Jennings’ text is to show the crucial difference between pederasty and 
paedophilia; the former as a practice of persuasion, seduction, or consent, the 
latter as one of nonconsensual predation upon pre-pubescent children. This all 
tarries upon the concept of, “the corruption of youths” or “paidophthoria,” in 
Greek. Jennings goes to great pains to show the perhaps flippant translation 
of paidophthoria as “pederasty” and how such a tactical mistranslation  
plays no small role in the instauration of a kind of double-edged ageism, the 
demonisation of consensual post-pubescent same-sex relations, and even its 
conflation into a rejection of same-sex relations, on the whole. One of the 
many tasty morsels in Jenning’s text is his disclosing of the culprits who try to 
sneak or smuggle paidophthoria, corrupting the youth (the very allegation  
levelled against Socrates), or perhaps what would best be translated as  
paedophilia (a breed of non-consensual pre-pubescent child abuse) into the  
Ten Commandments. The smugglers are Clement of Alexandria, Barnabas, 
and the Didache (the teaching of the twelve disciples). “Of course in no known 
version of the Bible does such a commandment anywhere appear.” 4 Leave  
that to Leviticus.
The crux of Jenning’s argument is his reading of Plato’s Laws, showing 
how the tolerance of same-sex relations in the earlier Platonic dialogues is 
called into question, if not utterly condemned and rejected in this, one of his 
later ones. Jennings offers insightful historical and political motivations as to  
why this Platonic anomaly may have come about (e.g., Sparta’s overtaking  
of Athens and the need for less passive Athenian citizens). If you think you 
know your Plato (or would like to) and have swallowed the standard  
talking-points served up by so many university-level Introduction to  
Philosophy classes (including some of my own) about how open and friendly 
Platonic philosophy is to homosexuality (if such a word can be used here) or 
homophilia (for lack of a better word), then the first 50 pages of Jenning’s 
book is a must-read. You must read it, like: tonight. The image of the de facto 
gay-friendly Plato is all the more dangerous because it is so tacitly presupposed 
~ so uncritically accepted ~ that it seems almost genetically to pass down 
through the educated classes. And at the very least, regardless of the Christian 
apologetics he seems at times to slip into for better or worse, Jennings’ text is 
a remarkable success insofar as he makes a very strong case in very few pages, 
rendering accessible to a wide audience (at least those with ears to hear) all the  
tools necessary to overcome this crippling naïveté. To out Plato: he, who very  
4. Jennings, Plato or Paul ?, 162.
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well may have invented of the closet,5 as, himself, a closet-homophobe is  
utterly scandalous and utterly necessary and for that Ted deserves our  
attention and applause. 
If we agree with Jennings argument, which I am inclined to do, the story 
doesn’t stop with Plato but would stretch further back to the gender roles 
which Plato and the Hellenics made use of to condemn same-sex relations. 
After Jennings analysis, the origins (if there are such things) of Western  
homophobia seem to be sexism; or at least different androcentrisms or 
caricatures of womanhood present in both the Greek and Hebrew traditions 
that either render passivity shameful and a sexual woman as only ever passive, 
or nature as the fetish of procreation rendering women as mere baby-making 
machines. Jennings, of course, understands this and speaks of it. But the point 
would be that the arche-homophobe, be it Plato or the writer of Leviticus, is 
always already dependent on the gender stereotypes which they in turn can  
use or abuse. 
And it must never be forgotten (and I’m not suggesting that Jennings has 
forgotten this) that it is not so much that Plato is the homophobe but rather 
the anonymous “Athenian” in Plato’s Laws. Derridean that he is, Jennings 
knows better than most how gifted, clever, and complicated a writer Plato is. 
Jennings seems to suffer a certain Clementine disease. Just as Clement of  
Alexandria ~ in his textual engagement with the gospel ~ had to acquiesce that 
Jesus wasn’t married, but still tries to make the case that Paul also was  
married (a untenable claim!), Jennings ~ in his careful and responsible textual 
engagement with the Laws ~ also has to acquiesce that it is the Athenian who 
is homophobic, yet he still makes the case that Plato also was homophobic. Ecce 
homo: Jennings of Alexandria! Is he trapped in an unjust synecdochal machine? 
If not a blatant logical fallacy of composition, confusing a part of Plato with the 
whole of Plato? Is it merely because it would sell fewer copies that this text is 
not entitled, The Anonymous Athenian or Paul? But I should not be unfair. 
At times Jennings does talk of homophobia as a “position that Plato…put 
in the mouth of the Athenian.” 6 Jennings takes great pleasure in putting things 
in and pulling things out of the mouths of others. It is one of his tropes that 
one can trace back as early as his 1988 text called Liturgy of Liberation in which 
he endeavours to take the act of forgiveness out of the mouths of priests.
But as fabulous as Jennings’ reading of Plato is I’m more struck by his 
reading of Xenophon’s version of the Symposium, specifically the importance of 
the kiss. Xenophon’s Socrates addresses the erotic expressions of the  
same-sex couple, Clinias and Critobulus, by stating that the latter has even  
5. Jennings, Plato or Paul ?, 50. 
6. Jennings, Plato or Paul?, 56.
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kissed Clinias, and nothing is a fiercer inducement to love than that. It’s an 
insatiable thing, and it produces a kind of delicious anticipation. That’s why I say 
that anyone who wants to be able to behave responsibly ought to refrain from 
kissing the young and attractive.” Jennings follows his quotation with his own 
question: “Is this to be taken ironically, or does it presage something  
more critical?” 7 I’d like to invite him, today, to say more about the answer to 
this question, if he has one. I was not quite sure if the possible presaging of  
something more critical comes three pages later when he mentions that  
another of Xenophon’s characters kisses one of the dancing girls at the  
symposium and that this may be a kind of “reprogramming of same-sex love 
into heterosexual desire.” 8 That’s crucial enough. 
Perhaps it is because consummation of same-sex love is to become so 
shameful in Xenophon that any inducement to consummation by kissing is 
what makes it so crucial since Jennings’ discussion moves to the  
shamefulness of gratifying sexual desires which should remain in anticipation. 
If you don’t kiss, then the love is not delicious enough to act further on;  
something found in Phaedrus’ account of Achilles and Patroclus in Plato’s 
Symposium as though “they were lovers, but they didn’t have sex.” 9 Jennings 
calls this, for good reason, “hermeneutical bravado.” And if such hermeneutical 
bravado assumes that Achilles and Patroclus did not have sex because they 
did not kiss, it renders all the more striking how Kleist has Achilles be kissed 
to death (so to speak) not by a same-sex partner, but by a woman, Penthesilea, 
Queen of the Amazons. The kiss is delicious anticipation, but it is delicious.  
As such, kissing annuls responsibility in that it induces one to love; to love 
further than mere kissing. If only kissing could take the place of sexual love.  
As Freud says, “It’s a shame I can’t kiss myself.” One can only miss such  
kisses. But if consummation is being used to shame same-sex desire, then 
resistance to such shame-mongering would endeavour above all things to kiss 
often and to kiss hard. 
 If it is the delicious aspect of kissing that moves honourable anticipation 
into shameful consummation, then perhaps one should kiss less delicious parts; 
kissing something more bitter than sweet; or, better, perhaps placing a dollop 
of the sweet and delicious on (or in) what are alleged to be the bitterest  
of places. Such possibilities lead us to Jennings’ quick mention of the Roman 
repugnance of oral sex, which seems to have everything to do with the 
unnaturalness of sexuality not aimed at procreation; what Plato referred to as 
“its wasting of the seed of life on a stony and rocky soil” and what will come to 
7. Jennings, Plato or Paul?, 53.
8. Jennings, Plato or Paul?, 56.
9. Jennings, Plato or Paul?, 55.
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be, much later, what Philo condemns as sowing seeds “in ponds or mountain 
streams instead of the plains,” which he considers one does when having sex 
with a menstruating woman. We should not overlook that, as such, oral sex 
can serve as both a hetero- and homosexual rebellion against the very tools of 
homophobia. Perhaps the strongest stance an ally can take in solidarity with 
lgbtq+ friends is with the tongue. Licking, kissing, sucking, and all forms of the 
‘-linguses’ of oral sexualities would become efficacious political resistances to 
vanilla intolerances. (Not that vanilla can’t be delicious.) 
The Encratite were an early Christian group that forbade all kinds of 
sexual intercourse; for example, Tatian (who may have been a student of Justin 
Martyr). For the Encratite, pederasty, adultery, and sex, in general, are all 
deplorable. But I do not think it responsible (perhaps Jennings has suffered too 
many kisses) to say, as he does about Tatian, that “it was not a problem to class 
marriage along with adultery and the corruption (or rape) of youths, since it 
was all the same for him.” 10 Converse accident: Just because the celibates may be 
forced to look down on all forms of sexual intercourse, it does not necessarily 
follow that they think, by consequence, that rape and consensual sex are  
“all the same.”
Jennings addresses the Roman dread of oral sex twice. First, it follows  
one of Seutonius’ account of Tiberius, who is alleged to have trained  
“little boys, whom he called his ‘minnows,’ to…get between his legs [while he 
was swimming] to lick and nibble him.” 11 This implicates Tiberius in both 
paedophilia and the unnaturalness of oral sex, making oral sex guilty by 
association; a tactic used throughout Jennings’ genealogy of homophobia that 
often uses guilt by association as a red herring to condemn same-sex practices 
by suggesting their proximity to bestiality, incest, (or even murder and  
genocide, in Plato). On this point, at times when Jennings highlights such  
a mismatch with incest his insistence on the mismatch seems a tacit assent  
with the mismatches that incest must be wrong; something I would not 
necessarily expect from him and that I don’t think should go without saying. 
Wouldn’t such an agreement and allowance of the de facto condemnation 
of incest (by which I mean post-pubescent and consensual sex between 
consanguineous relations) be just as deplorable as the de facto condemnation 
of same-sex eroticism?
The second address to Roman oral sex has to do with the emperor, Nero. 
Suetonius reports that “Nero practiced every kind of obscenity, and after 
defiling almost every part of his body finally invented a novel game: he  
 
10. Jennings, Plato or Paul?, 164.
11. Jennings, Plato or Paul?, 149.
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was released from a cage dressed in the skins of wild animals, and attacked 
the private parts of men and women who stood bound to stakes.” 12 Jennings 
comments that “Nero has outraged Roman sensibilities by finding a way 
to combine oral sex (repugnant to the Romans) with rape and torture (and 
execution). This is novelty by which Nero completes the work of ‘defiling  
every part of his body.’” 13
Oh, iterability! Four lines after just quoting Suetonius, Jennings 
misquotes that very quote and paints Nero in even a worse light than 
Suetonius had. 
Again, Suetonius: “defiling almost every part of his body.” 
Jennings quoting Suetonius: “defiling every part of his body.” 
Almost, Ted. It’s a Pauline disease, I suppose, to alter a citation after one 
cites it. Or maybe it’s a Matthew syndrome, who when quoting Isaiah changes 
the word “servant” to “lad” or “boy” [pais].14 Nero is not said to defile every  
part of his body but to almost defile every part of his body. After writing 
so much about smugglers, Jennings can’t resist becoming one. At least 
Jenning smuggles out rather than smuggles in, but, Jesus, why not smuggle a 
commandment or two out of the Decalogue.
In no way do I wish to defend Nero, but rather to show how Jennings, 
himself, is not immune to what he alleges against Phaedrus, earlier, as  
“hermeneutic bravado.” It should not go without saying that Nero is  
combining oral sex with anything at all. Nero could sew his mouth shut and 
would still be able to attack “the private parts of men and women” if only  
with his hands and penis. Of course it could be a description of oral sex,  
but it doesn’t necessarily have to be. I make this observation on two points.  
First, I think my reading of Suetonius, here, is indicative of the kind of  
apologetic hermeneutics Ted makes when trying to offer alternative readings 
of someone like Paul (e.g. on nature). Secondly, that even in Nero ~ the most 
obscene of the obscene ~ Suetonius yet gives us hope that not all parts of the 
body are defiled. In those of us who defile almost every part of our body, there 
is perhaps one part that resists and that part of the body, I would suggest,  
could be the tongue. The point is not that the tongue is beyond defilement,  
but rather that it can accomplish things, in a very singular way, that no other  
sense-organ or appendage can. It renders the mouth neither simply an orifice,  
nor itself as simply an appendage. The tongue can play the game of penetration  
and at the same time refuse to penetrate. It can be inside or outside. It discloses 
that the inside is the outside. It can lick and nibble on the surface or stretch  
12. Jennings, Plato or Paul?, 151-2.
13. Jennings, Plato or Paul? Ibid. 
14. Jennings, Plato or Paul?, 171.
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and strain to the depths. The tongue is the surface, itself. That stroke of  
genius called the salt and savour of Rome by Jennings, as well as that saltiness  
Kierkegaard discerns and encourages others to savour in a Christianity-to-come 
(which, thereby, arouses or seduces in different ways) cannot be relished 
without “the salt and savour” of Ted Jennings. 
 
VIRGIL BOWER 
VIRGIL BOWER | JENNUFLECTINGS II










SHEENA CALVERT & JOSEPH BISAT MARSHALL
Abstract: Design is the paradigmatic space of encounter between form and function, 
rationality and sensuality, objectivity and subjectivity. To design a book or a journal 
which includes text and image, without privileging one over the other, or without 
relinquishing any of those concerns requires an especially subtle choreography between 
all these attributes, in addition to re-staging research as an expression of risk. One could 
say every design is ‘an event’, one which allows each aspect to play its part and for each 
to be acknowledged and seen as important. As the chains of equivalence and points of 
divergence between and amongst these aspects is not always exposed or evident, these 
remarks are intended as an exposé of the process and decisions undertaken in the course 
of the design at hand. This is especially important when working on a brief as complex 
as that of Zetesis, which, by its very conceptualisation and content, intends to expose the 
cruelty of the classical canon.1 
“Language is the material of sense.” ~ Hannah Lammin.
2 
 
With and Against the Canon
The designer and typographer are always mediating the ~ sometimes  
conflictual ~ attributes noted above, while at the same time attempting to  
negotiate between the needs and desires of readers; researchers and a highly 
regarded academic publishing house, whose concerns are for clarity of 
communication, rigour and solid evidence of research, all of which can and 
should be expressed in and by the design.
Canons are comforting. They refer to well trodden paths and known 
entities. In any field of inquiry, canons of knowledge become the dominant 
force in any encounter we may have with the work before us: they are the 
memories we don’t even realise we have, drawing us inexorably towards the 
known ground of our intellectual and aesthetic endeavours.  They enframe us, 
even as we attempt to depart from them. They are inevitable. Even welcome, 
since without something to break away from, we have no ground from which 
to depart; no limit to transgress. 
1. The classical canons of design are many; they include the Golden Section (Phi, 1.86), which 
forms the basis of the ‘canons of page construction’ for books, from the Medieval period. ‘There was a 
time when deviations from the truly beautiful page proportions 2:3, 1:√3, and the Golden Section were 
rare. Many books produced between 1550 and 1770 show these proportions exactly, to within half a 
millimeter’. Jan Tschichold, The Form of the Book, (Hartley & Marks, 1991). The Western canon is the 
dominant literary force, shaping cultural and intellectual priorities, and design is an ally to the  
dissemination of such a canon through its role in typography and book design. 






“By all means break the rules, and break them beautifully, deliberately 
and well.” 3 ~ Robert Bringhurst, The Elements of Typographic Style.
As Robert Bringhurst suggests, these concerns are especially true of typography 
~ an art which is both scientific and poetic. It embraces and exemplifies the 
dualities of exactitude and expression, subjectivity and objectivity, respect 
for rules, and risk. Whilst reaching for the elusive goal of transparency ~ for 
the ‘window’ which Beatrice Warde and other typographic purists have 
coveted ~ typography is always already a form of mediation: it exists as a 
physical interface between ourselves and meaning, and in doing so it plays a 
part in constructing that meaning.4 However, even a crystal clear window has 
a presence, albeit a subtle one. Without material text[s] on paper, or screen, 
the event of written language; its performativity, its presence, would not exist 
and the force of these thoughts would remain mute. In its role as the concrete 
form of language, typography is the constant reminder that meaning is made, 
not pre-given: it ‘matters’, in every sense and nuance of that statement; its 
materiality is a fact, and a partner in the experience of reading. Typography 
is also a micro and macro art. To see the whole performance across a series of 
pages, as an event of reading, is as important as being aware of the details of an 
em-dash, chosen for its slightly queer curvature, or the slight deviations from 
the canon which Goudy ~ the typeface used here ~ implies; with its enchanted 
oddities, graceful and misbehaving.  
There are parallels with philosophy, wherein the overall argument 
needs to be seen in relation to the details of linguistic expression and 
rhetorical phraseology. The very form[s] of language become the texture of 
the argument, just as the typeface forms the texture of the page. Philosophy 
and its manifestation through typography and design are intimately entwined, 
and need to be brought into constant relation as a seamless presentation of 
form and content ~ even where even visual dissonance is the counterpart to 
philosophical argument. These are subtle questions, and ones that are not so 
evident to the untrained eye. However, the typeface chosen for Zetesis, and 
the subtleties of typographic detail are not accidental, nor are they arbitrary. 
They attempt to pay homage to the richness and detail of philosophical 
exposition in all its forms, and to actively work with, and not against, those 
3. Robert Bringhurst, The Elements of Typographic Style, (Hartley & Marks, Canada, 4th edition, 
2012), 10.
4. Beatrice Warde, The Crystal Goblet, (London: Sylvan Press, 1955). We refer here to Beatrice 
Warde’s essay on typography “The Crystal Goblet”, which was first delivered as a talk entitled “Printing 
Should be Invisible”, first given to the British Typographer’s Guild at the St. Bride Institute in London, 
October 7th, 1930. The essay’s title refers to the clearest vessel of wine as a metaphor for the role of the 
printed word as providing no obstruction to the presentation of content.
ZETESIS VOL. 1, NO. 1
SHEENA CALV ERT & JOSEPH BISAT MARSHALL | DESIGNING ATONAL RHY THMS
myriad expressions of conceptual content, while being a ‘window’ which is 
acknowledged as both crystal clear and fully present. 
We opened these remarks by claiming that there is no full objectivity 
in any design, but only a series of subjective choices that make the human 
presence felt. Design is a human activity, full of ambiguities, inflections, and 
contradictions, wherein technology is only ever a means, and the allure of 
its deterministic rationality is but a chimera. Subjectivity makes design an 
especially demanding encounter and negotiation between the reader and the 
author; one in which the designers’ hand is always present as a third party, or 
a silent interlocutor. With this in mind, within this design we have tried to 
navigate these poles and the differing requirements of the present context,  
with a steady hand, a human eye for detail, and the potential for gently 
critiquing the canon while acknowledging its persistent force and presence,  
and its defining role. 
This is how we resolved the brief given to us by a journal whose unusual 
remit for presenting the intersecting landscapes of art, philosophy and science 
privileges research generated by curiosity. First, we removed the images from 
the main part of the journal and set them into a separate insert as a remark on 
the ways in which artwork and text, the discursive and the figural, both diverge 
and differ between themselves while at the same exact time create dialogue and 
‘make’ sense (differently).5 These artworks, seen as a group, with their associated 
texts, are tangentially linked, through something akin to the philosophical 
aesthetic of Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, one where the narrative is about difference, 
not identity, and about the non-equivalent in place of a sequential narrative.6 
The images play differently in this space, and take up Paul Klee’s call not 
to reproduce what we can already see, but to make visible what we cannot. 
Deleuze states this as ‘rendering visible forces that are not themselves visible,’ 7 
which shares the aim of philosophy to ask ‘How can we see what we did not  
see before’? 8  
In the drawing together of images and artworks which support the 
philosophical departure points presumed by those questions, we posed another 
series of interrelated questions, which made sense in terms of the subversive 
and sensual forces of art, and the different logic they offer. Stated differently, 
this paper-bound ‘gallery’ of images operates as a space of visual reading which 
5. On this point, see the important work by Jean-Françoise Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, trans Antony 
Hudek and Mary Lydon, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).
6. Giles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, introduction by Constantin Boundas, trans Mark Lester and 
Charles Stivale, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
7. Deleuze Gilles, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans Daniel W. Smith, (London:  
Continuum, 2003).
8. Ibid.
invites a mediation on the ways in which images might randomly interact with 
one another, in contrast to their role as support or illustrations for texts. In 
being given an autonomous space, their treatment subverts the usual hierarchy 
of text versus image, in which text frequently wins out as the dominant 
discursive vehicles by which knowledge is disseminated. This creates a space  
for images to have an equivalent role in the communication of knowledge, 
and in posing a critique of how knowledge is formed per the canon, especially 
within the canonical object called the ‘book.’ 
We therefore invite you to “see” or “read” (or “listen to”) these images as 
forming a body of questions, not as supporting the texts within the journal, or 
operating as visual equivalents for philosophical ideas. The artworks possess 
their own dynamic force-field; one related, but not secondary, to the textual 
content which either accompanies them in short form, or to that of the journal. 
Image and text are not to be seen as being in opposition, but as possessing 
/ performing their own discreet mode[s] of communication, and it was this 
premise that underpinned our desire both to amplify and question the ways 
in which these modes take place. Finally, and to borrow a term from Thomas 
Hirshorn made in reference to the Gramsci Memorial, we wanted them to form 
‘precarious moments of grace,’ 9 moments in which they possess a presence of 
their own. 
We wished to enact a sub-textual intervention into questions of the canon, 
via the subtleties of punctuation rendered slightly strange, in the form of stray 
commas or wave-line em-dashes. Punctuation is a clear instance where material 
language affects the establishment of meaning in language. There are two 
kinds of punctuation, one that is rhetorical and based on pauses and breath 
(voiced); the other that is grammatical and related to the interactions of parts 
of speech (silent). Such conventions as capitalization, paragraph spacing and 
indents of course also count as punctuation, since they order the flow of ideas 
in a text. Initially, the function for which punctuation was created was purely 
rhetorical: it aided  the classical reader in knowing when to pause and where 
to place accents and inflections of voice when reading aloud from a text. It has 
become a mark of the performative in language, the vocal / acoustic, and the 
choreographic. This repertoire of marks, developed and added to over time, 
has become codified and regularised part of written language similarly moving, 
as did language, from the oral world into the silent, written world, later 
reinforcing grammatical roles, not just temporal ones. In contemporary times, 
the syntactical role of punctuation has entered yet another phase, the result 
9. See Thomas Hirschhorn’s, Gramsci Monument, in the Forest Houses; the Bronx. Through the 
artist being present, and producing something (in this case, public art), Hirschhorn seeks to create such 
‘precarious moments of grace’ from the temporary alignment of the produced and the observer, who 
needs to be both present and ‘awake’ to the potential of the work. 
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of the standardization and control of language made possible (and politically 
deemed necessary) by the new technology of printing. This shift has profoundly 
affected thought and reorganized our relationship to language (and language 
to itself) in ways which have deep implications for knowledge gained through 
the written form, and for the canonical object we call ‘the book’: that sequence 
of pages which are punctuated by the rhythms of material language in familiar 
and standardized ways; in turn regulating meaning and its association with the 
establishment of truth. 
In Zetesis, by disrupting the strictly linear ‘movement’ of language, 
through turned letters and strange punctuation, we sought to disrupt its 
ordinary rhythms, and to perform a different ‘movement’: one which is closer 
to the non-structures of improvisation than conventional musical form. We 
have therefore, by analogy, ‘punctuated’ the typographic and compositional 
rhythms of this book, differently, with a view to exposing and complementing 
the atonal and non-conventional forms of thought presented here, in a move 
which constitutes both an acceptance of the necessity of the canon, and at 
the same time, its refusal. Zetesis celebrates the paradoxical, a-logical, sensual 
characteristics of language, freed from the necessities of instrumentality, 
by  ‘playing’ it slightly differently. We have therefore included within these 
pages some subtle and hidden calls to think again about how design can create 





Speaking of the relationship between music and language, Adorno states that 
music, along with syntax, and formal structures, employs “a temporal sequence 
of articulated sounds which are more than just sounds.” 10 Unlike language, 
music does not possess an external ‘signified’ and in this sense, music remains 
non-conceptual. Adorno points out the non-identical nature of music and 
language: Music and language, while possessing similar attributes, divide along 
the fault-line of “intentionality”, or instrumentality. However, he goes on to 
say that albeit specific concepts may not emerge from tonality, still a kind of 
spaciality can be articulated.  This spatiality is shown by repetitive sequences, 
and harmonic figures which reappear, and become, as he puts it, ‘universal 
ciphers’. Adorno suggests further that when contextualized, these figures and 
sequences in turn provide a certain kind of space. Thus he writes:
 
10. T. W. Adorno, Music and Language: A Fragment, Quasi una Fantasia, Essays on Modern Music, 
Theodor W. Adorno. Trans Rodney Livingstone, (Verso, London, New York: 2012), 1. 
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“Space for musical specificity, just as concepts do for a particular 
reality, and at the same time, as with language, their abstractness 
[is] redeemed by the context in which they [are] located. The only 
difference is that the identity of these musical concepts [lies] in their 
own nature and not in a signified outside them.” 11
 
 
In a somewhat similar vein, one could characterise Nietzsche’s re-staging of 
philology as emulating or, indeed being considered, a kind of ‘musical event,’ 
where the lyrical timbre of his pacings, punctuations and arguments allowed 
one to understand the nuance of an argument by treating philology ‘musically’.12 
Another way of saying this might be that language is to be viewed as an 
instrument, rather than as instrumental, one that we must to learn to play well.
In a related but different sense, Andrei Igamberdiev, speaking of  
Beethoven’s Grosse Fugue begins to develop the relation of text to dissonance  
and dissonance to the double fugue. Described in its own time as 
‘incomprehensible’, the Grosse Fugue challenged the prevailing musical 
canons. The Fugue’s dark, complex tones and lack of harmonic resolution, are 
singularly uncompromised and complex. As a piece of music, which actively 
embraces counterpoint, and which consists of multiple movements within a 
single large movement, Stravinsky called it “an absolutely contemporary piece 
of music that will be contemporary forever.” 13 
The linguistic analogy could be made through conversation, where 
elements enter and depart with extreme suddenness, the composer / performer 
adding and subtracting fragments from the main theme at breakneck speed 
and in multiple layers and in plural times. The word Fugue comes from the 
Latin ‘to flee’ and the ‘event’, where sudden, unexpected, changes and shifts in 
the movement of the music are the motor-force. The Grosse Fugue is incomplete, 
self-referential, and recursive; its form and structure is neither finite nor 
expressly infinite, but the tension between the two keeps the movement and 
dynamic of the music alive, just as the tension between the dynamics of white 
space, typography and their counterpoint rhythms keeps the page alive.14  
11. Ibid., 2.
12. Friedrich Nietzsche, Diaries B. 3, 257; Dec. 21, 1871. See in particular where he writes:  
“Everything that [… ] cannot be understood in relation to music engenders […] downright aversion  
and disgust in me.” Cited in Rüdiger Safranski, Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography, 2002  
(W. W. Norton, USA), 19.
13. Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, Dialogues and a Diary (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 24.
14. Jan Tschichold, having set in motion the precepts for an entirely new form of modernist 
typography in his book Asymmetric Typography, (Faber, 1967), which was considered highly radical at that 
time, stated: ‘White space is to be regarded as an active element, not a passive background,’. However, 
he returned in the late 1930s to the classical, symmetrical canon of typographic design, subsequently 
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This is precisely what we have tried to generate within the two different 
bounded bodies of Zetesis, Vol. 1 ~ a way of writing, and indeed reading, that 
is closer to music ~ a kind of dark fugue ~ rather than to writing per se. For 
the classical canon has the capacity to be cruel, to be the enemy of the arts, to 
be an omnipotent ‘mop’ of creative juices; upholding tidiness as though the 
same as rigorous experimentation; or complete transparency as equivalent to 
communication. This is particularly the case with certain kinds of design ~ 
where the canon can belie or smother certain forms of thought, imagination, 
originality and understanding through a kind of generic massification of well-
trodden typographic paths that feign openness, but instead can amass a whole 
series of judgments that quietly weigh on any interpretative reading. 
However, as design is also always a collaborator in thought, and practice, 
~ a partner in meaning, a vital organ in the body of this book ~ there has 
been an opportunity to seek out the (sometimes) illusive openings where we 
can begin a rewriting of the canon in the most sensitive of ways. To design 
within the odd, new parameters that Zetesis has demanded, has required a 
particular turn to the carnal connections of the body, a connection formed 
through a fundamental knowing of rhythm: to move through choreographed 
pages, each one an attempt at conveying not only information and concept of 
the research to hand, but the rhythmic experience of postulating time, timing, 
and temporally induced spaces. For on the stage created by ‘the book’, there is 
no page considered in isolation. The publication in its entirety is a continuous 
stream of coming and goings, of concepts, remarks, events, just past, just 
present, just about-to-happen. 
This design-concept of rhythm is one that negates repetitive sameness 
as its principle concern. We would like to suggest that an ‘atonal’ rhythm 
is required, one that is similarly comprised of repeating elements (as is the 
necessity of ‘the book’ as collective material), but one that is given freedom in 
the spaces around these elements. Here, edges are no longer considered as rigid 
structure and the distance in between is no longer confined to the regular beat 
of the interval. We might image this as a camouflage pattern, which by its very 
nature is ideal for the inconspicuous inserting of subverted elements. 
To understand design in this way is, in the same breath, to understand 
design in harmonious coexistence with canonical thought. Just as a grouping of 
sounds is not dictated by the relation between sounds, so too the formation of 
design elements is not dictated with purely self-referential consideration.  
An atonal rhythm is made manifest by one that must dance always at its side. 
expounding the virtues of classicism in both typography and page layout. He later worked for Penguin 
Publishing. See also The Form of the Book, Essays on the Morality of Good Design (Hartley & Marks, 1996). 
Tschichold was described as an ‘apostate’ for having initially championed and then rejected the ‘New 
Typography’ as it had become known.
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The canonical rhythms that refer to the accumulated knowledge of thousands 
of years of historical and cultural progress in design are not only present, but 
essential to the cohesion of otherwise decontextualized elements. Intelligent 
listening and active participation is required in the formation of a structure 
that is to call itself ‘rhythmic’,15 without the canon there is no communal 
dialogue, there can be no space to experience the ‘beat’.
This ensemble of writing / reading / listening existing as it does, linked 
together by a variety of voices, is presented with an atonal beat layered as 
a participant in the subversion of existing patterns ~ a kind of atonality 
that flows throughout as a slightly roguish disturber of the peace. There are 
places within the design where elements have been toppled, snapped and 
flourished in new ways to cloud Warde’s infamous crystal goblet; to give the 
musculature of design its visibility without disrupting the necessary comfort 
zones too much.16 It may simply be a ‘backwards’ page number or an irregular 
alignment of titles; one might follow the line of a lowercase g, its tail flowing 
ana-fractuously from its body, and be made aware of a unique eccentricity in 
the form of its upward-curved ear, a single horn protruding from its head. It is 
in this world that we operate. 
Atonal design: it requires more than an audacious dive into uncharted 
and possibly murky ‘uncommunicative’ waters; it has required us to dance 
within and from the singular-plurality, to recall Jean-Luc Nancy, of rhythm.17
SHEENA CALVERT & JOSEPH BISAT MARSHALL
15. Dr. Mark Walker in conversation with Joseph Bisat Marshall, 16th September 2013. 
16. Op. cit. B. Warde, The Crystal Goblet.
17. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, (Stanford University Press, 2004). Jean-luc Nancy 
poses a new relation of the ‘I’ to the ‘we’, once drawn out through the nuances of the hyphen: 
“Being singular plural: in a single stroke, without punctuation, without a mark of equivalence,  
implication, or sequence. A single, continuous-discontinuous mark tracing out the entirety of  
the ontological domain, being-with-itself designated as the “with” of being, of the singular and 
plural, and dealing a blow to ontology—not only another signification but also another syntax.  
The “meaning of Being”: not only as the “meaning of with,” but also, and above all, as the “with”  
of meaning. Because none of these three terms precedes or grounds the other, each designates  
the co-essence of the others. This co-essence puts essence itself in the hyphenation ~ “being- 
singular-plural” ~ which is a mark of union and also a mark of division, a mark of sharing  
that effaces itself, leaving each term to its isolation and its being-with-the-others”, 37.  
We might therefore ask, what is the plural of rhythm, and what is its singular? 
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